Coker v. Georgia case brief

Coker v. Ga. case summary
33 U.S. 584

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Defendant sought review of the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction for rape and a jury-returned death sentence. The court granted defendant a writ of certiorari on the limited claim that the punishment of death for rape violates the Eighth Amendment.

FACTS:
-Defendant was convicted of rape and sentenced to death by a jury.
-The state supreme court affirmed both the conviction and sentence, and the court granted defendant's writ of certiorari for the limited purpose of determining whether a death sentence for a rape conviction violated the Eighth Amendment, which proscribed cruel and unusual punishments and which must be observed by states as well as the federal government.

HOLDING:
-After conducting an examination of recent death penalty cases that invoked the Eighth Amendment, as well as the trend of state legislatures to pass or repeal laws concerning death sentences for persons convicted of rape, the court held that a sentence of death was grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape.

ANALYSIS:
It did not matter that the Georgia statute required the existence of an aggravating circumstance in order for the jury to return a death sentence. Imposition of the death penalty for rape cases was cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Eighth Amendment.

CONCLUSION: The judgment of the state supreme court upholding the death sentence was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the court's opinion. ---
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United States v. Gementera case brief

United States v. Gementera379 F.3d 596

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
The Defendant entered into guilty plea to mail theft, a violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 1708, and appealed the judgment of the United States District Court (Northern California). The court had sentenced him to two months' incarceration as well as three years' supervised release, with a condition that he spend a day standing outside a post office wearing a signboard stating that he stole mail.

FACTS:
-Defendant pilfered letters from several mailboxes.
-He entered a guilty plea to mail theft and, as a result, was sentenced to two months' incarceration and three years' supervised release.
-One of the supervised release conditions required defendant to stand outside a post office wearing a signboard that stated that he stole mail.
-He appealed, but the court affirmed the lower court's ruling.

HOLDING:
The court held that it did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, as forbidden by the 8th Amendment, because it was in lieu of incarceration and did not exceed the bounds of "civilized standards" or other evolving standards of decency that marked the progress of a maturing society.

ANALYSIS:
The eight-hour condition did not violate the Sentencing Reform Act because the record completely established that the district court imposed the condition for the stated and legitimate statutory purpose of rehabilitation and, to a lesser extent, for general deterrence and for the protection of the public. The condition was not a stand-alone condition that was intended solely to humiliate but instead was a comprehensive set of provisions that exposed him to social disapprobation and provided an opportunity for him to repair his relationship with society.

CONCLUSION: The court affirmed the lower court's ruling.

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Gonzalez v. Thaler case brief

Gonzalez v. Thaler
132 S. Ct. 641

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied habeas relief, finding petitioner inmate's petition time-barred under 28 U.S.C.S. § 2244(d)(1)(A) in that his conviction became final when the time expired for seeking discretionary review and a later mandate's issuance was irrelevant. Certiorari was granted on whether the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction notwithstanding a 28 U.S.C.S. § 2253(c)(3) defect, and if the petition was time barred.

OVERVIEW: The certificate of appealability (COA) identified a debatable procedural ruling, but did not "indicate" the issue on which a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right had been made, as required by § 2253(c)(3). Since § 2253(c)(3) was nonjurisdictional, that defect did not deprive the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction over the appeal. Section 2253(c)(3) was nonjurisdictional. The contrast between § 2253(a), (b), (c)(1), showed that a failure to obtain a COA was jurisdictional, while a COA's failure to indicate an issue was not. Because the inmate did not appeal to the State's highest court, under § 2244(d)(1)(A), his judgment was final when his time for seeking review with the State's highest court expired. Nothing in § 2244(d)(1)(A) contemplated a conflict between the "conclusion of direct review" and the "expiration of the time for seeking such review," much less instructed that the later of the two was to prevail. An inability to initiate state habeas proceedings during Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07, § 3(a) (2011)'s six weeks did not preclude timely seeking federal relief. Thus, those six weeks were not added to the § 2244(d)(1)(A) time limit.

OUTCOME: The Court of Appeals' denial of habeas relief was affirmed. 8-1 Decision; 1 Dissent.

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Perry v. New Hampshire case brief

Perry v. New Hampshire 
132 S. Ct. 716

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner defendant was charged with unauthorized taking and criminal mischief, and he filed a motion to suppress a witness's identification on the ground that admitting it at trial would violate due process. The New Hampshire Superior Court denied the motion and a jury convicted defendant of theft. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court certiorari.

OVERVIEW: Defendant was arrested and charged with unauthorized taking and criminal mischief after police responded to a caller who reported that an African-American male was trying to break into cars parked outside his apartment building and the caller's wife told a police officer that she saw defendant open the trunk of a neighbor's car. Defendant moved to suppress the wife's identification, and the trial court denied the motion and convicted defendant of theft. Defendant's conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution did not require trial judges to conduct preliminary assessments of the reliability of eyewitness identifications that were made under suggestive circumstances when the circumstances were not created by law enforcement personnel. A primary aim of the line of cases which excluded eyewitness identification evidence that was obtained under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances that police created was to deter police from using improper procedures, and that rationale was inapposite in cases where there was no improper police conduct.

OUTCOME: The Supreme Court affirmed. 8-1 Decision; 1 concurrence; 1 dissent.

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Minneci v. Pollard case brief

Minneci v. Pollard case summary
132 S. Ct. 617

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Respondent prisoner in a privately operated federal prison brought an action in federal court against petitioner prison employees alleging that the employees deprived the prisoner of adequate medical care. Upon the grant of a writ of certiorari, the employees appealed the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which held that the prisoner could pursue an implied right of action under the Eighth Amendment.

FACTS: The employees contended that creating an implied action under the Eighth Amendment was not warranted in view of existing state law remedies. The prisoner argued that federal law should control based on the vagaries of different states' laws, and that state-law remedies did not provide protection based on federal constitutional rights. The U.S. Supreme Court held that no new federal remedy could be implied since state tort law authorized adequate alternative damages actions, providing both significant deterrence and compensation. The prisoner's claim focused on a kind of conduct that typically fell within the scope of traditional state tort law and, in the case of the private rather than government employees, state tort law provided an alternative, existing process capable of protecting the constitutional interests at stake. Further, it appeared that all states provided actions for a claim such as that of the prisoner, the fact that a state law might prove less generous than an implied federal action did not render the state process inadequate, and state tort law and a potential implied federal remedy were not required to be perfectly congruent.

OUTCOME: The judgment upholding an implied right of action was reversed. 8-1 Decision; 1 Concurrence; 1 Dissent.
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Cavazos v. Smith case brief

Cavazos v. Smith
132 S. Ct. 2

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Respondent inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254, asserting a claim of insufficient evidence regarding her conviction under Cal. Penal Code § 273ab. The district court denied the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed with instructions to grant the writ. Petitioner warden sought review, and certiorari was granted.

OVERVIEW: The inmate's seven-week-old grandchild died. The prosecution's three experts attested that the child's death was the result of shaken baby syndrome (SBS). One defense expert testified that the child died from old brain trauma. The other defense expert testified that the child's death was due to sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). The jury found the inmate guilty. In seeking habeas relief, the inmate argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the child died of SBS. The United States Supreme Court determined that the federal appellate court erred in granting the inmate's habeas petition because the evidence presented at trial supported the jury's decision since, inter alia, the affirmative indications of trauma formed the basis of the experts' opinion that the child died from shaking so severe that his brainstem tore. The federal appellate court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the jury on the question whether the prosecution's expert witness or the defense's expert witness more persuasively explained the cause of death.

OUTCOME: The Court granted the inmate's petition for a writ of certiorari and motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. 6-3 per curiam decision; 1 dissent.

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Missouri v. Frye case brief

Missouri v. Frye
132 S. Ct. 1399

SYNOPSIS: 
The respondent, who pleaded guilty to driving with a revoked license, filed a post-conviction relief petition alleging that his counsel's failure to inform him of a plea offer denied him Sixth Amendment effective assistance of counsel. 
A state court denied the post conviction relief petition, but the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed. Petitioner, the State of Missouri, sought review. 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.

FACTS:
After being charged with driving with a revoked license, the prosecutor sent respondent's counsel two plea bargains. 
Respondent's counsel did not advise him of the offers, which had expired. 
Prior to the preliminary hearing, the respondent was again arrested for driving with a revoked license. The respondent pleaded guilty without an agreement. 
On review, the Court reaffirmed that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance applied to the entry of a guilty plea. 

HOLDING:
The Court also held that defense counsel had a duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that might be favorable to an accused; when counsel allowed the offer to expire without advising respondent or allowing him to consider it, counsel did not render constitutionally effective assistance. 

ANALYSIS:
Under Strickland, however, the respondent had to show prejudice from the ineffective assistance. 
The Court concluded that the state appellate court erred by not requiring respondent to show not only a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the lapsed plea, but also a reasonable probability that the prosecution would have adhered to the plea and that the trial court would have accepted it.

OUTCOME: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. There was one dissent.
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Judulang v. Holder case brief

Judulang v. Holder
132 S. Ct. 476

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Petitioner alien filed an action against respondent U.S. Attorney General, seeking judicial review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) which found that the alien was ineligible to seek relief under former 8 U.S.C.S. § 1182(c) (repealed). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the alien's petition for review, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals.

FACTS: The U.S. Government initiated deportation proceedings against a resident alien who entered the United States in 1974, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in 1988, and pled guilty to a crime involving theft in 2005. The BIA applied the comparable-grounds approach in deciding whether the alien was allowed to seek relief from deportation under former § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1182(c) (repealed). The BIA found that the alien was not allowed to seek § 212(c) relief because he was being deported pursuant to 8 U.S.C.S. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for committing an aggravated felony involving a crime of violence, and the "crime of violence" deportation ground was not comparable to any ground for exclusion, including the one for crimes involving moral turpitude. The Supreme Court found that use of the comparative-grounds approach was arbitrary and capricious and violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 706(2)(A). The BIA was required to use an approach that was tied to the purposes of the immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration system, and the comparable-grounds approach had no connection to those factors.

CONCLUSION: The Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case. Unanimous decision.
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Florence v. Board Of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington case brief

Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders
Citation: 132 S. Ct. 1510

CASE SYNOPSIS:
A district court granted summary judgment to petitioner former detainee in a 42 U.S.C.S. §1983 action against defendant jail officials in which he alleged both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations.
The district court ruled that "strip-searching" non-indictable offenders (NIO) without reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's ruling.
The court granted Certiorari.

FACTS:
In this case, deference was to be given to jail officials unless there was substantial evidence showing that their response to the situation was exaggerated.
Concerns about gang members provided a reasonable basis in order to justify a visual inspection for signs of gang affiliation during jail intake.
Detecting contraband concealed by new detainees was a very serious responsibility.
The seriousness of an offense was found to be a poor predictor of who had contraband, and it was said that this would be difficult in practice in order to determine whether individual detainees fell within the proposed NIO exemption.
Offenders could be put at heightened risk from more contraband being brought in, which was a substantial reason not to mandate an exception for NIOs or for those who were not charged with an offense that involved a weapon or drugs as a matter of constitutional law.
The officers that conducted a preliminary search often had no access to criminal history records, as the detainee's rap sheet did not reflect his previous arrest for deadly weapons possession(s).
The search procedures to which the petitioner was subjected struck a reasonable balance between both inmate privacy as well as the needs of the jail.
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments did not require the adoption of an exemption for NIOs.

CONCLUSION: The Third Circuit's judgment, that reversed the prior ruling that "strip-searching" nonindictable offenders without reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment, was affirmed by the court.
5-4 Decision; 2 concurrences; 1 dissent.

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Green v. Fisher case brief

Green v. Fisher case summary
132 S. Ct. 38

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner prisoner was convicted in state court of murder, robbery, and conspiracy, but the prisoner asserted that the prosecution improperly introduced redacted confessions of nontestifying codefendants in their joint trial. Upon the grant of a writ of certiorari, the prisoner appealed the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which upheld a denial of the prisoner's habeas corpus petition.

OVERVIEW: The prisoner's direct appeal of his conviction was denied and, before the state's highest court rejected a further appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision which barred the use of redacted confessions of nontestifying codefendants. The prisoner contended that, when his conviction became final with the rejection of his appeal by the state's highest court, the use of the redacted confessions was contrary to clearly established federal law, thus warranting habeas corpus relief. The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held, however, that under 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(d)(1) clearly established federal law included only the Court's decisions issued before the relevant adjudication of the merits of the prisoner's claim, regardless of when the prisoner's conviction became final. The direct appeal was thus the relevant adjudication of the merits, and the preclusion of the redacted confessions was not clearly established federal law at the time of the adjudication.

OUTCOME: The judgment upholding the denial of the prisoner's habeas corpus petition was affirmed.

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Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid case brief

Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid 132 S. Ct. 680

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Respondent widow sought benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C.S. § 901 et seq., after her husband was killed in an accident while working onshore. An administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed her claim, and the U.S. Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board affirmed. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

FACTS: The widow's husband worked for a company that operated two drilling platforms on the outer Continental Shelf (OCS), and he performed most of his duties on those platforms. However, he was killed in a forklift accident while working at the company's facility onshore. After an ALJ and the U.S. Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board rejected the widow's request for compensation, the Ninth Circuit held that the widow could receive compensation under the LHWCA and 43 U.S.C.S. § 1333(b) if she could establish that there was a "substantial nexus" between her husband's death and the company's extractive operations on the OCS. The Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit's "substantial nexus" test was faithful to the text of § 1333(b), and it adopted that test over the "but for" test which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted in Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore Service, Inc., and the "situs-of-injury" test which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted in Mills v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs.

HOLDING:
A remand to the Board to apply the "substantial nexus" test, in the first instance, was an appropriate disposition.

RULES:
The "substantial-nexus" test which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted in Valladolid v. Pac. Operations Offshore, LLP is faithful to the text of 43 U.S.C.S. § 1333(b). The test requires an injured employee to establish a significant causal link between the injury that he suffered and his employer's on-outer Continental Shelf operations conducted for the purpose of extracting natural resources from the outer Continental Shelf. Although the Ninth Circuit's test may not be the easiest to administer, it best reflects the text of § 1333(b), which establishes neither a situs-of-injury nor a "but for" test. Whether an employee injured while performing an off-outer Continental Shelf task qualifies is a question that will depend on the individual circumstances of each case.

CONCLUSION: The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. 9-0 Decision; 2 concurrences.

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CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood case brief

CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood 132 S. Ct. 665

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Respondent consumers filed a class action against petitioners, a credit corporation and a bank, claiming that petitioners violated the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), 15 U.S.C.S. § 1679 et seq. The district court denied petitioners' motion to compel arbitration, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

FACTS: The consumers applied for credit cards marketed by a corporation and issued by a bank, and they signed agreements that required them to resolve any claim, dispute, or controversy relating to their account by binding arbitration. The consumers filed a class action against the corporation and the bank, claiming that they were charged fees that reduced their credit limit and were misled when they were told they could use the credit card to rebuild poor credit, and the district court denied the corporation and bank's motion for an order requiring the consumers to submit their claims to arbitration. The Supreme Court found that because the CROA was silent on whether claims under the CROA could be resolved by arbitration, the Federal Arbitration Act required that the arbitration agreements the consumers signed be enforced according to their terms.

HOLDING:
The Court rejected the consumers' claim that because 15 U.S.C.S. § 1679c gave consumers the "right to sue" and 15 U.S.C.S. § 1679f prohibited the waiver of any right consumers had under the CROA, the arbitration agreements in question were not enforceable. Section 1679c did not give consumers the right to bring an action in a court of law.

CONCLUSION: The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case. 8-1 Decision; 2 concurrences; 1 dissent.

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Golan v. Holder case brief

Golan et al. v. Holder case brief summary and case notes

132 S. Ct. 873

CASE SYNOPSIS:
Petitioners, who were reproducers of foreign works in the public domain, brought an action against respondent U.S. Attorney General alleging that §514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which had granted copyright protection to the foreign works, was unconstitutional.
The reproducers were granted certiorari, and appealed the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit which ruled that §514 did not violate the U.S. Constitution.

CASE FACTS:
The reproducers argued that §514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which allowed copyrights to works in the public domain, exceeded the copyright authority of Congress under Article I of the U.S. Constitution, § 8, cl. 8.
It was also argued that granting the copyrights to works which were previously reproduced without limit had violated the reproducers rights to free speech under the First Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that §514 was valid and had properly implemented an international treaty that was aimed to protect the foreign works.
The congressional authority to regulate copyright protection did not exclude application of such protection to works in the public domain nor did it require that works remain in the public domain. The requirement that the term of a copyright be limited remained applicable after the copyrights were granted.
Also, the historical practice of Congress included the protection of works that were previously unprotected, and the copyrights themselves served the objectives of constitutional copyright authority. Also, the idea/expression distinction and the fair use doctrine served as accommodations to the reproducers' freedom of speech.
The reproducers had no vested rights in works in the public domain which were not subject to ownership rights.

CONCLUSION: The court affirmed the judgment upholding the constitutionality of §514. 6-2 Decision; 1 Dissent.

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Howes v. Fields case brief

Howes v. Fields case summary
132 S. Ct. 1181

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.S. §2254(d)(1).
The court held that respondent inmate's interrogation was a "custodial interrogation" under Miranda because removal to a prison conference room and questioning about conduct that occurred outside the prison made any such interrogation custodial per se.
The petitioner, a warden, sought review and certiorari was granted.

ANALYSIS:

• The United States Supreme Court had expressly declined to adopt a per se rule. 
• Standard prison conditions and restrictions did not necessarily implicate the same interests that Miranda sought to protect. 
• Thus, being in prison, without more, was not enough to constitute Miranda custody. 
• Taking the inmate to a conference room, as opposed to questioning him in the presence of fellow inmates, did not necessarily convert a noncustodial situation to one in which Miranda applied. 
• Factors which leaned toward finding the inmate's questioning was custodial were offset by other factors.  For example, he was told at the outset, and reminded thereafter, that he could leave and go back to his cell whenever he wanted.  Also, he was not physically restrained or threatened and was not uncomfortable, was offered food and water, and the door to the conference room was sometimes left open. 
• The objective facts were consistent with an interrogation environment in which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and exit. 
• Being told if he did not cooperate he would be returned to his cell was not coercion by threatening harsher conditions.

CONCLUSION: The judgment of the Sixth Circuit holding that the inmate was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda was reversed. 6-3 Decision; 1 opinion; 1 concurrence in part and dissent in part.

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Maples v. Thomas case brief

Maples v. Thomas case summary
132 S. Ct. 912

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Petitioner state prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his murder conviction and death sentence. The district court denied the petition and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding a procedural default in state court based on the prisoner's failure timely to appeal the Alabama trial court's order denying him postconviction relief. Certiorari was granted.

OVERVIEW: The prisoner's postconviction petition, which sought relief in state court based on ineffective assistance of counsel, was written by two New York attorneys associated with a New York-based law firm. While the postconviction petition remained pending, his New York attorneys left the firm. When his petition was denied, notices were sent to the attorneys at the firm's address, but they were returned, unopened, to the trial court clerk, who attempted no further mailing. The prisoner's time to appeal ran out. The federal courts found procedural default. The Supreme Court determined that there was "cause" to excuse the missed notice of appeal deadline because (1) the prisoner showed that his attorneys of record abandoned him because the New York attorneys' departure from the law firm and their commencement of employment that prevented them from representing him ended their agency relationship with him, other attorneys at the firm had no authority to act for him, and local Alabama counsel did not serve as his agent in any meaningful sense of that word, and (2) he had no reason to suspect that he lacked counsel able and willing to represent him during the time permitted for an appeal.

CONCLUSION: The Court reversed the federal appellate court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. 7-2 Decision; 1 Concurrence; 1 Dissent.

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Martinez v. Ryan case brief

Martinez v. Ryan case summary
132 S. Ct. 1309

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: A district court denied petitioner inmate's habeas claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ruling that Ariz. Rule Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) was an adequate and independent state-law ground to bar federal review and no case was shown to excuse the procedural default since postconviction counsel's errors did not qualify as cause for a default. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Certiorari was granted.

OVERVIEW: Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance (IA) of trial counsel had to be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding (IRCP), a procedural default would not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of IA at trial if, in the IRCP, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective. The inmate's attorney in the IRCP filed a notice akin to an Anders brief, in effect conceding a lack of any meritorious claim, including a claim of IA at trial, which the inmate argued was IA. The Ninth Circuit did not decide if it was. Rather, it held that because he did not have a right to an attorney in the IRCP, the attorney's errors in the IRCP could not establish cause for the failure to comply with the State's rules. Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not determine if the attorney in the IRCP was ineffective or whether the claim of IA of trial counsel was substantial. Nor was prejudice addressed. Those issues remained open for a decision on remand. While 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(i) precluded relying on IA of a postconviction attorney as a "ground for relief," it did not stop its use to establish "cause" to excuse procedural default.

OUTCOME: The judgment upholding the denial of habeas relief was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 7-2 decision; 1 opinion, 1 dissent.

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Reynolds v. United States case brief

Reynolds v. United States
132 S. Ct. 975

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Defendant was indicted for failing to comply with the registration requirements of the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (Act), 42 U.S.C.S. § 16901 et seq., but the defendant claimed that the requirements did not apply to the defendant. Upon the grant of a writ of certiorari, the defendant appealed the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which affirmed a denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment.

FACTS: The defendant contended that he was convicted and served his sentence prior to enactment of the Act, that the Act's registration requirements thus did not apply to the defendant until the U.S. Attorney General (AG) determined the applicability of the Act to pre-Act offenders, and that the AG's rule applying the Act to pre-Act offenders was invalid. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Act did not require the defendant, as a pre-Act offender, to register before the AG validly specified that the Act's registration provisions applied to the defendant. The Act expressly granted the AG the authority to specify the applicability of the registration requirements to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of the Act, and such language was more naturally read to confer authority to apply the Act, not authority to make exceptions to applicability. Further, it was reasonable to conclude that Congress granted the authority to the AG to examine pre-Act offender problems and to apply the new requirements accordingly and to fill potential lacunae in a manner consistent with basic criminal law principles, and any delay in implementing the Act would not be unduly lengthy.

OUTCOME: The judgment affirming the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 7-2 Decision; 1 Dissent.

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Arizona v. United States case brief

Arizona v. United States case summary
132 S. Ct. 2492
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States sued petitioners, the State of Arizona and the Governor of Arizona, seeking a determination that Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 11-1051(B), 13-1509, 13-2928(C), and 13-3883(A)(5) were preempted by federal law. The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona enjoined the State from enforcing the statutes, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

OVERVIEW: The State of Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S. B. 1070 (Ariz.), in 2010, and the United States sought an order which enjoined §§ 2(B), 3, 5(C), and 6 of S. B. 1070, codified, respectively, as Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 11-1051(B), 13-1509, 13-2928(C), and 13-3883(A)(5), claiming that all four sections were preempted by federal law. The Supreme Court found that §§ 3, 5(C), and 6 of S. B. 1070 were preempted by federal law; however, it was not clear at this stage of the case that § 2(B)--which required state officers to make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of any person they stopped, detained, or arrested on some other legitimate basis--was preempted. Section 3 was preempted because it intruded on the field of alien registration, § 5(C) was preempted because it imposed criminal sanctions on aliens who sought or accepted employment when U.S. law did not make those activities a crime, and § 6 was preempted because it interfered with the system Congress had created for allowing the arrest of aliens who were in the United States unlawfully.

OUTCOME: The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case. 5-3 Decision; 3 dissents; 1 abstention.

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Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. case brief

Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc.
132 S. Ct. 1204

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Respondent Medicaid providers and recipients brought suits against petitioner California state officials pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, seeking to enjoin implementation of California statutes that reduced payments to providers under the state's Medicaid plan. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed or ordered preliminary injunctions preventing implementation of the statutes. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

OVERVIEW:
-Respondents argued that the state rate reductions were preempted by 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) because California had not shown that its Medicaid plan, as amended, would enlist enough providers to make Medicaid care and services sufficiently available.
-While the matter was pending before the Supreme Court, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approved several of the statutory amendments to California's plan as consistent with federal law.

HOLDING:
In light of the changed circumstances, it was necessary to determine whether respondents' claims could proceed directly under the Supremacy Clause or whether respondents were required to seek review of CMS's determination under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.S. § 701 et seq.

ANALYSIS:
-Respondents' challenge presented the kind of legal question that ordinarily called for APA review, and allowing a Supremacy Clause action to proceed after CMS had reached a decision threatened potential inconsistency or confusion. Remand was warranted because the parties had not fully addressed the question of whether a Supremacy Clause action was appropriate after the agency had acted.

OUTCOME: The Ninth Circuit's judgments were vacated, and the cases were remanded. 5-4 decision; 1 dissent.

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Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc. case brief

Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc. case summary
286 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
Tort Law

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Plaintiff, a minor child, sought review of a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which dismissed her action for preconception negligence after sustaining defendant supply company's demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend.

FACTS:
-The mother of plaintiff, a minor child, was involved in a car accident with defendant's employee. She brought suit for injuries and settled that action.
-Two years later she became pregnant and gave birth to plaintiff, who suffered from injuries relating to premature birth.
-Plaintiff brought a complaint for preconception negligence.
-Defendant demurred on the ground that no legal duty of care existed because claims for preconception negligence involve a special "physician-patient" relationship which gives rise to a duty to the fetus.
-In the absence of such a relationship, a legal duty had never been found under California law.
-The trial court agreed, finding that recognition of plaintiff's claim would constitute an unwarranted extension of the duty of care. 

HOLDING:
The court affirmed, holding that a motorist could not reasonably foresee that his negligent conduct might injure a child subsequently conceived by a woman several years after a car accident.

ANALYSIS:
-Unlike a medical professional's conduct, which is directly related to whether a child is conceived or born, such conception or birth was not a reasonably foreseeable result of the operation of a car.

RULES:
Absent professional negligence or product liability, no legal duty is imposed upon parties to protect subsequently conceived fetuses from injury.

CONCLUSION: The court affirmed the decision dismissing plaintiff minor child's action for preconception negligence after sustaining defendant supply company's demurrer because no duty of care existed because the motorist could not reasonably foresee that his negligent conduct might injure a child subsequently conceived by a woman several years after a car accident.

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Petriello v. Kalman case brief

Petriello v. Kalman case summary
576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990)
Tort Law

FACTS
-Plaintiff individual filed medical malpractice claim against defendant hospital and defendant doctor. -At trial, medical experts testified that as a result of injuries sustained during a surgical procedure, the individual had an increased risk of future bowel obstructions.
-The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the hospital.
-The jury returned a verdict for the individual in her claim against the doctor.
-On appeal, the court affirmed the directed verdict and the jury verdict.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff individual appealed a judgment of the Superior Court in the Judicial District of Ansonia-Milford (Connecticut) granting a directed verdict to defendant hospital in plaintiff individual's medical malpractice action. Defendant doctor appealed the jury verdict in plaintiff individual's favor in the same medical malpractice action.

HOLDING
The court held that in a tort action, a plaintiff who establishes a breach of duty that was a substantial factor in causing a present injury which has resulted in an increased risk of future harm is entitled to compensation to the extent that the future harm is likely to occur, overruling cases holding otherwise.

ANALYSIS
The court held that the hospital owed no duty to the individual to ensure that the nonemployee doctor obtained informed consent for surgery he performed. Hospital rules requiring doctors to obtain informed consent from patients prior to surgery did not obligate the hospital to obtain the informed consent.

RULES

-

In a tort action, a plaintiff who has established a breach of duty that was a substantial factor in causing a present injury which has resulted in an increased risk of future harm is entitled to compensation to the extent that the future harm is likely to occur. To the extent that the following cases hold otherwise, they are overruled

CONCLUSION
The court affirmed the directed verdict to defendant hospital because the hospital owed plaintiff individual no duty regarding informed consent for surgery performed by defendant doctor. The jury verdict against the doctor was affirmed because the individual established that the doctor's negligence caused the individual's present injury, resulting in increased risk of future harm entitling the individual to compensation.

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Alberts v. Schultz case brief

Alberts v. Schultz case summary
975 P.2d 1279 (N.M. 1999)
Tort Law

FACTS
-Plaintiff husband and plaintiff wife sued defendant doctors for the amputation of plaintiff husband's right leg.
-Plaintiffs' expert testified that, because the medical records were incomplete, he could not state to a reasonable degree of medical probability that immediate use of certain tests or bypass surgery would have increased the chance of saving plaintiff husband's leg.
-The trial court granted defendants' partial summary judgment due to plaintiffs failure to establish that defendants' conduct proximately caused plaintiff husband's injury, but denied defendants summary judgment on the issue of pain and suffering.
-The trial court found that there was an issue whether defendants' allegedly negligent conduct reduced the chance of avoiding plaintiff husband's injury, and it certified that issue for interlocutory appeal.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The matter was before the court on certification from the New Mexico Court of Appeals for a determination of whether New Mexico recognized a cause of action for the increased risk of harm to a patient as a result of a physician's negligence, and, if so, whether that doctrine applied in the underlying medical malpractice action filed by plaintiff wife and plaintiff husband against defendant doctors.

HOLDING
The court held that New Mexico recognized lost-chance claims, but that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs could not recover under a loss-of-chance theory because they could not show, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that defendants' alleged negligence proximately caused plaintiff husband to lose the chance of saving his leg.

RULES
-Under the lost-chance theory, the patient may seek recovery even if the chance of a favorable outcome prior to the negligence was very slim. Every patient has a certain probability that he or she will recover from the presenting medical problem. The probability of recovery may be high-more than fifty percent; or the prognosis may be more bleak-less than fifty percent. Whether great or small, there is some chance that the person will recover. Under the loss-of-chance theory, the health provider's malpractice has obliterated or reduced those odds of recovery that existed before the act of malpractice. The patient with a greater-than-fifty-percent chance of recovery is deprived of a more promising outcome. The patient with a slim chance is deprived of the opportunity to beat the odds. Where there was once a chance of a better result, now there is a lesser or no chance.

CONCLUSION
The court held that New Mexico recognized the legitimacy of lost-chance claims, but held that, as a matter of law, plaintiff husband and plaintiff wife could not recover on their medical malpractice claim against defendant doctors under a lost-chance theory because plaintiffs failed to show that defendants' alleged malpractice proximately caused plaintiff husband's lost chance for a better result.

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Lord v. Lovett case brief

Lord v. Lovett case summary
770 A.2d 1103 (N.H. 2001)
Tort Law

FACTS
-Plaintiff was treated by defendant physicians after suffering severe injuries in an automobile accident.
-She eventually sued them on grounds that their negligence deprived her of a chance of a fuller recovery.
-Prior medical malpractice case law in New Hampshire had never squarely faced the issue of whether a plaintiff could recover for lost opportunity.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Medical malpractice plaintiff appealed dismissal, for failure to state a claim, by Belknap Superior Court (New Hampshire), of her action against defendant doctors based on a theory that defendants' negligence deprived her of a chance for a substantially better recovery from injuries incurred in an automobile accident.

HOLDING
-The court adopted the majority rule, treating lost opportunity as a separate injury, for which plaintiff could recover if she proved defendants' negligence caused that injury to her, and her resulting damages, that is, the extent to which future damages were increased, by the preponderance of the evidence. 

ANALYSIS
-This type of injury fit perfectly well within the plain language of the definition of a medical injury in the statute, so there was no need to even examine the legislative history, although it, too, supported the adoption of this rule.

RULES
-The loss of a chance of achieving a favorable outcome or of avoiding an adverse consequence should be compensable and should be valued appropriately, rather than treated as an all-or-nothing proposition. Pre-existing conditions must be taken into account in valuing the interest destroyed. -When those pre-existing conditions have not absolutely pre-ordained an adverse outcome, however, the chance of avoiding it should be appropriately compensated even if that chance is not better than even.
-Accordingly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire holds that a plaintiff may recover for a loss of opportunity injury in medical malpractice cases when the defendant's alleged negligence aggravates the plaintiff's pre-existing injury such that it deprives the plaintiff of a substantially better outcome.

CONCLUSION
The court recognized loss of opportunity for a better outcome as a separate injury recoverable in tort, reversed the dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings.

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Black v. Abex Corp. case brief

Black v. Abex Corp. case summary
603 N.W.2d 182 (N.D 1999)
Tort Law

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Plaintiff appealed an order of summary judgment in the District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District (North Dakota), dismissing her wrongful death and survival claims against numerous asbestos manufacturers.

FACTS:
-Plaintiff sued forty-eight asbestos manufacturers, alleging her husband's death was caused by his occupational exposure to asbestos-containing products and asserting market share and alternative liability claims.
-Plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.

HOLDING:
-The court concluded that market share liability, premised upon the fact that defendants produced identical defective products that carry equivalent risks of harm, was inappropriate in this asbestos case as plaintiff alleged injury from exposure to many different types of asbestos products containing differing amounts of asbestos and as plaintiff could not identify any such product as causing decedent's injury.

RULES:

The requirements for market-share liability appear to be (1) injury or illness occasioned by a fungible product (identical-type product) made by all of the defendants joined in the lawsuit; (2) injury or illness due to a design hazard, with each having been found to have sold the same type product in a manner that made it unreasonably dangerous; (3) inability to identify the specific manufacturer of the product or products that brought about the plaintiff's injury or illness; and (4) joinder of enough of the manufacturers of the fungible or identical product to represent a substantial share of the market

ANALYSIS:
-Further, plaintiff's claim of alternative liability failed, where a crucial element is that all possible wrongdoers be brought before the court and plaintiff failed to assert that she included as defendants all possible manufacturers of asbestos-containing products to which her husband was exposed.

OUTCOME: The trial court's order of summary judgment in defendants' favor was affirmed as plaintiff could not maintain a market share liability theory where she could not establish that, in spite of product differences, the asbestos-containing products carried equivalent risks of harm.

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Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Company case brief

Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Company case summary
541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989)
Tort Law

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Appeals from decisions of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (New York) denying summary judgment to defendant drug manufacturers in products liability action arising from injuries plaintiffs suffered as result of plaintiffs' mothers' use of diethylstilbestrol (DES) during pregnancy.

FACTS:
-Plaintiffs sued defendant drug manufacturers in three product liability actions, alleging injuries from use of diethylstilbestrol (DES) by plaintiffs' mothers during pregnancy.
-In all three cases, the trial court denied defendants summary judgment, and the appeals court affirmed.
-On appeal, defendant drug manufacturers argued that summary judgment was proper because plaintiffs could not identify the manufacturer of the drug that allegedly injured them and that state law, which revived time-barred DES claims, violated constitutional due process and equal protection principles.

HOLDING:
The court affirmed, adopting a national market-share theory for apportioning liability, and holding the statute was rationally based and constitutional.

RULES:
The court now adopts a market share theory, using a national market, for determining liability and apportioning damages in diethylstilbestrol (DES) cases in which identification of the manufacturer of the drug that injured a plaintiff is impossible. The court also holds that the New York Legislature's revival for one year of actions for injuries caused by DES that were previously barred by the Statute of Limitations is constitutional under the New York and federal constitutions.

OUTCOME: The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment to defendant drug manufacturers, adopting a national market-share theory for apportioning liability and holding state statute reviving time-barred claims constitutional.

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Burke v. Schaffner case brief

Burke v. Schaffner case summary
683 N.E.2d 861 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)
Tort Law

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Appellant challenged an order of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (Ohio), which entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of appellee passenger in connection with appellant's claim that he was injured when the passenger stepped on the accelerator of a truck.

FACTS:
-Appellant brought an action against the driver and the passenger to recover from injuries sustained when he was pinned by the driver's truck.
-The passenger stepped on the accelerator of the truck when moving to make room for other passengers getting into the truck.
-Appellant settled his claim with the driver and tried his case against the passenger.
-Appellant did not call the passenger as a witness, and the passenger offered no evidence.
-Appellant's motions for a directed verdict and to reopen his case to call the passenger as a witness were denied, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the passenger.

HOLDING:
-On review, the court affirmed, finding that (1) a directed verdict was not warranted because reasonable minds could have differed as to whether the passenger negligently caused the injuries by stepping on the truck's accelerator; (2) the doctrine of alternative liability did not apply to shift to the passenger the burden of proving that she did not cause the harm because appellant claimed that only the passenger acted tortiously, to the exclusion of the driver; (3) because the burden did not shift from appellant, the passenger was not required to present any evidence that she did not cause the harm; and (4) appellant was required to present all of his evidence during his case in chief.

RULES:
-Under the alternative liability theory, a plaintiff must still prove: (1) that two or more defendants committed tortious acts, and (2) that plaintiff was injured as a proximate result of the wrongdoing of one of the defendants. Only then will the burden shift to the defendants to prove that they were not the cause of plaintiff's injuries. This doctrine does not apply in cases where there is no proof that the conduct of more than one defendant has been tortious.
-The rationale for the doctrine of alternative liability, and the burden-shifting exception, is not applicable in circumstances where only one person has acted tortious.

CONCLUSION: The court affirmed the judgment.

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Shinn v. Allen case brief

Shinn v. Allen case summary
984 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998)
Tort Law

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Appellant decedent's wife sought review of a decision from the 280th District Court, Harris County, Texas, which granted summary judgment in favor of appellee passenger, who was in a car that collided with appellant and her husband's car, killing the husband and seriously injuring appellant.

FACTS:
-This particular case involved an auto accident in which appellant decedent's spouse was seriously injured and her husband killed.
-Appellee passenger was in the auto that collided with appellant's car.
-Appellant sued appellee for negligence, alleging that appellee substantially assisted or encouraged an intoxicated person to drive an automobile on public roads that resulted in a collision.
-Appellee moved for summary judgment contending he owed no duty to appellant.
-Appellee's summary judgment was granted by the trial court.

ANALYSIS
-Appellant contended that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment because the evidence established the existence of both a duty and a question of material fact under the concert-of-action theory of liability.
-The court noted that the Texas Supreme Court had stated that whether the concert-of-action theory of liability was recognized in Texas was still an open question.
-Nevertheless, it examined the facts and concluded that appellant did not raise a material fact issue that appellee substantially assisted or encouraged the driver in operating the auto that collided with appellant.
-Accordingly, the summary judgment decision was affirmed.

RULES:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he: (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.

OUTCOME: Summary judgment in favor of appellee passenger, who was in the car that collided with appellant decedent's spouse's car, in appellant's action for negligence was affirmed. Appellee owed no duty to appellant and appellant failed to raise a material factual issue that appellee encouraged or assisted the intoxicated driver to operate the vehicle that collided with appellant's car.

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Brisboy v. Fireboard Paper Products Corporation case brief

Brisboy v. Fireboard Paper Products Corporation case summary
384 N.W.2d 39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
Tort Law

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
The corporation (D) went to the court, seeking review of a trial court order (MI). 
The trial court entered a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff (decedent's) personal representative on his negligence claim.
The personal representative had cross appealed the exclusion of evidence that related to various worker's compensation claims that were brought against the corporation for asbestos outside of the state. 

FACTS:
-The decedent died of lung cancer.
-It was said that his death was caused by 26 years of working with asbestos.
-It was also found that the decedent smoked two packs of cigarettes per day for the previous 30 years.
-A doctor testified that cigarette smoking does not increase an asbestos worker's risk of developing lung cancer.
-A jury verdict found that a corporation's negligence in failing to warn the decedent of the danger of working with asbestos was the proximate cause of his death.
-The court affirmed the verdict.

HOLDING:
-The court found that the decedent's autopsy indicated that he died from cancer resulting from asbestosis and that there was a massive amount of asbestos in his lungs.

ANALYSIS:
It was found that while the personal representative could not have directly proven that the corporation's asbestos fibers caused the disease that led to the decedent's death, the personal representative was able to establish that during the time the decedent worked with the corporation's products, the air was full of dust and that when dust from asbestos is visible, it implied that there was an extreme exposure.
-The court concluded that reasonable minds could have found that the decedent had indeed inhaled asbestos fibers.
-Although the decedent would have been contributory negligent with regard to lung cancer that was caused solely by his cigarette smoking, here there was no indication on the record that he was aware or should have been aware of the risk of cigarette smoking as it related to asbestos and asbestos-related lung cancer.

RULES:
-Under Michigan law, an actor will not be held liable for his negligent conduct unless that conduct is a legal or proximate cause of the harm to the plaintiff.
-There may be more than one proximate cause of an injury, and thus the mere fact that some other cause concurs, contributes, or cooperates to produce an injury does not relieve any of the parties whose negligent conduct is one of the causes of the plaintiff's harm.
-An actor's negligent conduct will not be a legal or proximate cause of the harm to another unless that conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.
-One of the considerations in determining whether an actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to another is the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the extent of the effect which they have in producing it.
-Where a number of events each contribute to the ultimate harm, one may have such a predominant effect as to make the effect of a particular actor's negligence insignificant.
-On the other hand, where none of the contributing factors has a predominant effect, their combined effect may act to dilute the effect of the actor's negligence and prevent it from becoming a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.

CONCLUSION: The court affirmed the jury verdict.  The jury found in favor of the personal representative on his negligence claim.

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Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. case brief

Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. case summary
211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927)
Tort Law

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Defendant railroad sought review of an order of the Circuit Court for Shawano County (Wisconsin), which entered a judgment for plaintiff property owner in a suit to recover for fire damage to his property.

FACTS:
-After his property sustained fire damage, plaintiff property owner filed a suit against defendant railroad.
-Plaintiff's property had been damaged when two fires united.
-The lower court entered a judgment for plaintiff.

ANALYSIS:
-On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court's order, holding that although only one of the fires was attributable to defendant, it was still liable to plaintiff for the damage caused by both fires.
-The court further held that the fact that the other fire was of unknown origin did not affect defendant's liability because the fire attributable to defendant was of a greater magnitude.
-Finally, the court held that the fire of unknown origin had not superseded the fire attributable to defendant.

RULES:
-Any one of two or more joint tortfeasors or one of two or more wrongdoers whose concurring acts of negligence result in injury, are each individually responsible for the entire damage resulting from their joint or concurrent acts of negligence.
-This rule also obtains where two causes, each attributable to the negligence of a responsible person, concur in producing an injury to another, either of which causes would produce it regardless of the other, because, whether the concurrence be intentional, actual, or constructive, each wrongdoer, in effect, adopts the conduct of his co-actor, and for the further reason that it is impossible to apportion the damage or to say that either perpetrated any distinct injury that can be separated from the whole. The whole loss must necessarily be considered and treated as an entirety. 

CONCLUSION: The court affirmed an order of the lower court, which entered a judgment for plaintiff property owner in a suit against defendant railroad to recover for fire damage to his property. A fire attributed to defendant was not superseded by another fire of unknown origin.

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Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transportation Services, Inc. case brief

Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transportation Services, Inc. case summary
928 P.2d 1202 (Alaska 1996)
Tort Law

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Appellant personal representative challenged a decision from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, which found that appellee trucker was negligent, but that his negligence was not a legal cause of the accident. The personal representative contended that giving the sudden emergency instruction was error and that the trucker was speeding and driving negligently.

FACTS:
-The decedent was killed when she pulled out of a parking lot and was broadsided by the trucker.
-The truck was asserted to be speeding. 

HOLDING:
-The court concluded that the sudden emergency instruction was generally useless because with or without an emergency, the standard of care was still of a reasonable person under the circumstances.

ANALYSIS:
-The court agreed with the the jury, which decided that the trucker was negligent and not exercising the care and prudence a reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances.
-The court also found that the personal representative's claims were defeated by a lack of causation, as the trucker's negligence was not the accident's legal cause, and the court could not say that the jury's lack of causation finding was unreasonable.
-The court asserted that a reasonable jury could have concluded, based on expert testimony, that the decedent caused the accident by abruptly pulling out in front of the trucker and that the trucker's negligence was not a contributing factor.
-The court opined that with the element of causation lacking, even the most egregious negligence could not result in liability.
-The court held that error in giving the instruction was harmless and affirmed the decision.

RULES:
The sudden emergency doctrine is a rule of law which states that a person confronted with a sudden and unexpected peril, not resulting from that person's own negligence, is not expected to exercise the same judgment and prudence the law requires of a person in calmer and more deliberate moments. The person confronted with the imminent peril must, however, act as a reasonable person would under the same conditions.

CONCLUSION: The court affirmed the trial court's decision that the trucker was not at fault in the accident, but that the primary cause was the decedent pulling out in front of the trucker, and that the giving of the sudden emergency instruction was harmless error.



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Cay v. State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development case brief

Cay v. State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development case summary
613 So. 2d 393 (La. 1994)
Tort Law

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Defendant department of transportation sought certiorari review of a judgment from the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Catahoula, which affirmed a trial court judgment in favor of plaintiff parents in the parents' wrongful death action against the department arising from their son's death in a fall from a bridge constructed and maintained by the department.

FACTS:
-A man fell off a bridge that was built and maintained by the Department of Transportation.
-He left the bar before crossing the bridge, on foot, carrying an open beer with him.  He refused a ride that he was offered. 
-The trial concluded that the decedent accidentally fell and apportioned fault 60 percent to the department and 40 percent to the decedent.

HOLDING:
-The court affirmed the judgment, finding that the department built the bridge with the knowledge that pedestrians were going to use the bridge and with the knowledge that standards required a minimum height for railings on bridges used by pedestrians.

ANALYSIS:
-Further, the court found that the department failed to build the bridge in accordance with standards and that the failure was a cause-in-fact of the accidental fall.
-Accordingly, the court held that concurrent fault in causing the accident rendered the department liable for damages, subject to a reduction for contributory negligence.
-The court held that the trial court manifestly erred in allocating 60 percent of the fault to the department.
-The court amended to quantify the decedent as 90 percent at fault and the department as 10 percent at fault.
-The court also determined that the decedent's intoxication and his negligence in failing to follow rules for pedestrian travel at night were significant factors in his fall.

RULES:
Cause-in-fact is the initial inquiry in a duty-risk analysis. Cause-in-fact is usually a "but for" inquiry which tests whether the injury would not have occurred but for a defendant's substandard conduct. The cause-in-fact issue is usually a jury question unless reasonable minds could not differ.

OUTCOME: The court affirmed, as amended, the judgment in favor of the parents in their suit against the department. The court amended the judgment to quantify the decedent as 90 percent at fault and the department as 10 percent at fault.

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Vieth v. Jubelirer case brief

Vieth v. Jubelirer case summary
541 U.S. 267 (2004)
Constitutional Law

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Appellants, registered Democratic voters, sued appellees, state executive and legislative Republican officers, alleging that the officers enacted legislation creating voting districts favoring Republicans in violation of the constitutional one-person, one-vote requirement. The voters appealed the judgment of a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania which dismissed the action.

FACTS:
-The voters contended that the districts created by the officers' legislation were meandering and irregular, and ignored all traditional redistricting criteria, including the preservation of local government boundaries, solely for the sake of partisan political advantage.

HOLDING:
-A plurality of the United States Supreme Court held, however, that the existence of the alleged political gerrymandering was a political question which precluded judicial intervention.

ANALYSIS:
-While prior Supreme Court precedent indicated that the constitutional provision for equal protection of the law granted judicial authority to control political gerrymandering, such precedent was erroneous in view of the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the propriety of voting districts.
-The judicial power to rectify gerrymandering based on race did not provide a basis for considering the political advantages or disadvantages of voting districts, since political affiliation was clearly not permanently discernible and the effects of political gerrymandering could never be adequately assessed.
-The U.S. Constitution provided equal protection to persons, not equal representation to political parties.

CONCLUSION: The judgment dismissing the voters' action was affirmed.

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Baker v. Carr case brief

Baker v. Carr case summary
369 U.S. 186 (1962)
Constitutional Law 
 PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Plaintiffs sought review of a decision from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granting defendants' motion to dismiss their complaint, which alleged that a state statute arbitrarily appointed representatives without any reference to any logical formula, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

FACTS:
-Plaintiffs, residents of several counties, filed a complaint against defendants, state officers and election officials, alleging that a state statute arbitrarily and capriciously appointed representatives without reference to any logical or rational formula and that it deprived them of the equal protection of the laws in violation of U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
-The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
-The court reversed and remanded, holding that the complaint's allegations of a denial of equal protection presented a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which plaintiffs were entitled to a trial and a decision.

ANALYSIS:
-The right that plaintiffs asserted was within the reach of judicial protection under U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
-The court further found that if discrimination were sufficiently shown, the right to relief under the Equal Protection Clause would not be diminished by the fact that the discrimination related to political rights.

CONCLUSION: The decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted was reversed and remanded because the complaint's allegations of a denial of equal protection presented a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which plaintiffs were entitled to a trial and a decision.

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United States Parole Commn. v. Geraghty case brief

United States Parole Commn. v. Geraghty case summary
445 U.S. 388, 100 S. Ct. 1202, 63 L. Ed. 2d 479, 1980 U.S.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Petitioners, United States Parole Commission and others, challenged the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, holding that the district court erred in refusing to certify respondent's action challenging parole guidelines as a class action and in granting summary judgment, and remanding the case for evaluation of proper subclasses and factual development.

FACTS:
-Respondent was denied parole and challenged the parole guidelines as inconsistent with the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 4201-4218, and the U.S. Constitution, and sought certification as a class of federal prisoners eligible for parole.
-The district court denied class certification and granted summary judgment to petitioners. Respondent was released before appeal, but the court of appeals held that the case was not moot and that the district court erred in refusing to certify and in granting summary judgment, and remanded the case for evaluation of the proper subclasses and for factual development.

HOLDING:
The court, on certiorari, held that the court of appeals properly heard respondent's challenge even though his personal claim had expired, limiting its holding to ruling that a case or controversy still existed, and remanded for the district court to determine whether respondent was the appropriate person to represent the class.

ANALYSIS:
The court held that the court of appeals' remand was proper, except for its direction to the district court to construct subclasses, because this was respondent's burden, and so the judgment was vacated and remanded as modified.

CONCLUSION: The court of appeals' remand was proper because a case or controversy still existed, even though respondent's personal claim expired before the filing of the appeal, when his prison term expired and he was released. However, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for the district court to determine whether respondent was the appropriate class representative, with directions to respondent to construct appropriate subclasses.

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Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services case brief

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services case summary
528 U.S. 167 (2000)
Constitutional Law

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Petitioners sought review of a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that held that petitioners' citizen suit under the Clean Water Act became moot once respondent fully complied with the terms of its discharge permit and petitioners failed to appeal the denial of equitable relief.

FACTS:
-The Supreme Court (Court) reversed an appeals court decision that held that petitioners' citizen suit for civil penalties under Clean Water Act was moot when respondent came into compliance.

ANALYSIS:
-The Court first addressed whether petitioners had standing to bring the action.
-It found respondent's discharges, and petitioners' reasonable concerns about the effects of those discharges, directly affected petitioners' recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests.
-The civil penalties petitioners sought carried with them a deterrent effect that made it likely the penalties would redress petitioners' injuries by abating current violations and preventing future ones. -Thus, petitioners had standing.
-The Court then addressed whether the matter became moot when respondent came into compliance with its discharge permit.
-The Court held the action may have become moot only if respondent's compliance or respondent's closure of its facility made it absolutely clear that respondent's permit violations could not reasonably be expected to recur.
-The effect of respondent's compliance and facility closure on the prospect of future violations was a disputed factual matter.
-Thus, the matter was not moot.

CONCLUSION: The appellate court's decision was reversed; the appellate court erred in concluding that petitioners' claim for civil penalties had to be dismissed as moot when respondent, albeit after commencement of the litigation, came into compliance.

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