Johnson v. Cherry case brief summary
726 S.W.2d 4 (1987)
CASE FACTS
Petitioner, a landowner, gave a deed to his land to respondents, a bank and its director, in exchange for enough money to pay his debts. The deed contained a repurchase option and respondents leased the land to petitioner. When petitioner did not pay his lease obligations, respondents sued to evict him.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The trial court found that the deed was a mortgage on petitioner's homestead and thus void under Tex. Constitutional art. XVI, § 50, rescinded the deed, awarded petitioner damages and granted nothing to respondents. The appellate court reversed the judgment.
DISCUSSION
CONCLUSION
The court reversed the judgment reversing the trial court's finding that the deed petitioner, a landowner, gave to respondents, a bank and its director, was actually an invalid mortgage on petitioner's homestead, entered judgment vesting title to the land in petitioner, and remanded the case to determine the amount owing on the loan. The court held parole evidence was admissible to show the deed was a mortgage, which petitioner had to repay.
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726 S.W.2d 4 (1987)
CASE SYNOPSIS
Petitioner, a landowner, sought review
of a judgment from the Shelby County (Texas) 11th District Court of
Appeals that reversed the judgment from the trial court finding that
the deed petitioner gave to respondents, a bank and its director, was
a mortgage on petitioner's homestead and invalid under Tex.
Constitutional art. XVI, § 50, awarded petitioner damages, and
granted nothing to respondents on the loan.CASE FACTS
Petitioner, a landowner, gave a deed to his land to respondents, a bank and its director, in exchange for enough money to pay his debts. The deed contained a repurchase option and respondents leased the land to petitioner. When petitioner did not pay his lease obligations, respondents sued to evict him.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The trial court found that the deed was a mortgage on petitioner's homestead and thus void under Tex. Constitutional art. XVI, § 50, rescinded the deed, awarded petitioner damages and granted nothing to respondents. The appellate court reversed the judgment.
DISCUSSION
- On appeal, the court held that parole evidence was admissible to show the intent of the parties, and that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the parties intended their transaction to be a mortgage despite inconsistent testimony.
- Thus, the existence of a debt would be imputed by law.
- The court held that repayment of the loan was a condition precedent to the rescission of the deed.
- Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, rendered judgment vesting title to the land in petitioner, and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the amount that petitioner owed respondents.
CONCLUSION
The court reversed the judgment reversing the trial court's finding that the deed petitioner, a landowner, gave to respondents, a bank and its director, was actually an invalid mortgage on petitioner's homestead, entered judgment vesting title to the land in petitioner, and remanded the case to determine the amount owing on the loan. The court held parole evidence was admissible to show the deed was a mortgage, which petitioner had to repay.
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