Bowsher v. Synar case brief summary (1986)
v Budget balancing statute gave Comptroller General certain powers of review over executive branch budget
v Constitution
does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the supervision of
officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts (only
congressional role in removal of executive officers that Const. allows
is impeachment process)
v CG is only removable by Congress, so is viewed as officer of the legislative branch – allowing
CG (legislative officer) to control execution of laws is legislative
encroachment on executive (separation of powers violation)
o CG exercises executive power by exercising independent judgment and evaluation with respect to budget estimates
o Interpreting and applying congressional act is essence of executive power
v Once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends
v Stevens concurrence
o Congress can’t delegate policymaking power to a smaller part of itself (needs to use b&p)
o Doesn’t agree that CG necessarily exercises executive power (could be characterized as legislative)
v White dissent
o Not so clear that CG is under legislative control or treading on executive functions.
v Blackmun dissent
o Should find removal powers unconstitutional, not the whole act
o Based on separation of powers doctrine that Congress can’t maintain control over officer assigned executive power
No comments:
Post a Comment