Friday, October 26, 2012

Hogan v. Tavzel case brief

Hogan v. Tavzel case summary
660 So. 2D 350 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995)
Tort Law

FACTS
-D, and P, a couple, were married for 15 years, but separated.
-They attempted to reconcile, D infected P with genital warts.
-D knew of condition, did not warn P.
-Couple was divorced after the deed.

ISSUE
-Can a P sue for battery due to getting a sexually transmitted disease through consensual sex?

HOLDING
-Yes, in Florida, the court sees no reason to not hold a tortfeasor liable for battery for infecting another with a sexually transmitted disease.

RULES
-Consent to sexual intercourse is not the same as consent to be infected with a venereal disease.

ANALYSIS
-The P did not consent to being infected, instead, the P consented to sex, which are both quite different.
-Here the defendant concealed an important fact that would have affected the P's decision to consent.

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Myhaver v. Knutson case brief


Myhaver v. Knutson

242 P.2d 445 (Ariz. 1997)

FACTS
-D was driving when another driver entered the road and drove towards him.
-When D saw the other car driving towards him, he accelerated and swerved left to avoid what he perceived would be a head on collision.
-As a result, D crossed the yellow line into oncoming traffic and collided with P's vehicle. The D was seriously injured as a result.
-The other driver continued, not realizing what had happened. The police stopped her and asked her to return to the scene.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
-A damage action was brought against the other driver (Magnusson) and they settled. Now, the P brings this suit against the D.

ISSUE
-Should the “sudden emergency” instruction by the jury be given in a case involving an automobile collision?

HOLDING
-Yes, in this case the court holds that the jury instruction given was proper.

RULES
-In the absence of negligence, the emergency instruction tells the jury that a person confronted with a sudden emergency that deprives him of time to contemplate the best reaction cannot be held to the same standard of care and accuracy of choice as a person who has time to deliberate.

ANALYSIS
-The emergency instruction should be confined to the case in which the emergency is not of the routine sort produced by the impending accident but arises from events the driver could not be expected to anticipate.

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National Bank of Cleveland v. Erskine & Sons, Inc. case brief

Negotiable Instrument

National Bank of Cleveland v. Erskine & Sons, Inc.

158 Ohio St. 450, 110 N.E. 2D 598

FACTS
-The D gave mining equipment in exchange for a note.
-D claims that the equipment was defective.
-The note contains a default clause which states if the chattel mortgage securing the note is breached in any respect, the note shall immediately become due at the holder's option without demand or notice.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
-Trial court: holds note is a negotiable instrument and submitted to the jury an issue of good faith of the plaintiff.
-Jury held for D, judgement entered.
-Court of appeals reversed. D appeals.

ISSUE
-Is the note negotiable?

HOLDING
Yes, the note is negotiable.

RULES
-If the note is not negotiable, than the endorsee takes it subject to all equities and defenses between the original parties.
-An instrument that is payable at a fixed date or before then at the option of the holder, or automatically payable conditioned upon the occurrence of specified acts or events that represent a kind of express or implied default by the obligor of such a nature as to indicate an increased risk to the holder that the instrument may not be paid at the date of ultimate maturity is negotiable.

ANALYSIS
-A promissory note that contains provisions stating that the holder of the note is empowered to declare the note due and payable before maturity in exercising his unrestrained option is non-negotiable.
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O'Dess v. Gunter case brief

An Indorsement


O'Dess v. Gunter

258 Mich. 667, 242 N.W. 804

FACTS
-P sued D on a promissory note.
-D argued that he was an indorser and received no notice of dishonor for a 4 year period.

ISSUE
-Was the D make a promise to pay (was he a maker), or was he merely an indorser?
-Is the D liable for the note?

HOLDING
-D was an indorser. He made no promise to pay, therefore he is not a maker.
-No, he is not liable because he did not get notice of dishonor for 3 years and, as an indorser, he was entitled to notice of dishonor.

RULES
-For one to be a maker of a note, the note must show that the individual makes an unconditional promise to pay.
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A person who places his signature upon an instrument, if that person is not a maker, drawer, or acceptor, is said to be an indorser, UNLESS he clearly indicates by appropriate words that he intends to be bound in some other capacity.
-An indorser is entitled to notice of dishonor. Here there was no notice of dishonor for at least three years, and the court states that he can not be held liable on the instrument as an indorser.

APPLICATION
-The note at question does not contain the language that states “I promise to pay,” or “we promise to pay,” or any other similar language that indicates that the D made a promise to pay.
-Gunter (D) made no promise to pay.

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Held v. Moore case brief

An example of an indorsement.

Held v. Moore

Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Lancaster County, January 10, 1964.
49 Lancaster Law Review 111.

FACTS
-P sues to recover $15,000 and 6% interest on a promissory note that was given by Herbert Moore and indorsed by Lois Moore.
-Note was executed and delivered to P on August 12, 1960, and was payable on same day.
-Lois (D) signed her name on the back.
-Complaint states that note was presented to Herbert for payment, but payment was refused.
-Note was then presented to Lois (D) for payment, but she refused.
-D claims that she did execute the note, but denies that she knew the capacity in which she signed the note, nor does she know why she signed the note.
-D denies that the note was presented to her for payment, but she admits that she has not paid the note.
-D's only defense is “I signed the note, but don't know why or in what capacity I signed it.”

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
-Judgment was entered against Herbert for failure to answer P's complaint.
-Lois has filed an answer, and P has filed motion for judgment on the pleadings against her.

ISSUE
-Is the defense: “I signed the note, but don't know why or in what capacity I signed it” a good defense?

HOLDING
-No, the defense that the D asserted is not valid.

RULES
-”In the absence of a qualified indorsement, the indorser engages upon dishonor and any necessary notice of dishonor and protest to pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of his indorsement” UCC 3-414.
APPLICATION
-The D specifically guaranteed payment of the note at maturity by indorsing the back of the note. Due to this, she is made liable to the P if payment was not made by the maker.
-The court holds that since her signature was voluntarily made (no coercion or fraud), even though she did not know the effect of her signature on the note, she must be held responsible for the legal effect of her act.

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Sunday, October 21, 2012

Sikora v. Wenzel case brief

Sakora v. Wenzel case summary
727 N.E. 2d 1277 (Ohio 2000)

FACTS:
-Condominium deck owned by D collapsed during a party held by one of D's tenants.
-P, guest at the party, was injured as a result of the collapse.
-City hired an engineering company which concluded that the deck's collapse resulted from improper construction and design which violated the state's building code.
-A decade earlier, a firm that was developing the property wanted to modify the units to include decks.
-The plans were given to the city at that time but were rejected due to being unsafe.
-No inspection of the decks was made at the time they were built.
-The firm that had the decks built was given a certificate of occupancy, and later, D purchased the property not knowing of any defects.

ISSUE:
-Is lack of notice a sufficient excuse in a strict liability proceeding?
-Is the statute in this case a strict liability statute?

HOLDING:
-No, when strict liability is imposed, a D will be deemed liable per se, meaning that no defenses or excuses (including lack of notice) are applicable.
-No, the statute was written in a way that does not suggest strict liability.

APPLICATION:
-The court stated that since D never knew nor should have known of the defect which caused liability under the statute, he should not be liable to P for failing to comply with the statute.
-The question becomes: did the landlord know or should have he known of the defect?

Friday, October 19, 2012

Zielinski v Philadelphia Piers, Inc. breve caso

Zielinski v Philadelphia Piers, Inc. 139 F. Supp. 408 (1956)
Jurisdicción: Tribunal Federal de Distrito, de Oriente Dist. de Pennsylvania.HECHOS1. Zielinski (P) estaba operando un montacargas para JA McCarthy, Inc. cuando fue herido por Sandy Johnson.2. P demandó a Filadelfia Piers, Inc. (D) y alegó sus lesiones fueron causadas por la operación negligente Sandy Johnson de una carretilla elevadora propiedad de Philadelphia Piers.3. P alegó que Johnson era un empleado y agente de Filadelfia embarcaderos en el momento del accidente.4. Johnson había trabajado para Philadelphia muelles por 15 años y no era consciente de que la compañía había transferido la propiedad de la operación y que había estado trabajando realmente para Contratistas vagón, Inc.5. Johnson equivocadamente declaró que había estado trabajando durante los muelles de Filadelfia. Philadelphia Piers había hecho una negación general de las alegaciones en la queja, pero no aclaró que había transferido la operación para Contratistas vagón.6. Carga General, Piers Filadelfia, y la compañía de seguros que proporcionan seguros para ambas empresas eran conscientes de error de Zielinski. Zielinski no descubrió que había demandado a la compañía equivocada hasta la conferencia previa al juicio. Zielinski se trasladó a Filadelfia estop embarcaderos de negar los hechos alegados en la demanda debido a que la empresa le había permitido creer que eran ciertas.
EDICIÓN¿Puede un ser acusado impedido de negar los hechos alegados en una queja si ha hecho una negación efectiva de esos hechos ya sabiendas permite que un demandante a seguir confiando en ellos?
EXPLOTACIÓNSí. Un acusado que a sabiendas haga declaraciones inexactas pueden ser impedido de negar esas declaraciones en el juicio.
REGLASBajo estas circunstancias, los principios de equidad requieren que d ser impedido de negar la agencia porque, de lo contrario, sus afirmaciones inexactas y declaraciones en el expediente, que lo sabía (o tenía los medios de conocer) eran inexactos, se han privado a P de su derecho de acción.
APLICACIÓNSi Interrogatorio 2 habían sido contestadas con precisión al decir que los empleados de contratistas vagón, Inc. había convertido el asunto en manos de la compañía de seguros, P habría dado cuenta de su error.
NOTAS-A negación general sólo podrán efectuarse cuando el acusado tiene la intención de buena fe para negar todas las alegaciones de la demandante.-A la negación de una parte de los alegatos requiere una negación específica de las partes que se les niega, y una indicación de las partes son ciertas.-De acuerdo con FRCP 11 hay un requisito de la buena fe en súplica.-De acuerdo con FRCP 8 (b), una negación bastante debe cumplir con el contenido de las aseveraciones negadas.-Una parte puede admitir, denegar, o se ha declarado insuficiente la información para responder a las diferentes partes de una queja.


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Le Roy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Railway

Le Roy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Railway (1914)
232 U.S. 340

Iter Procedimental

El demandante dueño de la propiedad interpuso un recurso contra la empresa demandada ferrocarril de recuperar para la destrucción de su propiedad adyacente a la derecha del ferrocarril de vía. El Tribunal de Circuito de Apelaciones del Octavo Circuito preguntas certificado a la corte con respecto a si el dueño de la propiedad puede ser encontrado concurrente negligencia.

Datos

La negligencia del ferrocarril fue la causa inmediata de la destrucción de la propiedad. La propiedad fue colocado por su dueño cerca del derecho de vía del ferrocarril, pero en la tierra del dueño. La cuestión era si el último hecho constituía una prueba de la negligencia del propietario que se presentarán al jurado.

El tribunal sostuvo que los derechos de un hombre en el uso de sus bienes, no puede ser limitado por los errores de otros. La doctrina de la culpa concurrente fue totalmente fuera de lugar. Aunque la operación de un ferrocarril era un uso legítimo de la propiedad y otros bienes en sus alrededores pueden estar sujetos a riesgos por ello, el riesgo de la operación ilícita no era uno de ellos. Por lo tanto, el dueño de la propiedad no estaba limitada en el uso de su propiedad por su proximidad a una vía férrea o sujetas a riesgos distintos de los que procedían de la operación cuidadosa de la carretera o de caso fortuito.

Regla

El uso de un propietario de sus bienes no puede ser limitado por los usos ilícitos de otro propietario.

• El uso de un dueño de la propiedad de sus bienes, no puede ser reducido para dar cabida a la negligencia de un vecino.


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Ruling Pertaining to the Difference Between France and New Zealand Arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair case brief

Ruling Pertaining to the Difference Between France and New Zealand Arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair case summary
26 I.L.M. 1349 (1987)

FACTS

-The environmental group, Greenpeace, had a ship in a harbor in New Zealand.
-Greenpeace was en route to protest French nuclear testing that was taking place in the South Pacific.
-French secret agents set a bomb on the ship, sinking it off. 
-The bomb killed a crew member.
-New Zealand authorities arrested two of the agents.

ARGUMENT
France claimed that the agents were working for the government, so they should not be held personally responsible for the bombing.

RULES
French law states that criminal acts committed pursuant to official government orders are not illegal.
  • New Zealand stated that international law does not excuse criminal if they are committed pursuant to government orders.
  • New Zealand tried and convicted the French agents and sentenced them to a New Zealand jail.
  • France stated that they should serve their term in France.
  • France pressured New Zealand by restricting imports of New Zealand goods into France.
  • France and New Zealand finally agreed to Third Party dispute settlement through the Secretary General of the United Nations.

HOLDING
The United Nations Secretary General found that:
1.  France should give an apology.
2.  France should pay compensation.
3.  France should remove the trade restrictions.
4.  The two French agents should be allowed to serve their sentences in France (and not in New Zealand).

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Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie case brief

Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie case summary
(Libya v. United States)
1992 I.C.J. Rep. 114 (April 14)

FACTS
-An airplane exploded over Scotland, killing many American citizens.
-The US and the UK traced the bomb back to two Libyans. 
-The Libyan government refused to extradite the Libyans for trial.
-Libya argued that under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Civil Aviation (the Montreal Convention) (974 U.N.T.S. 177 (1971)), Libya could either extradite or prosecute the suspects themselves. 
-Libya chose to prosecute the suspects themselves.
-The United States and the UK accused the Libyans of "Forum Shopping" and took the case to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
-UNSC issued two resolutions (UNSC Resolutions 731/748).  These urged Libya to hand over the bombing suspects.
-UNSC also embargoes arms sales to Libya, told member states to close offices of the Libyan Airlines.
-Coercive powers are detailed in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

ANALYSIS
How did the UNSC justify the resolutions?
-Article 39 allows the UNSC to take enforcement actions to restore international peace. You could argue that international terrorism is a breach of the peace.
-But how could you say that Libya's exercising their rights under a multilateral treaty is a threat to the peace?
-Libya went to the International Court of Justice to protest the UNSC resolutions.
-Libya claimed that it was fully within its rights under the Montreal Convention to try the suspects in Libya and not have to turn them over.
-The I.C.J. found that the UNSC resolutions were permissible, and the Libya must hand over the suspects.
-Basically, the I.C.J. found that UNSC resolutions trumped everything else, even multilateral treaties.
-Article 103 of the United Nations Charter says, "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."
-Article 25 says that member States must follow UNSC resolutions.

HOLDING
-The I.C.J. does not perform Judicial Review of UNSC decisions. They are binding and not reviewable.
-If UNSC decisions were reviewable, it would not give the same sense of finality that is required for them to be acted upon.

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Bennett v. Stanley case brief

Bennett v. Stanley
92 Ohio St. 3d 35

Procedural History
•    Plaintiff, husband and father, filed a wrongful death and personal injury action against defendants, homeowners, in his capacity as administrator of his wife and son’s estates and as custodial parent. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and father appealed. The Court of Appeals for Washington County (Ohio) affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and the state supreme court granted leave to appeal.

Facts
•    Homeowners purchased a home with a swimming pool. The pool was enclosed by fencing and a brick wall, and was covered by a tarp. Homeowners removed the tarp and fencing on two sides of the pool, and although they drained the pool, they allowed rainwater to collect in the pool to a depth of over six feet. The pool became a pond. It contained no ladders, the sides were slick with algae, and frogs and tadpoles lived in the pool. Plaintiff’s family rented the house next to homeowners several months after homeowners purchased their house. Plaintiff was married and the father or stepfather of three young children. Homeowners were aware that children lived next door and evidence showed that there was some fencing between the properties, but with an eight-foot gap. In March 1997, plaintiff arrived home to find his stepson and wife unconscious in homeowners’ pool. Both later died.
•    The state supreme court used this case to adopt the attractive nuisance doctrine as the law of Ohio and also held that an adult who attempted to rescue a child from an attractive nuisance assumed the status of the child and was owed a duty of ordinary care by a property owner.

Rule
•    The attractive nuisance doctrine applies where an artificial condition on a property owner’s land creates an unreasonable risk of harm to trespassing children, who, because of their youth, o not realize the danger of the condition.

Application
•    Ohio has long recognized a range of duties for property owners vis-a-vis persons entering their property. Currently, to an invitee the landowner owes a duty to exercise ordinary care and to protect the invitee by maintaining the premises in a safe condition. To licensees and trespassers, on the other hand, a landowner owes no duty except to refrain from willful, wanton, or reckless conduct which is likely to injure the licensee or trespasser
•    The Supreme Court of Ohio has consistently held that children have a special status in tort law and that duties of care owed to children are different from duties owed to adults. The amount of care required to discharge a duty owed to a child of tender years is necessarily greater than that required to discharge a duty owed to an adult under the same circumstances. This is the approach long followed by the Supreme Court of Ohio and there is no reason to abandon it. Children of tender years, and youthful persons generally, are entitled to a degree of care proportioned to their inability to foresee and avoid the perils that they may encounter. The same discernment and foresight in discovering defects and dangers cannot be reasonably expected of them, that older and experienced persons habitually employ; and therefore the greater precaution should be taken, where children are exposed to them
•    Recognizing the special status of children in the law, the Supreme Court of Ohio has even accorded special protection to child trespassers by adopting the “dangerous instrumentality” doctrine. The dangerous instrumentality exception to nonliability to trespassers imposes upon the owner or occupier of a premises a higher duty of care to a child trespasser when such owner or occupier actively and negligently operates hazardous machinery or other apparatus, the dangerousness of which is not readily apparent to children.
•    Elements such as knowledge of children’s presence, the maintenance of a potentially dangerous force, and an exercise of care by the owner commensurate with the danger are a part of the attractive nuisance doctrine in most states.
•    Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, a possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon land if: (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, (b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, (c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, (d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and (e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children.
•    The attractive nuisance doctrine will not extend tort liability to the owner of a residential swimming pool where the presence of a child who is injured or drowns therein is not foreseeable by the property owner.
•    One of the key elements of the attractive nuisance doctrine is that the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass.
•    The differences in duty a landowner owes to the different classes of users are not abandoned. The court further recognize that children are entitled to a greater level of protection than adults are. The “distinctions without differences” between the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and the attractive nuisance doctrine are removed. Whether an apparatus or a condition of property is involved, the key element should be whether there is a foreseeable, unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to children
•    The attractive nuisance doctrine balances society’s interest in protecting children with the rights of landowners to enjoy their property. Even when a landowner is found to have an attractive nuisance on his land, the landowner is left merely with the burden of acting with ordinary care. A landowner does not automatically become liable for any injury a child trespasser may suffer on that land.
•    The requirement of foreseeability is built into the attractive nuisance doctrine. The landowner must know or have reason to know that children are likely to trespass upon the part of the property that contains the dangerous condition. Moreover, the landowner’s duty does not extend to those conditions the existence of which is obvious even to children and the risk of which should be fully realized by them. If the condition of the property that poses the risk is essential to the landowner, the doctrine would not apply.

Holding
•    The state supreme court reversed the intermediate appeals court’s judgment and remanded the case to the trial court.


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Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority case brief

Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
75 Ohio St. 3d 312

Procedural History
•    The appellant transit authority (authority) contested an order of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County (Ohio), which entered a verdict awarding appellee claimant damages arising from the authority’s operation of a rapid transit train which struck the claimant causing him serious and permanent injuries. After the trial court overruled the transit authority’s motion for a directed verdict, the jury considered the allegation of negligent operation.

Facts
-The claimant, who was lying on the railroad tracks after an alleged assault, was struck by a train, resulting in severe, permanent injury.
-The claimant filed an action against the authority, alleging that the operator was negligent by failing to bring the train to a stop after the point she perceived or should have perceived the claimant’s peril prior to striking him.

Procedural History

-The trial court instructed the jury that the claimant was an invitee, and that as a result the authority was required to use ordinary care to discover and to avoid danger.
-The trial court denied the authority’s motion for a directed verdict, the jury found for the claimant, and the trial court denied the authority’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
-On appeal, the court held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the claimant’s legal status and the authority’s corresponding duty, and that the erroneous instruction was prejudicial. Thus, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that upon entering the track area, the claimant became a trespasser as a matter of law and the authority was only liable for injuries resulting from willful or wanton conduct.

Rule
If an invitee trespasses into areas beyond the scope of the invitation, then in those areas the landowner owes no duty except to refrain from wanton or reckless conduct that would likely injure the trespassing invitee.

Application
•    The status of an invitee is not absolute but is limited by the landowner’s invitation. The visitor has the status of an invitee only while he is on part of the land to which his invitation extends, or in other words, the part of the land upon which the possessor gives him reason to believe that his presence is desired for the purpose for which he has come. If the invitee goes outside of the area of his invitation, he becomes a trespasser or a licensee, depending upon whether he goes there without the consent of the possessor, or with such consent.
•    Where an entrant upon another’s land exceeds the scope of the landowner’s invitation, the entrant will lose the status of an invitee, and become either a licensee or trespasser.
•    In determining whether the person is a trespasser, the question whether his entry has been intentional, negligent, or purely accidental is not material, except as it may bear on the existence of a privilege. Without the consent or privilege to enter an area, the law views such entry from the aspect of the landowner whose duties to the entrant flow from the parameters of his permission to be there. As a result, the determining fact is the presence or absence of a privilege to enter or to remain on the land, and the status of an accidental trespasser is still that of a trespasser.
•    A landowner owes a duty to an invitee to exercise ordinary care for the invitee’s safety and protection. Conversely, a landowner owes no duty to a licensee or trespasser except to refrain from willful, wanton, or reckless conduct which is likely to injure him.
•    A railroad owes no duty to anticipate or prevent the presence of licensees or trespassers.
•    When a trespasser or licensee is discovered in a position of peril, a landowner is required to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him. The duty to exercise ordinary care arises after the landowner knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know or believe, that a trespasser or licensee is on the land.

"Willful vs. Wanton conduct"
-Willful conduct involves an intent, purpose, or design to injure.
-Wanton conduct involves the failure to exercise any care whatsoever toward those to whom he owes a duty of care, and his failure occurs under the circumstances in which there is great probability that harm will result.

Holding
•    The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erroneously and prejudicially instructed the jury that the claimant was an invitee as a matter of law, and finding that in fact the claimant was a trespasser to whom the authority owed substantially less of a duty.


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Avila v. Citrus Community College District case brief

Avila v. Citrus Community College District
38 Cal. 4th 148

Procedural History
•    Plaintiff community college baseball player sued defendant rival community college for negligence. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reversed a trial court’s judgment sustaining the rival college’s demurrer, concluding that Gov. Code, § 831.7 did not extend immunity to claims predicated on the negligent supervision of public school athletes. The rival college petitioned for review.

Facts
•    The player’s team was playing a preseason road game against the rival college’s team. During the game, the player was hit in the head with a pitched ball. The player alleged the pitch was an intentional beanball or was thrown negligently. He also alleged the rival college was negligent in failing to summon or provide medical care for him when he was obviously in need of it, failing to supervise and control its team’s pitcher, failing to provide umpires or other supervisory personnel to control the game and prevent retaliatory or reckless pitching, and failing to provide adequate equipment to safeguard him from serious head injury.
•    The court concluded that § 831.7′s immunity protection did not extend to injuries sustained during supervised school sports, including participation in an intercollegiate baseball game. However, on the facts alleged, the rival college, as the host school, owed no duty to the visiting team’s player to prevent the home team’s pitcher from hitting batters, even intentionally. Thus, the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk barred any claim predicated on the allegation that the rival college’s pitcher negligently or intentionally threw at the player.

Rule
•    Primary assumption of the risk arises when, as a matter of law and policy, a defendant owes no duty to protect a plaintiff from particular harms.
The Application
•    Applied in the sporting context, it precludes liability for injuries arising from those risks deemed inherent in a sport; as a matter of law, others have no legal duty to eliminate those risks or otherwise protect a sports participant from them. Under this duty approach, a court need not ask what risks a particular plaintiff subjectively knew of and chose to encounter, but instead must evaluate the fundamental nature of the sport and the defendant’s role in or relationship to that sport in order to determine whether the defendant owes a duty to protect a plaintiff from the particular risk of harm.
•    Coparticipants in sporting activity have a duty not to act recklessly, outside the bounds of the sport, and coaches and instructors have a duty not to increase the risks inherent in sports participation.
•    In interscholastic and intercollegiate competition, the host school and its agents owe a duty to home and visiting players alike to, at a minimum, not increase the risks inherent in the sport.

Holding
•    The appellate court’s judgment was reversed.


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Moore v. Hartley Motors case brief

The beautiful city of Palmer Alaska.

Moore v. Hartley Motors

36 P.3d 628

Procedural History
•    The appellant (injured party) appealed the judgment of the Superior Court in Palmer (Alaska), which granted summary judgment to the appellees: the safety class instructor, the organizations that developed and offered the class, and the owner of the property on which the class took place, in an action for damages arising from an injury sustained during an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) safety class.

Facts
•    The injured party was injured when she drove her ATV over a rock and the vehicle rolled over. -Before participating in the class, the injured party signed a release of liability.
-In the injured party’s damages action, the trial court granted summary judgment for appellees.
•    On appeal, the supreme court determined the trial court did not err in rejecting the injured party’s claim that the release was invalid for failure of consideration. In addition, the supreme court found the release did not present a violation of public policy. However, the supreme court concluded even if there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding a misrepresentation, the trial court erred in failing to consider the scope of the release signed by the injured party. Based on the language of the release, the supreme court concluded the injured party agreed to release appellees only from liability for injuries sustained as a result of participation in the ATV riding and safety class. The supreme court advised the allegedly improper course layout could be actionable if the course posed a risk beyond ordinary negligence related to the inherent risks of off-road ATV riding assumed by the release.

Rule
•    A court errs in failing to consider the scope of a release before granting summary judgment in a negligence action.

Application
•    An otherwise valid release is ineffective when releasing a defendant from liability would violate public policy.
•    As with any contract, a release of liability is only valid to the extent that it reflects a conspicuous and unequivocally expressed intent to release from liability.
•    An exculpatory release can be enforced if the intent to release a party from liability for future negligence is conspicuously and unequivocally expressed.
•    For purposes of an exculpatory clause, if a given danger can be eliminated or mitigated through the exercise of reasonable care, it is not a necessary danger and is therefore not an inherent risk of the activity.
•    For purposes of an exculpatory clause, an “unreasonable risk” has been described as one for which the likelihood and gravity of the harm threatened outweighs the utility of the conduct and the burden on the defendant for removing the danger.
•    An exculpatory clause should not be upheld where the negligent act falls greatly below the standard established by law for protection of others.

Holding
•    The supreme court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
-Trial Court erred in granting summary judgement.
-Genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the injury resulted from unreasonable dangers that were not within the scope of the release.


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Bryant v. Adventist Health System/West case brief

Bryant v. Adventist Health System/West (2001)
289 F.3d 1162

Facts
-The decedent sought treatment at the hospital operators’ emergency room for coughing up blood and a fever.
-Based on an x-ray, the emergency room physician diagnosed pneumonia and asthma.
-The physician failed to detect a large lung abscess (an admitted emergency condition) from the x-ray, and, after administering the medication, discharged the decedent.
-When another doctor read the x-ray and discovered the ABCs, the decedent was admitted to the hospital as an inpatient.
-The decedent was then transferred to the intensive care unit of another hospital and later released, after which he suddenly died.

Procedural History
-Plaintiff heirs sued several defendants, including defendant hospital operators, arising from the death of the heirs’ decedent. The claims against the hospital operators included violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).
-The heirs appealed the grant of summary judgment to the hotel operators by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Issue
-What duty of care does a hospital have?

Holding
-Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, a hospital has a duty to stabilize only those emergency medical conditions that its staff detects.  HOWEVER, A hospital may be found liable  if the screening examination is so cursory that it is not designed to identify acute and severe symptoms that alert the physician of the need for immediate medical attention to prevent serious bodily injury.

Application/Rules
-If an individual seeks emergency care from a hospital with an emergency room, and if that hospital participates in the Medicare program, then the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital’s emergency department to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition exists.
-If the hospital’s medical staff determines that there is an emergency medical condition, then, except under certain circumstances, the staff must “stabilize” the patient before transferring or discharging the patient.
-To stabilize means to provide such medical treatment of the condition as may be necessary to assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of the condition is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility.
-Transfer includes both discharge and movement to another facility.
-Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, an “emergency medical condition” is defined in part as: a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in (1) placing the health of the individual in serious jeopardy, (2) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (3) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.
-The United States Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) holds that a hospital does not violate the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, if it fails to detect or if it misdiagnoses an emergency condition. An individual who receives substandard medical care may pursue medical malpractice remedies under state law.

Conclusion
•    The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court.


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Mercy Medical Center, Inc. v. Winnebago County case brief

Mercy Medical Center, Inc. v. Winnebago County case summary (*)
206 N.W.2d 198 (1973)

Facts
-A patient arrived at Mercy Medical Center suffering from a self-induced abortion which was incomplete.
-The patient received immediate hospitalization and care. 
-There was no previous authorization of the hospital service by the county, and a proper notice of the rendering of the service was given to the county by the hospital.
-The patient refused to cooperate with the county official that visited her in the hospital to gather information that was required by the county (a requirement of the county paying the bill).
-The county denied liability and was sued by the hospital after a judgement against the patient for a bill that was not paid.

Procedural History
-The hospital, appellant, seeks review of a Circuit Court judgment that was entered in favor of the County. 


Holding
-A county's liability for emergency relief under the statute was not excused when a person that otherwise met the requirements of the general relief statute refused to make an application.
-The court stated that the hospital's right to recover under the Wisconsin statute was not conditioned upon a recipient's subsequent action or inaction or even a refusal to apply for relief.
-Reversed.

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St. John v. Pope case brief

St. John v. Pope (1995)
901 S.W.2d 420

Facts
-Pope came to the emergency room of Central Texas Medical Center complaining of back pain and fever.
-Pope had recently undergone back surgery and epidural injections, and his white blood cell count was extremely high.
-The emergency room physician, Dr. Suarez, examined Pope and initially diagnosed the patient as having lower back pain and acute psychosis.
-Pope's wife asked to transfer her husband to Round Rock Hospital because the couple lived in Austin and the physician who had previously treated Pope practiced at the Round Rock Hospital.
-Meanwhile, Suarez telephoned Dr. Holland St. John at home.
-St. John was a board-certified internist and on call at the hospital on the evening in question.
-Suarez recounted to St. John that he had received a patient for evaluation of fever and back pain who had a history of recent back surgery.
-Because St. John's area of specialization was not neurology or neurosurgery, and the Center was not able to handle cases involving these specialties, St. John recommended that Pope be referred to a hospital with the requisite neurosurgeon or to the physician who had performed the surgery.
-Suarez agreed, and indicated that he would arrange the transfer.
-Suarez called Pope's doctor, but the Round Rock Hospital's emergency room refused to accept the transfer.
-Not wishing to hospitalize her husband in San Marcos, Mrs. Pope took her husband home against the advice of the staff at the Center. The following day, an ambulance transported Pope to an Austin hospital. There a lumbar puncture revealed that he was suffering from meningitis.
-Pope developed several permanent disabilities from the disease.
-The Popes sued the Center and the Round Rock Hospital, two Round Rock physicians, Suarez, and St. John. The petition alleged generally that the defendants failed to exercise professional care and were negligent.

Procedural History
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of petitioner and held that petitioner and respondent had not formed a physician-patient relationship such that petitioner owed a duty of care

Issue
-Does a doctor have a duty of care when there is no doctor-patient relationship?
"whether an on-call physician, consulted by an emergency room physician over the telephone, formed a physician-patient relationship by expressing his opinion that the patient be transferred to another facility, and if not, whether the physician owed duties outside that relationship.

Holding
No, without a doctor-patient relationship, the doctor does NOT have a duty of care.

Application
•    Physicians are not obligated to practice their profession or render services to everyone who asks. It is only with a physician’s consent, whether express or implied, that the doctor-patient relationship comes into being.
•    The duty to treat the patient with proper professional skill flows from the consensual relationship between the patient and physician, and only when that relationship exists can there be a breach of a duty resulting in medical malpractice.
•    The court concludes that a physician may decline treatment and thereby decline to create a physician-patient relationship, even on the basis of an erroneous conclusion that the patient’s condition is beyond his or her ability to treat. Creation of the physician-patient relationship does not require the formalities of a contract. The fact that a physician does not deal directly with a patient does not necessarily preclude the existence of a physician-patient relationship.
•    The mere fact that a doctor is “on call” does not in itself impose any duty

Holding
•    The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment that respondent patient take nothing from petitioner physician. A physician-patient relationship was not established between petitioner, as a consulting, on-call physician and respondent.

Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove case brief

Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove (1961)
174 A.2d 135

Procedural History
•    Defendant hospital appealed an order of the Superior Court, New Castle County (Delaware), which denied the hospital’s motion for summary judgment but held that the hospital was liable to plaintiff, the administrator of a decedent infant’s estate, for refusing to furnish medical treatment to the child in an emergency.

Facts
•    A baby was taken by his parents to the emergency room of a hospital, presenting a history of two days of high temperature, sleeplessness, and diarrhea. The nurse refused to admit the baby, saying it was hospital policy not to treat a patient who was already under the care of a physician. The parents returned home and made an appointment to see the child’s doctor that evening, but the child died in the afternoon of bronchial pneumonia. The administrator of the infant’s estate filed suit against the hospital. The trial court denied the hospital’s motion for summary judgment but held that the hospital was liable for refusing to furnish medical treatment in an emergency because it was a quasi-public institution.

Issue
•    What is the legal duty for a private hospital?
The Rule
•    A private hospital owes the public no duty to accept any patient not desired by it, and it is not necessary to assign any reason for its refusal to accept a patient for hospital service. HOWEVER, Liability on the part of a hospital may be predicated on the refusal of service to a patient in case of an unmistakable emergency.

Application
•    On appeal, the court affirmed the denial of summary judgment but disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning. The court explained that the hospital was a private institution and had the right to deny any person admission or treatment. However, a hospital’s liability could be predicated on the refusal of service to a patient in an unmistakable emergency. The case was remanded to the trial court for further development of the record.
•    The receipt of public funds and the exemption from taxation do not convert a private hospital into a public one. The rule has even been applied to a county-owned hospital if leased to and operated by a private corporation.
•    A private hospital owes the public no duty to accept any patient not desired by it, and it is not necessary to assign any reason for its refusal to accept a patient for hospital service.
•    A private hospital is under no legal obligation to the public to maintain an emergency ward, or, for that matter, a public clinic.
•    Liability on the part of a hospital may be predicated on the refusal of service to a patient in case of an unmistakable emergency.

Holding
•    The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the hospital’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings


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Le Roy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Railway case brief

Le Roy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Railway (1914)
232 U.S. 340

Procedural History
•    Plaintiff property owner brought an action against defendant railroad company to recover for destruction of his property lying adjacent to the railroad’s right of way. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit certified questions to the court concerning whether the property owner could be found contributorily negligent.

Facts
•    The negligence of the railroad was the immediate cause of the destruction of the property. The property was placed by its owner near the right of way of the railroad, but on the owner’s land. The issue was whether the latter fact constituted evidence of negligence of the owner to be submitted to the jury.
•    The court held that the rights of one man in the use of his property could not be limited by the wrongs of another. The doctrine of contributory negligence was entirely out of place. Although operation of a railroad was a legitimate use of property and other property in its vicinity may be subject to risks by it, a risk from wrongful operation was not one of them. Therefore, an owner of property was not limited in the uses of his property by its proximity to a railroad or subject to other risks than those which came from the careful operation of the road or unavoidable accident.

Rule
•    The uses by one owner of his property may not be limited by the wrongful uses of another owner.
•    A property owner’s use of his property cannot be curtailed to accommodate a neighbor’s negligence.


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Christensen v. Royal School District case brief

Christensen v. Royal School Dist. (2005)
156 Wn.2d 62

Procedural History
•    Plaintiff child and plaintiff parents brought suit, in federal district court, against defendant school district, defendant principal, and defendant teacher, alleging that teacher had sexually abused the child and the district and the principal were negligent in hiring and supervising the teacher. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington certified a question for clarification.

Facts
•    The child, a 13 year old, had engaged in sexual activity with the teacher in his classroom. Defendants alleged that the child had consented to have sex with the teacher. The district court asked whether a 13-year-old victim of sexual abuse, who brought a negligence action, could have contributory fault assessed against her under the Washington Tort Reform Act. In responding with a “no,” the supreme court concluded that, as a matter of law, a child under the age of 16 could not have contributory fault assessed against her for her participation in this type of relationship. She lacked the capacity to consent, and she was under no legal duty to protect herself from the sexual abuse. Societal interests embodied in the criminal laws protecting children from sexual abuse had to apply equally in the civil arena when harm was caused to the child by an adult perpetrator of sexual abuse or a third party in a position to control that person’s conduct. Second, the idea that a student had a duty to protect herself from sexual abuse at school by her teacher conflicted with the well-established law that a school district had an enhanced and solemn duty to protect minor students in its care.

Rule
•    Children do not have a duty to protect themselves from sexual abuse by their teachers. Moreover, the supreme court concludes that contributory fault may not be assessed against a 13-year-old child based on the failure to protect herself from being sexually abused when the defendant or defendants stand in a special relationship to the child and have a duty to protect the child.

Application
•    The legislature has rejected the notion, in the criminal arena, that a 13 year old is capable of consenting to sexual relations by adopting statutes that provide that an adult is guilty of a felony if he or she engages in sexual activity with a minor, even if the child victim “consented” to engage in the sexual conduct.
•    The notion that minors are incapable of meaningful consent in a criminal law context should apply in the civil arena and command a consistent result.
•    A defense of contributory fault should not be available to a perpetrator of sexual abuse or to a third party that is in a position to control the perpetrator.
•    A school has a special relationship with the students in its custody and a duty to protect them from reasonably anticipated dangers.
•    Contributory fault may not be assessed against a 13-year-old child when that child brings a civil action against a school district and a school principal for sexual abuse by a teacher.

Holding
•    The court holds that a child under the age of 16 years may not be assessed with contributory fault for participating in a sexual relationship with a teacher in an action against a school district and/or school principal for negligent hiring or negligent supervision of the teacher.


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Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corporation case brief

Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corporation (1972)
60 N.J. 402

Procedural History
•    Plaintiffs, minor worker and his father, challenged an order of the Superior Court (New Jersey) that affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ action for negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of warranty of fitness of purpose in a products liability case.

Facts
•    Plaintiff minor worker was injured while operating a machine for his employer, and he and plaintiff father filed an action for negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of warranty of fitness of purpose against defendant manufacturer in a products liability case. The trial court dismissed the action and the superior court affirmed.
•    On appeal, the court reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the evidence was sufficient to withstand a motion for dismissal on the theory of either negligence or strict liability. On the strict liability issue, the court determined that where there was an unreasonable risk of harm to the user of a machine that had no protective safety device, a jury could have inferred that the machine was defective in design unless it found that the manufacturer’s addition of a safety device would have rendered the machine unusable for its intended purposes. The court also found that defendant did not have the right as a matter of law to assume that the user would provide a safety device; thus, it was error to dismiss the negligence action. The court concluded that under the facts, the defense of contributory negligence was unavailable.

Issue
•    Is The defense of contributory negligence is unavailable of policy and justice dictate?

Rule
•    The defense of contributory negligence is unavailable of policy and justice dictate.
•    If the duty of the mfr.(defendant) Is to prevent the plaintiff from being negligent (installing safety equip.) then the plaintiff shouldn’t be held contributory negligent.

Application
•    Where there is an unreasonable risk of harm to the user of a machine which has no protective safety device, the jury may infer that the machine was defective in design unless it finds that the incorporation by the manufacturer of a safety device would render the machine unusable for its intended purposes.
•    Contributory negligence may be a defense to a strict liability action as well as to a negligence action. However, in negligence cases the defense has been held to be unavailable where considerations of policy and justice dictate.

Holding
•    We hold that under the facts presented to us in this case the defense of contributory negligence is unavailable.
•    The court reversed the superior court’s order affirming the dismissal of an action for negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of warranty of fitness of purpose in a products liability case after plaintiff minor worker was injured while using a machine at work because the evidence was sufficient to withstand a motion for dismissal on the theory of either negligence or strict liability. A new trial was ordered.


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Wassell v. Adams case brief

Wassell v. Adams (1989)
865 F.2d 849

Procedural History
•    Plaintiff motel guest challenged the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which found that defendant motel owners were negligent and that their negligence was the proximate cause of an assault on plaintiff but reduced substantially the damage award based on a finding that plaintiff was contributorily negligent.

Facts
•    Plaintiff motel guest was raped in her motel room by a man who she let into her room late at night for a glass of water. Plaintiff filed an action against defendant motel owners alleging that defendants were negligent in failing to warn plaintiff of the dangerous nature of the neighborhood or take precautions to protect her against the assault. The district court jury found that defendants were negligent and assessed damages of $ 850,000, but in addition found that plaintiff had also been negligent and that her negligence was 97 percent to blame for the attack. The jury awarded only $ 25,500 in damages. The district court judge denied plaintiff’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial.
•    On appeal, the court affirmed. The court held that defendants’ conduct was not willful and wanton such that plaintiff’s negligence was irrelevant. The court also held that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in determining that the jury’s verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence.

Rule
•    A jury’s finding of comparative negligence will not be disturbed unless clearly contrary to legal standards.

Application
•    The federal standard is that a new trial can be granted only when the jury’s verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, and the court of appeals can reverse only when persuaded that in applying this standard the district judge abused his discretion.

Holding
•    The court affirmed, holding that defendants were negligent but not guilty of willful and wanton conduct and that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in finding that the jury’s verdict that plaintiff motel guest was contributorily negligent was not against the clear weight of the evidence.


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Marshall v. Nugent case brief

Marshall v. Nugent (1955)
222 F.2d 604

Procedural History
•    Co-defendants and plaintiff cross-appealed judgments of the district court in an action alleging negligence for injuries suffered while plaintiff attempted to warn oncoming traffic of dangerous traffic condition.

Legally Significant Facts
•    Three appeals arose from judgments in favor of injured plaintiff. The first, by defendant oil company, alleged error on grounds of lower court’s refusal of motion for directed verdict at close of all the evidence as to contributory negligence as a matter of law; that defendant’s acts constituted merely a condition, not a proximate cause, of harm; and employee’s conduct was outside scope of employment.
•    The court found plaintiff acted as reasonable person to warn oncoming traffic of accident; plaintiff’s injury was not remote and occurred while accident scene still existed; and oil company’s employee briefly stopped while in the course of authorized journey. The court found plaintiff’s contention that lower court’s judgment in favor of co-defendant, driver of automobile that struck plaintiff, was proper because no evidence of substantial or prejudicial error at trial existed. The court found that defendant oil company lacked standing to assert indemnification.

Rule
•    The defendant remains liable for the full consequences of his negligent act when the intervening force is one which a reasonable man would have foreseen as likely to occur under the circumstances, and the issue of foreseeability remains a question of fact for the jury.

Application
•    To establish liability it is not necessarily true that the defendant’s culpable act must be shown to have been the next or immediate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The defendant’s act may be more remote in the chain of events; and the plaintiff’s injury may more immediately have been caused by an intervening force of nature, or an intervening act of a third person whether culpable or not, or even an act by the plaintiff bringing himself in contact with the dangerous situation resulting from the defendant’s negligence.
•    In dealing with issues of negligence and proximate causation, the trial judge has to make a preliminary decision whether the issues are such that reasonable men might differ on the inferences to be drawn. This preliminary decision is said to be a question of law, for it is one which the court has to decide, but it is nevertheless necessarily the exercise of a judgment on the facts, just as an appellate court may have to exercise a judgment on the facts, in reviewing whether the trial judge should or should not have left the issue to the jury.

Holding
•    Court affirmed judgment against defendant oil company as plaintiff’s attempt to warn was reasonable and did not constitute contributory negligence; extra risks created by defendant’s negligence were not over after collision; court affirmed judgment against plaintiff as jury verdict was not so decidedly against evidence as to shock conscience.


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Ventricelli v. Kinney System Rent A Car, Inc. case brief

Ventricelli v. Kinney System Rent A Car, Inc. (1978)
45 N.Y.2d 950

Procedural History
•    Plaintiff lessee brought a personal injury action against defendants, lessor and automobile owner, resulting from an automobile accident. The lessee brought a defective product complaint against third-party defendant manufacturer. The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, modified the trial court’s order to dismiss the action against the lessor so as to limit recovery from the automobile owner. The lessee and lessor appealed.

Facts
•    The lessee was injured when she was struck by the automobile owner’s car while trying to close the trunk lid of her leased vehicle while parked along side a curb. There was evidence that the trunk lid repeatedly flew open and that several attempts to repair the lid failed.
•    The court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The court held that the negligence of the lessor was not the proximate cause of the lessee’s injuries because it was not reasonably foreseeable that the lessee, while in a safe area attempting to close the defective trunk lid, would be struck by another automobile. The court concluded that effective cause of the lessee’s injuries was solely the negligence of the automobile owner.

Rule
•    Recovery for negligence may be obtained only where the injuries incurred were reasonably foreseeable from the acts or omissions constituting the breach of duty.

Application
•    Proximate cause and foreseeability are relative terms, nothing more than a convenient formula for disposing of the case. The range of reasonable apprehension is at times a question for the court, and at times, if varying inferences are possible, a question for the jury. So it is with proximate cause and foreseeability.
•    The word “proximate” means that because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point

Holding
•    The court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court in modifying the lower court’s order to dismiss the lessee’s personal injury action against the lessor.


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Derdiarian v. Felix Contractor Corp case brief

Derdiarian v. Felix Contractor Corp (1980)
51 N.Y.2d 308

Procedural History
•    Defendant employer sought review of an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, holding the employer liable in a negligence action for injuries suffered by plaintiff employee, who was struck by a car at his work site.

Facts
•    Plaintiff employee was injured on an excavation job when he was struck by a car driven by a man suffering an epileptic seizure. Plaintiff and plaintiff’s wife sued defendant employer, defendant driver, and defendant contractor for negligence, claiming that the employer failed to maintain a safe work site by erecting a traffic barrier. The trial court found for plaintiff, apportioning defendant employer’s liability at 55 percent.
•    On appeal, defendant employer argued that there was no causal link between the employer’s breach of duty and plaintiff’s injuries. The court affirmed because plaintiff’s injuries were a foreseeable result of the risk created by the employer.
The Rule
•    An intervening act will not serve as a superseding  cause, relieving the defendant of liability, where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk which rendered the defendant negligent.

Application
•    Depending upon the nature of the case, a variety of factors may be relevant in assessing legal cause. Given the unique nature of the inquiry in each case, it is for the finder of fact to determine legal cause, once the court has been satisfied that a prima facie case has been established.
•    To carry the burden of proving a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must generally show that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury. Plaintiff need not demonstrate, however, that the precise manner in which the accident happened, or the extent of injuries, was foreseeable.
•    Where the acts of a third person intervene between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury, the causal connection is not automatically severed. In such a case, liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant’s negligence. If an intervening act is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant’s conduct, it may well be a superseding act which breaks the causal nexus. Because questions concerning what is foreseeable and what is normal may be the subject of varying inferences, as is the question of negligence itself, these issues generally are for the fact finder to resolve.
•    An intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause, and relieve an actor of responsibility, where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk which renders the actor negligent.

Holding
•    The court affirmed the decision holding defendant employer liable for negligence because plaintiff employee’s injuries were a foreseeable result of defendant employer’s failure to maintain safe work site.

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Delaney v. Reynolds case brief

Delaney v. Reynolds (2005)
3 Mass. App. Ct. 239

Procedural History
•    Plaintiff girlfriend appealed the judgment of the Worcester Superior Court Department (Massachusetts), which granted summary judgment in favor of defendant boyfriend. The girlfriend had brought a negligence action alleging that the boyfriend knew that she had serious emotional and mental problems, including thoughts of suicide, but nonetheless negligently kept his loaded gun in a place readily accessible to her.

Facts
•    The boyfriend was a police officer. It was his practice to store his handgun, loaded and unlocked, in his bedroom in a duffle bag or in a bureau drawer. On a night when the girlfriend had been drinking and taking drugs, the parties fought, and the boyfriend told her to pack her belongings. While packing, she noticed the duffle bag, removed the handgun, aimed it at a window, and pulled the trigger twice. The gun did not fire. The boyfriend jumped from a sofa and ran after the girlfriend who then went into the master bedroom, put the gun beneath her chin, and pulled the trigger. The gun fired and a bullet entered her chin and existed her right check. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the boyfriend upon the ground that the girlfriend’s intervening act of shooting herself was a superseding cause of her injuries.

Rule
•    Suicide or an intentionally self-inflicted injury does not constitute an intervening and superseding cause.
•    HOWEVER, there are some jurisdictions where this wouldn’t even make it to the jury, thus Suicide or an intentionally self-inflicted injury does constitute an intervening and superseding cause.

Application
•    Negligent conduct is the proximate cause of an injury if the injury to the plaintiff was a foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligent conduct. A result is foreseeable if it was not highly extraordinary. That formulation is not altered when the original negligent act is followed by an independent act or event that actively operates in bringing about a plaintiff’s injury, that is, a so-called intervening cause. Where the intervening occurrence was foreseeable by a defendant, the causal chain of events remains intact and the original negligence remains a proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injury. Where, however, the intervening event was of a type so extraordinary that it could not reasonably have been foreseen, that new event is deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury and relieves a defendant of liability
•    A purposeful act of suicide, rather than any antecedent negligence, will be deemed the legal cause of a decedent’s injury unless the defendant’s negligence rendered the decedent unable to appreciate the self-destructive nature of the suicidal act or, even if able to appreciate the nature of the act, unable to resist the suicidal impulse.

Holding
•    The court reversed the judgment.


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Hughes v. lord advocate case brief

Hughes v. lord advocate (1963)
Ac 837 hi

Facts
•    Boy fell in manhole

Rule
•    Where the actual cause of an injury results from an unforeseeable action of a known risk, the unforeseeability of the manner in which the risk occurs does not excuse negligence.

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Palsgraf v. Long Island Railway Company case brief

Palsgraf v. Long Island Railway Company case summary (1922)
248 N.Y. 339

Procedural History
•    Defendant railroad appealed a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (New York), which affirmed the trial court’s holding that the railroad was responsible for injuries to plaintiff passenger resulting from an explosion.

Facts
•    The passenger was standing on a platform of the railroad after buying a ticket. A train stopped at the station, and a man ran forward to catch it. When he attempted to board the train in haste, he dropped a package containing fireworks. As a result, the passenger was injured from the subsequent explosion and sought to hold the railroad liable for negligence. Pursuant to a jury verdict, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the passenger. The appellate court affirmed, and the railroad appealed.
•    Upon final determination, the court reversed the judgment, holding that the passenger failed to prove that the railroad’s alleged negligence proximately caused her injuries. Essentially, the court held that under the foreseeability test, it was not reasonable to hold that the railroad’s alleged negligence was the cause of the passenger’s injuries. Rather, it was the explosion that was the proximate cause, and the railroad could not have reasonably expected such a disaster.

Issue
•    Does negligence liability exist only for injuries to foreseeable plaintiffs

Rule
•    Liability for damages based on negligence exists only where the injuries to the plaintiff were reasonably foreseeable from the act or omission.

Application
•    Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest or the violation of a right. Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do. Negligence is the absence of care, according to the circumstances.
•    If no hazard is apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent and harmless, at least to outward seeming, with reference to a plaintiff, does not take to itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a wrong, though apparently not one involving the risk of bodily insecurity, with reference to someone else. In every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which would have averted or avoided the injury. The ideas of negligence and duty are strictly correlative
•    The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension. This does not mean, of course, that one who launches a destructive force is always relieved of liability if the force, though known to be destructive, pursues an unexpected path. It is not necessary that a defendant should have had notice of the particular method in which an accident would occur, if the possibility of an accident was clear to the ordinarily prudent eye. Some acts, such as shooting, are so imminently dangerous to any one who may come within reach of the missile, however unexpectedly, as to impose a duty of prevision not far from that of an insurer. Even today, and much oftener in earlier stages of the law, one acts sometimes at one’s peril. Under this head, it may be, fall certain cases of what is known as transferred intent, an act willfully dangerous to A resulting by misadventure in injury to B. These cases aside, wrong is defined in terms of the natural or probable, at least when unintentional. The range of reasonable apprehension is at times a question for the court, and at times, if varying inferences are possible, a question for the jury.
•    Negligence is not a tort unless it results in the commission of a wrong, and the commission of a wrong imports the violation of a right, such as the right to be protected against interference with one’s bodily security. But bodily security is protected, not against all forms of interference or aggression, but only against some. One who seeks redress at law does not make out a cause of action by showing without more that there has been damage to his person. If the harm was not willful, he must show that the act as to him had possibilities of danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the doing of it though the harm was unintended. Affront to personality is still the keynote of the wrong.

Dissent
Liability is limited by proximate cause, not by defining the scope of duty or negligence.

Holding
•    The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and dismissed the complaint.

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The Evolution of Legal Marketing: From Billboards to Digital Leads

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