Corporations Outline

 Corporations Outline

Law of Agency

1. General Introduction

General Observations

• Relationship of agency and authority is viewed as position of status, not of contract.

Gorton v. Doty (Idaho 1937) (p.1)

• Facts: Pre-mandatory automobile insurance case. Involved person loaning car to another on condition that only that other can drive it. Is the other an agent of the car’s owner?
• Court imposed a structure of relationship regardless of the agreement between the parties.

A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc. (Minn. 1981) (p.7)

• Facts: Case arose out of financial collapse of Warren Seed & Grain Co. Defendant had loaned money and exercised significant influence over operations.
• “Control” is used as the touchstone for the existence of an agency relationship.
• The lender began to become involved in the day-to-day business of the borrower.
• Agency deals with a set of conditions, not a single factor.

2. Contractual Obligations

General Observations

• How do you defend against employees who use their delegated authority irresponsibly?
  • Employee handbook including guidelines
  • Require approval by the Board or a third party
  • Internal audits of employee’s transactions
• Note that when a business sets up an interface such as a telephone hotline or a website, it may be liable under a theory of apparent authority even if it is “captured” by an unauthorized person.

Actual Authority

• Expressed: Verbally or through writing granting agency.
• Implied: If an action is so understood between two people, it creates a legally binding agency relationship. There is implied authority to do those things that are inherent in the job.

Apparent Authority

• Ability to bind a principal against the principal’s will.
• Note that apparent authority is rooted in status and not in a notion of estoppel (i.e., misrepresentation of fact).
• Ways in which apparent authority can arise:
  • Continued course of dealing: Actions of principle give third party impression that an agent is acting on behalf of principal. Third party is responsible for initially checking with principal, but not unreasonably.
  • If a principal makes agent’s limitations secret, then third party can hold principal responsible. See Watteau v. Fenwick.
  • Trade practices or power of position.
  • Continuation/Termination: Must give notice than an agent has been terminated.

Inherent Authority

• Cases where there is some prenumbral authority beyond actual authority, but not under apparent authority circumstances. In other words, trust in an agent alone gives the agent some authority beyond her mandate.

Mill Street Church of Christ v. Hogan (Ky.App. 1990) (p.14)

• Distinguishes implied and apparent authority. First is constructively determined actual authority. Second is a matter of appearances.

Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc. (3d Cir. 1960) (p.16)

• Question was whether an extremely high compensation contract had been granted by a corporate officer with authority to bind the corporation.

Three-Seventy Leasing Corporation v. Ampex Corporation (5^th Cir. 1976) (p.22)

• Company policy requires that Ampex (Mueller) sign an agreement entered into by Joyce. Mueller didn’t sign. However, there was evidence that Mueller was trying to get the benefit of the contract without being bound.
• Test for apparent authority is whether a reasonably prudent person would have supposed that the agent has the authority he purports to exercise.
  • Note: Listening to the agent’s representations of her authority may not be enough. If it is reasonable to do so, the third party should check with the principal.
• This case shows that if you sit on a contract, you may still be responsible for it.

Watteau v. Fenwick (Q.B. 1892) (p.25)

• Facts: Case where a pub manager held himself out to be independent, but was actually bound by a principal and was not authorized to enter into contracts.
• Inherent authority might be necessary in cases where the agent pretends not to have a principal but actually does. However, the agent does not have the power to enter into an agreement with the third party. The third party would want to get at the principal, even though the case would be neither actual nor apparent authority.

Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc. (SDNY 1917) (p.28)

• No implied actual authority because the position was unique at the time.
• Hand says that the case was analogous to a regular concert recital (which ordinarily would not give the agent power to bind the company), but then goes on.
• Situation more closely resembles an advertising campaign and therefore is an example of apparent authority.
• Note that there is a very subtle distinction in reasoning: there can’t be implied authority in a novel circumstance, because the implication involves an appeal to established custom. However, there can be apparent authority in a novel situation because it can be established by analogy to a familiar situation.

Nogales Service Center v. Atlantic Richfield Company (Ariz. 1980) (p.31)

• Classic inherent authority case. A principal can be liable for acts within an agent’s domain even if the principal has forbidden the agent from acting.
• Inherent authority most often occurs when there is a “general agent” who is restricted from entering into a particular contract, but whose general domain of authority includes actions like the one entered into.

Ratification and Estoppel

• Ratification occurs when an agent acts to bind a principal without authority. However, the principal comes to have knowledge of the agent’s act (all of its material aspects) and does not renounce it.
• Seems like both silence and affirmative statement can act as ratification.

Botticello v. Stefanovicz (Conn. 1979) (p.36)

• Ratification requires acceptance of the results of the act with an intent to ratify, and with full knowledge of all the material circumstances.

Hoddeson v. Koos Bros. (N.J.Super 1957) (p.40)

• Someone pretended to be a salesman at a store and collected payment from a customer. Is the store liable to the customer?
• The proprietor has a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent someone who is not his agent from acting as such.

Agent’s Liability on the Contract

• If A enters a contract with T, purportedly on behalf of P, but isn’t really the agent. Normally, T would sue both on alternate grounds.

Atlantic Salmon A/S v. Curran (Mass.App.Ct. 1992) (p. 43)

• Defendant represented himself as the agent of a corporation that did not exist.
• It is the duty of an agent, if he does not want to avoid personal liability to disclose not only that he is acting as an agent but also the identity of his principal.

3. Obligations in Tort: Scope of Employment

Franchiser to Franchisee

• Issue is whether there is a relationship of principal and agent between the two.
• Note that control is often the test.
• However, even if there isn’t control, the franchiser may still be liable under a theory of estoppel or apparent authority.
• Usually, the franchise agreement will require that the franchisee will indemnify the franchiser for any tort claim. The franchisee will take out insure to cover this indemnity.

Employer to Employee

• Issue is whether a particular action should be considered within the scope of employment.
• Servants are distinguished from independent contractors. There are two types of independent contractors:
  • Agent-type IC: has agreed to act on behalf of a principal, but is not subject to principal’s control.
  • Non-agent-type IC: operates independently and simply enters into an arm’s length transaction with others.

Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin (Tex. 1949) (p.48)

• The fact that the proprietor of the gas station in question did not consider himself to be controlled by Humble is not dispositive. Must look at actual content of the relationship.
• Terms of the agreement between Humble and the proprietor are evidence.

Hoover v. Sun Oil Company (Del. 1965) (p.50)

• Non-binding advice by the agent of a franchiser does not in itself constitute a master-servant relationship.
• Control over details of day-to-day operations is the key test.

Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc. (Va. 1975) (p.53)

• Franchising is a common business form. Status of franchisee as independent contractor should be recognized by courts.
• Regulatory provisions of a typical licensing contract do not constitute a master-servant relationship.
• Control of details of the work still the test.

Billops v. Magness Construction Co. (Del.Sup. 1978) (p.58)

• Test is whether the franchiser is merely ‘setting standards’ or actually exerting control over daily operations.
• Can be ‘apparent agency’ in tort if the litigant can show reliance on the indicia of authority originated by the principal. Such reliance must be reasonable.

Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States (2d Cir. 1968) (p.61)

• Test of scope of employment is whether the principal could have reasonably foreseen that “arise out of and in the course of” agent’s employment.
• Activities of the enterprise do not reach into areas where the servant does not create risks different from those attendant on the activities of the community in general.

Manning v. Grimsley (1^st Cir. 1981) (p.66)

• Test of whether an employer is liable for an employee’s assault: did the plaintiff’s activity interfere with the employee’s ability to perform his duties successfully.

Arguello v. Conoco, Inc. (5^th Cir. 2000) (p.69)

• Factors used in determining scope of employment include:
  • Time, place, and purpose of the act
  • Similarity to acts which the servant is authorized to perform
  • Whether the act is commonly performed by servants
  • The extent of departure from normal methods
  • Whether the master would reasonably expect such act would be performed

Majestic Realty Associates, Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co. (N.J. 1959) (p.76)

• Person is not normally liable for the negligent actions of a contractor involving work that is not in itself a nuisance. Exceptions are:
  • When landowner retains control of the manner and means of doing the work which is the subject of the contract
  • Where the landowner engages an incompetent contractor
  • Activity is a nuisance per se
• Landowner is liable for work that creates an inherently dangerous situation

4. Initial Comment on Fiduciary Obligations

Reading v. Regem (K.B. 1948) (p.81)

• If a servant takes advantage of his service and violates his duty of honesty and good faith to make a profit for himself, he is accountable to the master.
• Evidence that servant takes advantage of employment. If cause of the profit is due to:
  • Company assets of which he has control
  • Company facilities he enjoys
  • Position he occupies

General Automotive Manufacturing Co. v. Singer (Wis.2d 1963) (p.84)

• Failure to disclose all material facts of a side business related to one’s employment can create accountability to one’s employer.

Law of Partnerships

1. Choice of Organizational Form

General Observations

• The structure of business associations is a matter of state rather than federal law.
• Many states use the ALI model codes. However, these uniform codes are affected by the different, potentially outcome-determinative interpretations of different state courts.
• Partnerships and corporations have fundamentally different tax structures:
  • Partnership income is taxed only once – as the annual personal income of partners.
  • Corporate income is taxed twice – once at the level of the corporate entity and once at the level of dividend outlays to investors.
• In practice, corporations don’t usually pay out most of their income in dividends, but instead reinvest it.
• Corporations also have ways of reducing their corporate tax burden. The payment of interest on debt is tax deductible and debt (such as bonds) can have many of the components of equity and still have the advantages of debt.
• Closely held corporations can distribute their profits in salary, pensions, etc.
• Service companies that sink costs and then extract profits – e.g., real estate companies, movie productions, mineral extraction – tend to be partnerships for tax reasons.

2. Partnership Formation and Existence

General Observations

• The General Partnership is the only form of business association that people can enter into without filing or without a written document. Thus, it is the default for business associations.
• Entity theory: Partnerships are tax-filing but not tax-paying entities. According to the RUPA, partnerships can sue and be sued as entities.
• In effect, partners are principals and agents of each other.
• Partnerships must be for-profit.

Fenwick v. Unemployment Compensation Commission (N.J. 1945) (p.92)

• Agreement between owner and employee said ‘partners’ because owner wanted to get out of paying unemployment insurance.
• There are several elements in determining the existence or non-existence of a partnership:
  • Intention of the parties (Partnership Agreement as evidence)
  • Right to share in profits
  • Ownership of partnership property and control of business
  • Community in power of administration
  • Language of the agreement [?]
  • Conduct of the parties toward third person
  • The rights of the parties on dissolution
• Holding: Agreement is evidence of a partnership but is not conclusive, except in cases of estoppel, where people represent themselves to others as partners.

Martin v. Peyton (N.Y. 1927) (p.97)

• Lenders to an investment firm wanted many conditions to protect their investments.
• Trustees [lenders] may inspect the firm books and veto any business they think is highly speculative or injurious without incurring partnership liability.
• A lender contracting for an ‘option’ for membership may be suspicious but is not dispositive.
• In modern times, this wouldn’t end up in court because the defendants were clearly creditors and not partners. However, in the early years of the UPA, courts weren’t sure how lenders and partners, as opposed to lenders and corporations, mixed.
• Even though the lenders weren’t liable, being a partnership rather than a corporation put them at more risk.

Southex Exhibitions, Inc. v. Rhode Island Builders Association, Inc. (1^st Cir. 2002) (p.102)

• Concerned whether a joint venture could be considered an ongoing partnership
• Issue was whether a profit sharing agreement amounted to proof of a partnership
• A share of profits in a business is prima facie evidence of a partnership unless these profits were received in payment:

• As a debt by installments or otherwise;
• As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord
• As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner
• As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits of the business
• As the consideration for the sale of a good will of a business or other property by installments or otherwise [?]

Young v. Jones (D.S.C. 1992) (p.107)

• Case concerns “partnership by estoppel”
• Plaintiffs were investors who had relied on an erroneous audit by PW-Bahamas, but were not customers of PW-Bahamas.
• They were suing PW-Bahamas and wanted to rope in the U.S. national Price Waterhouse partnership
• South Carolina law required that plaintiffs ‘extend credit’ to PW-Bahamas in reliance on its relationship with PW-US. In this case, since the plaintiffs were not clients of PW-Bahamas, they could not hold PW-US liable under a theory of partnership by estoppel.
• Note that this case was decided on contract grounds (privity) and did not reach the question of whether PW-US would have been liable if the plaintiffs had been clients of PW-Bahamas.

Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA)

• §101. Section on definitions.
• §103. Gives cases where presumptive (default) rules cannot be waived.
• §201. Declares that a partnership is an entity distinct from its partners.
• §202. Formation of a partnership.
  • §202(c)(2-3) shows that sharing gross revenue does not necessarily constitute a partnership. Thus, in real estate, it is common for commercial rental payment (as for a store in a mall) to be fixed rent and a percentage of sales. (see Southex for example of how this is applied)
• §301. Each partner is an agent of the partnership. An act of a partner is not binding if it is not work-related, unless authorized by the other partners.

3. Fiduciary Duties

General Observations

• Fiduciary duty (trust) can be divided into:
  • Negative obligations (e.g., non-competitiveness)
  • Affirmative obligations (e.g., to account over for benefits)
• Duty of care, despite RUPA, is not a fiduciary duty

Meinhard v. Salmon (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo) (p.111)

• In this case, one partner in a joint venture [Salmon] secretly entered into a new lease related to their business before their old lease had expired. Other partner [Meinhard] claimed that the new lease was property of the partnership.
• The opportunity for the new lease came about as a result of the partnership enterprise.
• Salmon should have disclosed the new opportunity to Meinhard, so the latter could have competed for the new lease.
• As the managing partner, Salmon owed a particular duty to his other partner.
• Lessons from this case:
  • Respond honestly to initial questions, or at least have a strategy for answering the question (e.g., evasion, stonewalling)
  • Write something into the partnership agreement concerning an exit strategy.

Bane v. Ferguson (7^th Cir. 1989) (Posner) (p.117)

• Question is whether a former partner [Bane] who has left the partnership but still has a pension has standing to sue his former partners for a breach of fiduciary duty that occurred after his departure.
• Court rules that Bane has no standing to sue.

Meehan v. Shaughnessy (Mass. 1989) (p.119)

• Case where law partners wanted to leave their firm and take clients with them.
• They did disclose the fact that they were leaving, but were secretive concerning which clients they intended to take, overly aggressive in planning to obtain clients’ consent, and disloyal in the substance and method of communicating with clients.
• It is okay to plan for competing against former partners, and to take steps such as setting up the physical space of their future office.
• It is a breach of duty to obtain an unfair advantage in competing for current clients while still a member of the partnership.

Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray (Ind.App.1990) (p.127)

• Case of partner with alcohol problem.
• Partners voted to expel him even though he had not relapsed into alcoholism, pursuant to the expulsion terms of the partnership agreement.
• An expulsion, even under the terms of a partnership agreement, is invalid if it is conducted in bad faith or for a predatory purpose.
• Holding: There was no bad faith or predatory purpose for the expulsion, therefore it is valid.
• Lessons from this case:
  • Law firms need expulsion arrangements without cause. Otherwise, you will definitely end up in court. (might anyway if the expelled partner argues that the expulsion was not in good faith)
  • One way of doing this while protecting partners is to give leaving partner a substantial monetary award.

Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA)

• §401. Sets out default rules. This is a central provision of the RUPA and courts take it increasingly seriously. Be prepared to think critically about its advantages and disadvantages.
  • §401(b) sharing profits and losses
  • §401(f) equal rights in management
  • §401(h) partner can only get remuneration for winding up (i.e., cannot collect salary in addition to partnership interest)
  • §401(i) unanimous consent of all partners required for bringing in new partners
  • §401(j) ordinary decisions are by majority of partners; extraordinary decisions must be unanimous
• §403. Partners have a right to inspect the books and records of the partnership.
• §404. Fiduciary duties:
  • §404(b) Duty of loyalty requires account to partnership for profits, property, etc.; don’t deal with partnership as or on behalf of a party with an interest adverse to the partnership; refrain from competing.
  • §404(c) Duty of care requires refraining from gross negligence, reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or knowing violation of the law.
  • §404(d) Requires good faith and fair dealing when exercising rights vis-à-vis the partnership.

4. Partnership Property and Management Rights

General Observations

• Remember that default rule gives majority of partners control over ordinary business operations.
• As of RUPA, mergers of partnerships and corporations are treated the same. Merger requires unanimity.

Putnam v. Shoaf (Ct. App. Of Tenn. 1981) (p.134)

• This case stands for the proposition that a partner does not have any rights to specific partnership property. The partnership interest is an undivided interest, like a joint tenancy.
• Thus, if the partnership had an unknown asset at the time of the transfer of partnership interest, such as an untapped oil reservoir or a legal claim, the former partner has no right to it.
• Case seems to support the entity theory of partnership against the notion that a partner can have an individual claim against a third party for damages to the partnership.

National Biscuit Company v. Stroud (N.C. 1959) (p.142)

• This case involved a deadlock in a two-person partnership.
• One partner can’t deny another equal partner power to bind the partnership. So, deadlocks can’t stop decisions.
• Lessons from this case:
  • Very important to have a dispute resolution mechanism in the partnership agreement. Options for resolving disputes include:
  • Resolution (mediation, negotiation, etc.)
  • Buy-out (dissociation)
  • Dissolution (winding up) of the partnership

Summers v. Dooley (Idaho 1971) (p.144)

• Summers, against Dooley’s prohibition, hired a third employee and paid him out of partnership funds.
• Court ruled that because Dooley made active and repeated objections, the employee should not have been paid out of partnership funds.
• This shows that equal partner cases can go either way. The outcome here was the opposite of National Biscuit.

Day v. Sidley & Austin (D.D.C. 1975) (p.146)

• In this case, Sidley was merging with another firm. Plaintiff was a partner at Sidley and chairman of the firm’s DC office. According to the plaintiff, the firm had decided to appoint a co-chairman of the DC office without telling him. Without knowing this fact, plaintiff had voted in favor of the merger.
• There was no mention of a right to any position within the firm in the Partnership Agreement.
• Other partners had no fiduciary obligation to maintain plaintiff in his position as sole chairman of the DC office.
• Here, the partnership agreement seemed to work.

Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA)

• §§501-03. Transferring Partnership Property and Interest:
  • §501. Partner is not a co-owner of partnership property.
  • §502. Only transferable interest of a partner in the partnership is the partner’s share of the profits and losses of the partnership and the partner’s right to receive distributions. The interest is personal property.
  • §503. A transfer is permissible, does not by itself cause the partner’s dissociation, and does not entitle the transferee to rights of management or participation in partnership’s business.

5. Dissociation and Dissolution

General Observations

• There is a terminology change between the old UPA and the RUPA:
  • Old UPA. Dissolution is changing of relationships as a result of a partner leaving a partnership. Winding up is closing everything down and sell assets.
  • RUPA. Dissociation is same as old dissolution – i.e., when a partner or partners leave the partnership. Winding up is the same as before.
• Note that there is no statutory right of expulsion. RUPA does allow for cases where a disbarred attorney may be expelled.
• RUPA allows for a judicial process on expulsion. This would be an equitable hearing on the merits. Judge may deny the course of action if she thinks it is not equitable.
• RUPA requires that there be notice of the dissociation to the other partners.
• Partnership agreements that provide for ouster for cause are bad because they would almost definitely have to go to court.
• One alternative to expulsion is to create term partnerships that require renewal.

Capital Accounts

• Capital account is different than share of partnership assets.

• There is a capital account for each partner. It is equal to:
  • + Contributions
  • + Share of profits
  • – Distribution to partner
  • – Losses

Owen v. Cohen (Cal 2d. 1941) (p.154)

• One partner in bowling alley partnership was a real jerk. Plaintiff brought the case to court for a court-ordered dissolution.
• Court agreed to dissolve the partnership.
• Why did Owen bring this case to court? Because he didn’t want Cohen to call it wrongful dissolution and go to court for settlement. Remember that bringing an action is not itself an act of wrongdoing.

Collins v. Lewis (Texas Ct. of App. 1955) (p.157)

• Collins was money man; Lewis was manager. Together they formed a partnership for a cafeteria. When costs became excessive, Collins filed for a court-mandated dissolution.
• Court distinguished between power to dissolve and right to dissolve. One always had power, but if one didn’t have a right, then one would be responsible for damages.
• By refusing a judicial dissolution, the court would force Collins to either pay damages or buy out Lewis’s share of the partnership.

Page v. Page (Cal 2d. 1961) (Traynor) (p.162)

• Partners were brothers. For years they had lost money in their business. Their major creditor was a corporation wholly owned by the plaintiff. Once the business started making modest amounts of money, the plaintiff wanted to dissolve the partnership.
• Note that the plaintiff would have benefited from the dissolution because as a creditor he would have been entitled to the assets of the partnership.
• Traynor ruled that the partnership was “at will” and therefore a party could unilaterally dissolve it. Nonetheless, the power to dissolve could not be undertaken in bad faith and therefore the court should refuse to recognize a proper dissolution.
• Note: Can’t square Page and Owen except on the equities. [why?]

Prentiss v. Sheffel (Ariz.App. 1973) (p.165)

• In a three person partnership at will, the two plaintiffs had shut out the defendant from management of the partnership. They applied for a court-supervised dissolution sale of the business. Trial court granted dissolution and auctioned off business.
• Plaintiffs successfully purchased business at the auction. Appellate court ruled that the purchase was rightful and not in bad faith.

Monin v. Monin (Ky.App.1989) (p.168)

• In milk hauling partnership between brothers, one brother [Sonny] expressed intention to dissolve partnership. At the same time, he bid for the milk contract until then held by the partnership. The partners held a private auction and the other partner [Charles] purchased the partnership’s assets. Nonetheless, Sonny received the milk contract.
• Court ruled that Sonny had violated his fiduciary duty to partnership by not withdrawing his application for the hauling contract formerly held by the partnership.
• Both Page and Monin have a close relationship with Meinhart and Salmon.

Pav-Saver Corporation v. Vasso Corporation (Ill.App.1986) (p.171)

• Partnership agreement stated that license for certain patents would revert to plaintiff following dissolution.
• Agreement contemplated mutual dissolution, but provided for liquidated damages in the case of a unilateral dissolution.
• The court ruled that plaintiff had engaged in a wrongful dissolution which notwithstanding the Partnership Agreement would be governed by the default rules of the UPA.
• UPA says that partners that did not cause a wrongful dissolution are entitled to continue the business. Thus, the defendant could keep control of the patents.
• Siegel says this is an ‘outrageous’ situation. Contract contemplated unilateral termination and provided for liquidated damages. However, the court imposed additional damages.

Kovacik v. Reed (Cal 2d. 1957) (p.177)

• This is a case about sharing losses, not about dissolution.
• Holding is that one partner cannot collect from another partner for losses when 1^st partner supplies capital and 2^nd partner supplies labor.
• Intangible assets are traditionally considered part of a partner’s capital account. Kovacik says that this should go one step further and contributions of labor after the establishment should also count. [but why should this affect distribution of profits and losses? I thought capital accounts didn’t matter for these.]
• RUPA explicitly rejects this view and says that equal partners must pay equal shares of losses.

G & S Investments v. Belman (Ariz. 1984) (p.181)

• Case of the drug-using, sexually harassing partner who died.
• Issue is the interpretation of the buy-out formula.
• Note that a capital account is determined in an entirely different way from the fair market value of the partnership interest. In a dissolution, the court will rely on the former, not the latter.
• Defendant had a negative capital account because there was a write-off for depreciation (a loss), which is very common in real estate.
• If a partner is expelled, he is penalized because he has a negative capital account. So, should always ask when drafting agreement whether buy-out agreement has a rational result.

Jewel v. Boxer (Cal 3d. 1984) (p.185)

• Attorneys fees received on cases in progress upon dissolution of a law partnership are to be shared with former partners, regardless of which former partner provides legal services in the case after the dissolution.
• Case stands for the proposition that the partnership remains intact until its final termination and no partner is entitled to extra compensation for services rendered in completing unfinished business.
• Policy reason for rule that it encourages stability of business as winding up occurs.

Meehan v. Shaughnessy (p.190)

• The UPA allows partners to remove cases from the firm if they give a “fair charge.”
• For cases that were unfairly removed, the court ruled that the profits would be held in a “constructive trust” and distributed according to the shares of interest as they stood before the partners left the firm.

RUPA

• §§601-03. Two general ways to dissolve a partnership:
  • Violation of Agreement: this is called ‘power’ of dissolution. Damages, equity, etc. might apply.
  • Not in violation: if there is no definite term, the partnership is ‘at will.’
• §701. Payment of Withdrawing Partner’s Interest
  • §701(a). Must pay off leaving partner. Amount is what would have been distributed to a partner if the partnership were liquidated. This is related to each partner’s capital account.
  • §701(b). Creates a default low-end value for a liquidated partnership.

• §§801-03. Winding Up Partnership Business
  • §801(1-2). In a partnership at will, a partnership is dissolved after any partner gives notice. In a partnership with a definite term or for a particular undertaking (this must include law firms), a partnership can be dissolved by a majority vote within 90 days after a partner’s dissociation.
  • §801(5). Judicial winding up due to frustration of economic purpose of partnership or not reasonably practicable to carry on business.
  • §802. After decision to dissolve the partnership, it remains an entity during the winding up period, until its business is completed. Then the partnership is terminated.
  • A partner, for good cause, may request judicial supervision of the winding up.

6. Limited Partnerships

General Observations

• Limited partners are only responsible up to extent of their investments and don’t have full control of management.
• There must be a general partner with unlimited liability, though the general partner can be a corporation.
• LP’s must file with the state Department of State or Commerce. Fling certificate must include:
  • Name
  • Address of office
  • Name & address of general partners
  • Latest date at which LP will dissolve
• Note that LP acts have been revised to allow some role for limited partners in management.

Holzman v. De Escamilla (Cal 2d) (1948)

• A partner can be considered a general partner in an LP if:
  • Name is on certificate
  • Represents himself as liable
  • Takes part in management
• In this case, the “limited partners” were clearly involved in the management and thus should be treated as general partners. They could overrule general partner’s choice of crops to plant and had a direct role in finances.

Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA)

• §102. Requirements for name of partnership: words “limited partnership”, may not list limited partners or have certain words.
• §201. Requirements for certificate of limited partnership.
• §206. Requirements for filing certificate.
• §303. Conditions of limited partner’s liability to third parties.
• §304. People who erroneously (in good faith) believe they are limited partners of a general partnership shall be treated as limited partners.

Law of Corporations

1. Establishment and Limited Liability

General Observations

• History: Corporations originally chartered by the British Crown, then under special corporation acts in the U.S.
• Now there are general corporation acts.
• All participants have limited liability even if they participate in management.
• Some states have subheadings for ‘closely held’ corporations, but these are really the same form as public corporations.

Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws

• Note that often it is easier to draft articles of incorporation for a large public company than for a small, closely-held company.

Southern-Gulf Marine v. Camcraft (La.App.1982) (p.201)

• Defendant promised to construct a large boat for plaintiff. It turned out that their contract was signed before the plaintiff had incorporated.
• Defendant (wanting to get out of a contract that turned out to be a bad deal) argued that since one party to the contract did not exist, the contract itself was invalid.
• Court holds that absent harm to the substantial rights of the defendant arising from the plaintiff’s lack of incorporation at the time of the contract, the contract should be enforced.

Walkovszky v. Carlton (N.Y.1966) (p.206)

• Defendant was an individual shareholder in several corporations, each of which owned only two taxi cabs.
• “Broadly speaking, the courts will disregard the corporate form whenever necessary to prevent fraud or to achieve equity.”
• “It is one thing to assert that a corporation is a fragment of a larger corporate combine which actually conducts the business … It is quite another to claim that the corporation is a “dummy” for its individual stockholders who are in reality carrying on corporate ends … Either circumstance would justify treating the corporation as an agent and piercing the corporate veil to reach the principal but a different result would follow in each case. In the first, only a larger corporate entity would be held financially responsible … while in the other the stockholder would be personally liable … Either the stockholder is conducting the business in his individual capacity or he is not.”
• Dissent sees the equities of the case in terms of the legislature’s intent in granting limited liability.
• Note: the individual corporations could have been sued as partners.

Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source (7^th Cir. 1991) (p.211)

• This case is an instance of “reverse piercing”
• Sea-Land shipped goods on behalf of Pepper Source and then was stiffed on its freight bill. The owner of Pepper Source also owned four other business entities which conducted substantially the same work. Sea-Land sought to hold both the owner and his other companies liable.
• A corporate entity will be disregarded when two requirements are met:
  • Such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of corp. and owner no longer exist.
  • Adherence to fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.
• Four factor test for determining unity of ownership:
  • Failure to maintain adequate corporate records and formalities
  • Commingling of funds or assets
  • Undercapitalization
  • One corporation treating the assets of another as its own.
• Standard of “promoting injustice” looser than affirmative fraud.
• Note that Pepper Source is a very uncommon example of recovery against shareholders in the case of contract.

Kinney Shoe Corporation v. Polan (4^th Cir. 1991) (p.217)

• Defendant created two corporations: first was an industrial company and second held a lease to a building, which it then subleased to the first. Second had no other assets except the sublease. Plaintiff was the landlord who had leased the building to the second company. When second corporation did not pay its lease, the plaintiff wanted to go after the first corporation and its owner.
• Court added an option third prong to the two-prong test in Pepper Source: if the plaintiff should have known that the corporation was grossly undercapitalized, it should not be able to pierce the corporate veil.
• On basis of third prong, plaintiff could not reach defendant in this case.

In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Product Liability Litigation (N.D.Ala.1995) (p.221)

• This is an example of lifting the veil in a tort case.
• Used two-prong test. Injustice prong handled by fact of the tort. Unity prong is focus of the case.
• Factors in whether a parent should have liability for the torts of a subsidiary:
  • Mixing of parent & subsidiary’s business departments
  • Whether the subsidiary is grossly inadequately capitalized
  • Whether parent pays subsidiary’s salaries and expenses
  • Whether parent uses subsidiary’s property as its own
• Note that Delaware courts do not require a showing of fraud or injustice if the corporation is just an instrumentality of its sole shareholder.
• Akin to Berkey v. Third Ave Ry Co – a favorite of Siegel’s

Frigidaire Sales Corporation v. Union Properties, Inc. (Wash.2d 1977) (p.229)

• This is a limited partnership tax shelter case. Tax shelters take advantage of the fact that due to some accounting rules (e.g., depreciation) a firm can appear to lose money even if it is economically profitable. Standard form for a tax shelter, especially in mineral extraction and real estate industries, is a limited partnership with a corporate general partner.
• Court says that since the defendants (both limited partners and shareholders in the corporate general partner) adhered to the formalities of both partnership and corporate law, the veil could not be pierced.

Revised Model Business Corporations Act (RMBCA)

• §1.23. Timing of document. Document accepted for filing is effective [i.e., considered filed] at the date and time of filing, or as specified in the document as its effective time on the date it is filed.
• §1.25. Filing duty of Secretary of State is merely ‘ministerial’ – i.e., doesn’t affect the validity of the document, relate to correctness of information in document, or create a presumption that the document is valid or invalid.
• §§2.01-04. Incorporation
  • §2.02. Sets out requirements for articles of incorporation: corporate name, number of share, address of office and name of agent, name and address of each incorporator.
  • §2.03. Timing of incorporation (the same as timing of document),
  • §2.04. Liability for pre-incorporation transactions.
• §§3.01-04. Purposes and Powers of the Corporation.
  • §3.02. Note that this includes general power to make charitable donations. Also includes power to make political contributions.
  • §3.04. “Ultra Vires” – A corporation’s power to act can only be challenged in a proceeding by a shareholder to enjoin it from acting, by a receiver, or by the Attorney General.

2. Shareholder Derivative Actions

General Observations

• Shareholder actions to compel a corporation to sue are usually brought against corporate ‘insiders’ rather than 3^rd parties.
• The derivative action is one of equity, since the shareholder had no standing at law
• The shareholder is nominal plaintiff and corporation is nominal defendant, but corporation is real plaintiff in interest (SH ex rel Corp v. Director)
• To prevent lawyers from blackmailing corporations through unmerited derivative suits, courts now supervise settlements. Also, defendant is sometimes required to post a bond.
• A derivative suit is only one action – even though standing and merits are considered separately.
• Note that in both Cohen and Eisenberg, below, a Delaware corporation is sued under the laws of another state. Thus, the internal affairs doctrine has limitations.

Process of Filing a Derivative Action

• While there is lots of case law on the subject of determining whether there is excuse, there actually isn’t much law on the subject of what happens if Board rejects a demand. Law isn’t settled.
• Generally, the only way court will intervene after rejection of demand is if plaintiff can show that defendant’s decision-making procedures were not followed.
• Under all laws, if plaintiff makes a demand, he cannot afterwards seek excuse.

Litigation Committees

• Under both New York and Delaware law, even outside members of the Board are often interested in the outcome of a derivative suit because they could be found liable for a breach of their fiduciary responsibilities if the plaintiff prevails. Thus, the committee structure developed – because otherwise there would almost always be excuse.
• Litigation committee is typically comprised of non-Board members.
• In New York, litigation committees are only required to make a prima facie showing of independence. Thus, New York tends to reserve business judgment to the corporation.
• In Delaware, court looks more at details of committee’s decision-making process. Also looks at whether litigation committee’s decision corroborates the court’s independent judgment.

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. (U.S.1949) (p.232)

• Court goes into history of “strike suits” or nuisance lawsuits designed to result in settlements primarily benefiting plaintiff’s lawyers. Having a share threshold (i.e., requiring 50,000 shares) is not an unconstitutional way of screening strike suits.
• Question is whether a state-mandated threshold is substantive or procedural law (only the first being admitted into federal courts under Erie).
• Court rules that share thresholds have a procedural element.
• Siegel says that Cohen today might have gone the other way, depending on the Supreme Court’s level of activism regarding state laws.

Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. (2^nd Cir. 1971) (p.236)

• Note flow charts below:

Originally, FT was the only company. It created a subsidiary FTC, which in turn created another subsidiary FTL.

FT then merged into FTL, and shares of FT were converted into shares of FTC. FTL became the operating company and FTC the holding company.

Thus, minority shareholders in the former FT were now shareholders in the holding company, but had no power over the operating company.

• Because of restructuring, minority shareholders in parent don’t have a vote in the subsidiary. Majority shareholders claimed the move was for tax and regulatory reasons.
• This is standard practice today and Eisenberg wouldn’t even have had a cause of action.
• The real question in this case was whether the suit was a derivative suit (which would require posting of a bond) or a direct action.
• Court ruled that since alleged harm was to Eisenberg himself (i.e., his rights as a shareholder) and not to the corporation, the suit was direct and not derivative.

Grimes v. Donald (Del.Sup.Ct.1996) (p.241)

• Case of excess executive compensation, Board relinquishing its power to remove executive, and failure of Board to exercise fiduciary duties.
• There were two possible sets of claims: abdication of power by Board (a direct claim) and lack of due care, waste, etc. (derivative claim).
• Holding that Board hasn’t abdicated its power to fire, even though they have made it difficult.
• The derivative claim raises the question of “demand.” Demand requirement is intended to reflect the fundamental priority of the Board in management of the corporation.
• Delaware law says demand requirement can be excused if plaintiff shows:
  • Majority of the board has a material financial or familial interest
  • There is reasonable doubt that majority of the board is capable of acting independently (because of domination or control)
  • Reasonable doubt that underlying transaction is the product of a valid exercise of business judgment
• If demand is rejected by the Board, Board is given presumption of business judgment rule. Plaintiff must make particularized claims that raise a reasonable doubt that the Board should be allowed this presumption.
• A plaintiff cannot both make demand and ask for excuse – one or the other only.

Marx v. Akers (N.Y.1996) (p.249)

• Action brought charging that outside directors’ pay was excessive.
• According to NY courts, the purposes of requiring demand are:
  • Relieve courts from deciding matters of internal governance unnecessarily
  • Provide Boards with reasonable protection from harassment
  • Discourage ‘strike suits’
• Some states (not NY) have a ‘universal demand requirement’ that cuts out excuse altogether.
• New York law says a demand can be excused if:
  • Majority of directors are interested in transaction
  • Directors fail to inform themselves to a reasonable degree about transaction (not explicitly in Grimes)
  • Directors failed to exercise business judgment in approving transaction (transaction is egregious on its face)
• Court rules that plaintiff should NOT be granted an excuse on issue of executive compensation (despite back-scratching issue)
• Court rules that plaintiff should be granted an excuse on the issue of Board compensation, but even so failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (compensation was not excessive on its face)

Auerbach v. Bennett (N.Y.1979) (p.256)

• Litigation Committee ‘investigates’ cases of corporate bribery and finds no reason for filing a claim.
• Court rules that it can investigate the independence of the Committee as an initial matter. Examination of Committee has two components:
  • Selection of procedures appropriate to the pursuit of its charge
  • Substantive decision predicated on the procedures chosen. Decision itself falls squarely within business judgment rule

Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado (Del.1981) (p.261)

• Maldonado instituted a derivative suit in which the requirement of demand was excused.
• Four of the defendants in the claim were no longer on the Board. The remaining directors appointed two new outside directors to the board and created an “independent investigation committee” composed solely of the two new directors.
• The independent committee investigated Maldonado’s claims and then asked that the derivative suits be dismissed – on the grounds that continuing the suit would only hurt the corporation.
• Court rules that an independent committee should be able to file a motion to dismiss a derivative action if:
  • Court should inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee
  • Court should determine, applying its own independent business judgment, whether the motion should be granted.

RMBCA

• §§7.40-7.46. Rules governing derivative proceedings.
  • §7.41(2). Requires that plaintiff must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the corporation, rather than shareholders similarly situation, as required in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1.
  • §7.42. The RMBCA has a universal demand requirement (see discussion in Marx)
  • §7.43. Court may stay proceedings to allow investigation by independent committee.
  • §7.44. Allows independent directors, independent committee, or a court-appointed independent panel to dismiss claims after a good faith investigation
  • §7.45. Does not require court’s approval for settlement
  • §7.46. Gives court leeway to order parties to pay legal expenses.

Delaware General Corporation Law (Del.)

• §327. This is a very short provision simply requiring that a plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction in question. Presumably the details are handled through common law precedents.

New York Business Corporation Law (NY)

• §§626-27.
  • §626(c). Requires an account of what shareholders did before coming to court or why they didn’t do anything. Implicitly allows excuse – according to court’s common law standards.
  • §626(d). Requires court supervision of settlements.
  • §626(e). Allows plaintiff to recover legal expenses through judgment, but must turn over all other awards to corporation.
  • §627. Requires posting a bond for small shareholders (5% rule).

3. Corporate Purposes

General Observations

• Today, even in the absence of a specific corporate benefit arising from a charitable donation, there are almost no limits on what corporations can give.
• Corporate giving is culturally bound: not in every country is a corporation expected to give voluntarily to charitable causes.
• Note that while some statutes, such as Delaware §122, seem to merely authorize contributions that further corporations’ business, courts are extremely tolerant of charitable gifts.

A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow (N.J. 1953) (p.270)

• Discussion of giving a donation to good ol’ Princeton
• Policy justification for corporate giving is in part transfer of wealth to corporate hands and heavy burdens of individual taxation
• Note that New Jersey passed a law explicitly allowing charitable donations, so one question is whether this new law affects the articles of incorporation for existing companies. Court rules that legislature may alter corporate charter provisions in the public interest even if they affect the contractual rights between corporation and stockholders or stockholders inter se.

Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (Mich. 1919) (p.276)

• The Plaintiff shareholders were direct competitors with Ford. Case was about whether Ford should be allowed to hold off paying of extra dividends, in part to expand its manufacturing capacity.
• Court affirms the primacy of shareholder profits as the purpose for business corporations, but says it should not interfere with long-term planning.
• Court rules that Ford must pay dividends to shareholders.
• Note that Ford was a pioneer in finance and the court probably didn’t pick up on all the factors involved.

Shlensky v. Wrigley (Ill.App.2d 1968) (p.281)

• Similar case of majority owner refusing action that shareholders feel is in their best interest (in this case, installing lights in Wrigley Field).
• Court interprets Dodge (above) as requiring some fraud or breach of good faith before courts will intervene.
• Presents planning problem of how to deal with a kooky majority owner. Ideas:
  • Buy-out alternative
  • Require going public (through covenant)

RMBCA

• §3.02(13). Allows corporation power to make donations for charitable purposes
• §3.02(15). Allows corporation power to make donations for purposes that further the business of the corporation (e.g., political contributions).

4. Duty of Care

General Observations

• According to Siegel, this is not actually a “fiduciary duty” in spite of the RMBCA. [what is it? A contractual duty?]

Kamin v. American Express Company (NY 1976) (p.316)

• The plaintiff in this cases basically charges the Board with making bad decisions in buying certain stock and then issuing it to shareholders as an ‘in-kind’ dividend.
• Interprets §720(a), which holds directors liable for negligence as meaning that they are liable for negligence in their duties, not for mere misjudgment.
• In this case, the defendant directors did not overlook the facts called to their attention and attempted to view the total picture in arriving at their decision.

Smith v. Van Gorkom (Del.Sup.Ct. 1985) (p.320)

• Van Gorkom unilaterally arrived at the idea of working with a corporate takeover specialist [Pritzker] and then was pigheaded about the deal he struck with Pritzker, not willing to disclose how he arrived at the deal or consider alternatives.
• The Board did not adequately inform themselves of Van Gorkom’s dealings. However, they put the proposed merger to a stockholder vote, which it passed.
• Court establishes ‘gross neglect’ as the appropriate standard for evaluating whether a business judgment was ‘informed.’
• Held that the Board’s breach of duty resulted from failure to inform themselves and failure to adequately inform shareholders.
• Note that there seems to be some role for a ‘total fairness’ analysis. [unclear]
• Under Delaware §141(e) directors are allowed to rely in good faith on reports made by officers.
• Note that Delaware enacted the amendment to §102(b) in response to this case, allowing corporate charters to eliminate directors’ liability, except in certain circumstances.

Brehm v. Eisner (Del.Sup.Ct. 2000) (p.339)

• Initial decision was reached without the plaintiff having an opportunity for discovery.
• Under Delaware §141(e), Board can rely on a qualified expert. To defeat a motion for dismissal based on prima facie reliance on an expert, plaintiff must prove:
  • Directors did not in fact rely on expert
  • Reliance was not in good faith
  • Did not reasonably believe that expert’s advice was within area of expert’s professional competence.
  • Expert not selected with reasonable care
  • Subject matter so obvious that Board should have overruled expert’s advice
  • Decision by Board constituted waste or fraud
• To overcome dismissal (due to lack of excuse), plaintiffs must use ‘tools at hand’ to show particularized facts that would allow for excuse. Note that these ‘tools at hand’ include shareholder rights of inspection (allowed under Delaware §220).

2^nd Eisner Case

• Court says there is no protection from corporation’s §102(b)(7) provision because there was a breach of loyalty and bad faith.
• Case’s fact pattern closely resembles that of Smith v. Van Gorkem, so that case could have been won for shareholders even with a 102(b)(7) provision.
• Lesson of this litigation is that the Board must follow a real substantive decision-making process.

Francis v. United Jersey Bank (N.J. 1981) (p.349)

• Trustee of company in bankruptcy was bringing this suit on behalf of credits (not that it is direct and not derivative).
• Even though they are prepared by officers and experts, financial statements may give rise to a duty to inquire further into matters revealed by those statements. Upon discovery of an illegal course of action, a director has a duty to object.
• Note that a director’s negligence does not result in liability unless it is the proximate cause of the harm.
• Lesson is that sitting on the Board is not an honorific position, even in a closely held family business. If the closely held corporation goes bankrupt, the trustee can sue on behalf of creditors.

In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation (Del.Ch. 1996) (p.355)

• On Board’s duty to monitor operations of corporation: absent grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards nor senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of employees. Only sustained or systematic failure of the Board to exercise oversight can establish lack of good faith.
• Board has a positive duty to set up a process through which they get good information
• Major point of this case is that courts will examine settlement agreements in derivative suits in detail.

RMBCA

• §8.30. Standards of Conduct for Directors
  • §8.30(b). Standard for oversight is the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.
  • §8.30(c). Board, unless it has knowledge that would make such reliance unwarranted is entitled to rely on officers, experts, board committees.
• §8.31. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff: Director shall not be liable for any decision unless:
  • §8.31(a)(2). Decision is not in good faith; sustained failure of the director to devote attention to ongoing oversight.
• §8.42. Standards for officers generally the same as for directors. Officers may immunize themselves from liability if they follow the duties listed in this section.
• §2.02(b)(4), (5). Corporation may pass a bylaw eliminating or limiting the liability of a director except for (A) the amount of a financial benefit received by a director to which he is not entitled; (B) an intentional infliction of harm on corporation or shareholders; (C) making unlawful distributions; (D) violating criminal law.

Del. GCL

• §102(b)(7). The amendment to this apparently eliminates the standard of care requirement. Even gross negligence (but not recklessness) can be protected from liability. Exceptions are for (A) breach of duty of loyalty; (B) acts or omissions not in good faith or intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law; (C) improper personal benefit.

NYBCL

• §717. Seems to establish an ordinary negligence standard, but it is specific to the position of a director. Entitled to rely on officers, experts, committees – all basically in good faith.

5. Duty of Loyalty

General Observations

• Note that under the Restatement of Agency (Second): “Unless otherwise agreed, an agent who makes a profit in connection with transactions conducted by him on behalf of the principal is under a duty to give such profit to the principal.”
• Most of these are cases in which a director is both an official of the corporation and a contractee (e.g., director is selling something to company or buying shares).
• Common law rule said that transaction between corporation and director was voidable by shareholders.
• Modern legislation reverses common law presumption. All contracts are allowed on their face if they fall under certain categories:
  • Full disclosure
  • Ratified by fully informed shareholder vote
  • To be airtight, might want to recuse interested shareholders from vote. This is desirable but not required.
• Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: If a transaction is in line with corporate business and is of practical advantage to corporation, then a director must fairly present the opportunity to the corporation first.
• Two circumstances where Corporate Opportunity Doctrine applies:
  • Director uses company information or is acting in a capacity where a solicitor would reasonably believe he is dealing with the company.
  • Director comes across any opportunity in the corporation’s line of business that would be of practical benefit to the corporation.
• Dominant shareholders have a duty to minority shareholders.

Bayer v. Beran (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1944) (p.368)

• Director’s wife was an opera singer who performed in the company’s advertising campaign.
• Court found that wife did not receive special treatment in terms of billing or salary.
• Court rule that Board’s decision to renew advertising contract was essentially an act of ratification.
• Textbook said that Bayer’s reasoning was: because contract was fair, it is valid even though the disinterested Board had not formally ratified it (or maybe the standard for ratification was lower).

Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc. (2^nd Cir. 1980) (p.373)

• Founder broke business into two corporations in order to insulate liability and minimize estate taxes, while dividing the business according to the interests of the parties (i.e., actively interested in management versus not interested).
• Family failed to manage these two corporations so that the inactive one would retain its value.
• In this case, Court followed the common law rule, which said that in case of an interested board, the directors would have to prove that the interested transaction was reasonable and fair. Court found that the transaction was not fair.
• Siegel says, however, that some courts might find ‘shareholder beware’ because the parties did enter into an initial agreement.

Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc. (Del. 1996) (p.377)

• Broz was President of RFBC and also on the board of a peer corporation [CIS]. He received an opportunity that was not offered to CIS.
• Broz individually contacted a number of CIS directors, who told him that CIS would not be interested in the opportunity. In trial, all CIS directors agreed that they would have let Broz pursue the opportunity.
• At the time, CIS was being courted by PriCellular for acquisition. PriCellular and RFBC competed for the opportunity described above.
• Guth case said that director must offer opportunity to board if:
  • Corporation is financially able to undertake the opportunity
  • Opportunity is in line with corporation’s business and of practical advantage to it.
  • By embracing the offer, self-interest of director would come into conflict with interests of the corporation
• Court finds that although there hadn’t been a formal process, the informal contacts proved that Broz had not acted in bad faith.

Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien (Del.1971) (p.385)

• Sinclair owned 97% of stock in subsidiary Sinven. Plaintiff was minority shareholder. Sinclair decided to drain Sinven of assets by announcing huge dividends.
• Plaintiff objected that Sinclair drained Sinven of cash to such an extent that it could not expand.
• In case of parent/subsidiary transactions (where there are minority shareholders), the proper test of board behavior is one of intrinsic fairness.
• Court said the holding company was not ‘self-dealing’ because it paid equal dividends to minority shareholders.
• However, a contract between Sinclair and Sinven, which fixed price of oil Sinven would sell to Sinclair, was self-dealing. And Sinclair broke the contract, which would make it liable for a derivative suit from the minority shareholders ex rel Sinven.
• Siegel says that this may not be good law, even in Delaware.

Zahn v. Transamerica Corporation (3^rd Cir. 1947) (p.389)

• Transamerica was majority shareholder in Axton-Fisher, and knew that AF’s assets were about to rise sharply in value. Through its board appointees, it had AF exercise an option to redeem a class of stock at a set price. As a result, Transamerica then owned the vast majority of the remaining classes of stock. The board then liquidated the company, resulting in a large profit for Transamerica.
• Here, since the transaction was dominated by the majority, dominating board has to prove fairness. Majority has fiduciary relationship toward minority.
• The court says that AF’s call to redeem the class of stock is voidable in equity.
• Most states will say that a share is a contractual right and fiduciary duty doesn’t go further.
• Remedies available to court include:
  • Void transaction
  • Impose remedial damages to make transaction fair.
• Note that corporations might issue callable stock because they want to reduce the amount of dividends they have to pay.

Fliegler v. Lawrence (Del.1976) (p.395)

• Case involved a director’s attempt to sell land to his corporation through a corporation that he formed.
• Ratification of interested transaction by disinterested shareholders shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff to show the transaction amounted to a gift or waste.
• Because interested shareholders voted, the vote does not immunize interested directors from total (intrinsic) fairness examination.
• Defendants proved intrinsic fairness of transaction.

In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation (Del.Ch.1995) (p.398)

• When a controlling shareholder is involved in a transaction, the ratification of a ‘majority of the minority’ does not eliminate the ‘total fairness’ examination. It simply shifts the burden of proof from defendant to plaintiff.
• In this case, there was no controlling shareholder involved in the transaction, so the ratification of the interested transaction changes the test to one of business judgment (plaintiffs have burden of proof).
• Disinterested vote immunizes directors against both loyalty (interested transaction) and care (waste) claims.

RMBCA

• §§ 8.60 – 8.63.
  • §8.61. Establishes total fairness test in cases where ratification did not take place.
  • §8.62. ‘Qualified Directors’ (i.e., disinterested directors) may vote to ratify transaction or appoint a committee to ratify the transaction.
  • §8.63 talks about ‘qualified shares’ (i.e., disinterested shares) being the only shares able to vote in ratification of interested transaction.

NYBCL

• §§ 713-14.
  • §713(a)(1-2) tests for interested contract. Also, courts have the power to look into the transaction and rule equitably. Director must disclose interest in good faith to board or committee. Also can disclose to shareholders for ratification vote.
  • §713(b) in case contract fails §713(a) tests, must prove ‘entire fairness’ of transaction, which is a high standard.

Federal Securities Law and Control of Closed Corporations

1. Federal Corporation Law: 1933 Securities Act

General Observations

• The Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act are examples of ‘disclosure regulation’ – chosen by federal government because it encourages higher levels of risk and process of capital formation.
• Point of disclosure procedures is for market to constitute a ‘fair game’ – that outcome is bounded in certain ways by the rules.
• Once a company files with the SEC, the staff conducts a prima facie investigation, but does not audit the company.
• Important to understand process of selling stock. There are specialized marketers (underwriters and dealers) because initial public offerings of stocks must sell quickly or they will ‘go bad.’ Underwriters may do ‘best effort’ (i.e., gives back unsold stock) and ‘full’ (i.e., buys whole block of stock).
• Between filing and effective dates, a preliminary statement or ‘red herring’ is circulated among investors, who can sign up for allocations.

Great Lakes Chemical Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (D.Del. 2000) (p.405)

• Note that this case is mainly a good compilation of previous important cases.
• SEC v. W.J. Howey (U.S.1946): Case where Florida corporation sold individual tracts of land in an orange grove, and then took exclusive control of the property through service contracts. To see whether the individual tracts constituted ‘securities’, Court looked at three requirements:
  • An investment of money
  • In a common enterprise
  • With profits to come solely from the efforts of others
• United Housing Foundation v. Forman (U.S.1975): Non-profit housing cooperative sold share of ‘stock’ – the sole purpose of which was to allow purchasers to occupy an apartment in the coop. Supreme Court said that the name “stock” was evidentiary but not dispositive. Looked at 5 most common features of stock:
  • Right to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits
  • Negotiability
  • Ability to be pledged or hypothecated
  • Voting rights in proportion to number of share owned
  • Ability to appreciate in value
• Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth (U.S.1985): Transaction involves a sale of securities even if someone is buying 100% of a closely held corporation, which that person plans to manage. Howey should only be applied to an “investment contract” and not to any of the other devices listed in SEA §2(a)(1).
• Note that in Great Lakes, Court found Landreth inapplicable because the LLC membership interests, while “stock-like,” were not stock. Therefore, it applied the Howey test.
• Court found that since profits would not come solely from the efforts of others, the LLC membership interests were not an “investment contract” within the definition of Howey.

Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp. (5^th Cir. 1977) (p.417)

• Case deals with the SA §4(2) exception for non-public offerings.
• Issue with what constitutes a public offering has to do with number of people solicited, amount of money involved, manner of offering, and relationship between parties and information available to investor.
• In a private offering, offerees must have available information equivalent to that afforded by a registration statement for a public offering.
• Availability means disclosure or effective access to relevant information.

Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp. (SDNY 1968) (p.426)

• Case concerns false statement on registration statement. Question was whether defendants’ “due diligence” defenses protected them from liability.
• Lawyers who prepared the registration statement are not “experts” within the meaning of SA §11 and therefore are not liable.
• The liability of a director who signs a registration statement does not depend upon whether or not he read it, or if he did, whether or not he understood what he was reading. (objective reasonableness standard)
• Relying on experts although one has reason to believe their results are wrong doesn’t exempt one from liability. To require a check on matters easily verifiable is not unreasonable.

Parts of a 10-K Report

• Descriptive Materials. Historical and requires corporation to disclose ‘risk factors.’ Also requires disclosure of legal proceedings that are still pending.
• Management Discussion & Analysis. Elements relating to their stock and how it is traded.
• Financial Statements and Notes
• Other Disclosures (e.g., insurance, stock options, etc.)

Securities Act of 1933, as amended (“SA”)

• § 2(a). Definitions. Note the non-exhaustive (but large) list of examples of securities.
• §4. Offers exceptions to registration requirements for certain types of securities.
  • §4(1). Any transactions by another person besides the issuer, underwriter, or dealer (i.e., any secondary market transactions).
  • §4(2). Sales by issuer not involving a public offering.
• §5. Allows for criminal penalties.
  • §5(a). Prohibits trading except after registration statement is filed and in effect.
  • §5(b). Prospectus must meet requirements of section 10. All securities must be accompanied by a prospectus.
• §8(a). Registration statement is good 20 days after filing, unless SEC finds that it is incomplete or inaccurate and requires changes.
• §10. Requirements for registration statement.
• §11. Civil liabilities for false registration statement. (private cause of action)
  • §11(a). Any person who has acquired a security with a false registration statement may sue directors, partners, experts, and underwriters.
  • §11(b). For non-expert sections, there is an exemption for due diligence (reasonable investigation).
  • §11(e). Damages valued at difference between purchase price and the time of sale (before suit) or time of the suit. Defendant can lower damages by demonstrating that part of the loss of value was due to other factors besides omission or misstatement.
  • §11(g). Damages can only be up to price of security.
• §12. Civil liabilities arising in connection with prospectuses. (private right)
  • §12(a). Liability for offering or selling a security in violation of section 5. Or for any untrue material statement in prospectus. Note that plaintiff need not show reliance. Plaintiff also does not have to show “scienter” or intent – negligence is sufficient.
  • §12(a). Action is for rescission of purchase.
• §17. Fraudulent Interstate Transactions. (criminal sanctions)
  • §17(b). Must disclose any consideration for promoting or publicizing a security.

SEC Regulations:

• Rules 501-06 (Regulation D): Allows “safe harbor” exemption for securities that raise relatively low amounts of money, allowing them to avoid registration and required disclosure. Issuers must make reasonable effort to ensure that buyers will not resell the securities.

2. 1934 Securities Exchange Act

General Observations

• Most important aspect is the private right of action created by SEC Rule 10-b(5).
• Fraud on the Market Doctrine. Relies on efficient market hypothesis – idea is that stock value only changes with new information. Therefore, false information will affect the value for all stockholders, even if they did not rely on the information.
• Note that in ‘fair market value,’ ‘fair’ modifies ‘market’ rather than ‘value’ – the fairness comes from the fact that the outcomes should be bound by the rules of the market.

Basic Inc. v. Levinson (U.S. 1988) (p.444)

• Question is: where in the merger negotiation process do companies need to tell shareholders?
• TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway (U.S. 1976): Test for materiality of omitted fact is whether “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it as altering the ‘overall mix’ of information made available.”
• Court ruled that courts must balance the likelihood of the event and the magnitude of its impact.
• Efficient market hypothesis implies that the market is acting as an “unpaid agent” of the investor, informing him that given all of the information available, the value of the stock is worth the market price. Thus, the plaintiff in a 10b-5 case does not have to prove reliance on the defendant’s information.
• There is a rebuttable presumption of reliance – the defendant can rebut by severing the link between the misrepresentation and the price paid by the plaintiff.

West v. Prudential Securities, Inc. (7^th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook) (p.457)

• About false information that was privately released: stockbroker falsely claimed that an acquisition was going to happen. A few close associates bought the stock on the basis of his false claims.
• Question is whether other investors (besides the close associates) who bought the stock could sue for fraud on the market.
• Non-public information that affects the behavior of a few buyers does not necessarily raise the price of the stock. This is because there are so many substitutes for a given issue of stock: if one becomes more expensive, investors simply switch to a different investment.
• Therefore, other investors do not have a claim.

Pommer v. Medtest Corporation (7^th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook) (p.462)

• Company official told potential investor interested in buying the official’s stock that company had a patent, when the patent was still pending. Company ultimately received the patent. Is the company liable for the false statement?
• Securities laws approach matters from an ex-ante perspective: a statement materially false when made does not become acceptable because it happens to come true.
• However, the ultimate truth of the statement may affect damages.
• The company is not liable for false statements made by the official in pursuit of his own interests.

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores (U.S. 1975) (p.466)

• Requires that for a 10-b(5) private action, there must actually be a purchase or sale
• An overly pessimistic portfolio that discourages buying cannot be grounds for liability.

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder (U.S. 1976) (p.466)

• Negligence is not sufficient for 10-b(5) liability.
• Court requires “scienter” or “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Note that court later ruled that recklessness was sufficient.
• Note in this respect the contract between 10-b(5) and SA §§11-12 in required level of scienter for liability.

Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank (U.S. 1994) (p.466)

• There is no ‘aiding and abetting’ liability under 10-b(5)

Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green (U.S.1977) (p.466)

• Case is about allocation of authority between SEC and states to regulate securities.
• Delaware allows ‘short-form’ mergers, in which a vast majority can merge without shareholder approval. Minority shareholders have a right to fair treatment.
• Using short-form mergers to push out minority shareholders is not “manipulation” within the meaning of 10b-5. Term refers to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.
• Other considerations against extending the federal cause of action:
  • Private cause of action should not be implied when unnecessary to ensure the fulfillment of Congress’ purposes.
  • Shouldn’t be implied when the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law.
  • Difficult to distinguish between effects of short-form merger and other legal corporate moves with the same effects.

Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp. (3^rd Cir. 1988) (p.472)

• Case about stock options. Court rules that since they are securities and since options have a positive role to play in the market, they are covered by 10-b(5).

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (“SEA”)

• §10(b). To use any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of SEC rules necessary for public interest or protection of investors.
• §12. Registration requirements for securities.
  • §12(a). Makes it unlawful for brokers to trade a security on a national exchange if it hasn’t been properly registered.
  • §12(g). This is the provision for integrated registration.
• §13. Allows SEC to set up rules for filing periodical reports and describes the types of information to be listed in these reports.
  • §13(d). Requires owners of more than 5% of class of securities to report to SEC.
• §14. Section dealing with proxy solicitations.
  • §14(a). Allows SEC to set up and enforce rules regarding proxy solicitations.
  • §14(c). Information sent to investors regarding annual meetings must be similar to that regarding offer of security.
  • §14(e). Unlawful to make untrue statement in connection with tender offer.

3. Insider Trading

General Observations

• Note that it doesn’t make sense to make insider buying a private right of action.
• Currently, insider trading can be tracked using artificial intelligence, which is increasingly effective.
• SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3a, which makes it a fraud to trade on the basis of a tender offer – even if there is no fiduciary relationship but just ‘reason to know’ that the information came from one with fiduciary duty.

Goodwin v. Agassiz (Mass.1933) (p.477)

• Classic common law view that there was no obligation of trust between buyer and seller of stock.
• Directors do not have a fiduciary duty to individual stockholders.
• Plaintiff, as a sophisticated trader, could not have been defrauded because he sold his shares of his own accord, without receiving information from the defendants.

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (2^nd Cir. 1969) (p.480)

• Insiders may not take advantage of info that was for corporate purposes. Must disclose information to the public or abstain from trading.
• Rule 10-b(5)(c), “to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person” is interpreted as covering insider trading
• Company does not have to be a party in transaction in order to violate 10-b(5) – if it makes a misrepresentation, even one that it doesn’t profit from, it is still liable.

Chiarella v. U.S. (U.S.1980) (p.492)

• Dealt with non-public information associated with an offer to buy rather than a sale or the target company’s performance. In this case, the person who used the information was the printer of the tender offer.
• Two elements of 10b-5 insider trading liability:
  • Existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
  • Unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure
• Court said duty to abstain from trading arises from the relationship of trust between a corporation’s shareholders and its employees. Since there was no relationship of trust between Chiarella and the shareholders, he had no duty to “disclose or abstain.”

Dirks v. SEC (U.S. 1983) (p.493)

• Dirks found out about a fraud scheme, investigated, and made a good-faith effect to make the fraud public. Meanwhile, friends of his traded on the basis of the information that was not yet public.
• Question of whether disclosure of nonpublic information is an improper breach of duty depends on the purpose of the disclosure – it must be for personal benefit.
• Some tippees must assume an insider’s duty to the shareholders not because they receive inside information, but rather because it has been made available to them improperly.
• In this case, the tipper did not breach duty since there was no personal gain. Therefore, the tippee did not have a duty to disclose or abstain.
• Dissent thinks that a motive of personal gain should not be a requirement for liability for insider trading.

U.S. v. O’Hagan (U.S. 1997) (p.501)

• Similar fact pattern as Chiarella, except that defendant was lawyer for buying firm.
• Court distinguishes from Chiarella to find liability.
• Court went along with “misappropriation” theory. Theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.
• Policy reason for misappropriation theory is to protect the integrity of the markets against abuses by outsiders who owe no duty to the corporation’s shareholders.
• Full disclosure of the fact that a confidant plans to trade on the basis of the nonpublic information will foreclose liability under 10b-5, but the confidant may still be liable under breach of state law duty of loyal.
• Liability under Rule 14e-3(a) does not require a breach of duty to the tipper. Thus, even though O’Hagan escapes 10b-5 liability, he is still liable under 14e-3.
• Misappropriation theory breaks the need for a security>company>tip direct chain. Duty is not to trading party but to source of information.

Carpenter v. U.S. (U.S. 1987) (p.507)

• Wall Street Journal’s “Heard on the Street” column had a short-lived effect on the price of the stocks it covered. Author of column would disclose information to friends before the column was published.
• Court affirmed securities fraud conviction by an evenly divided vote – thus, this decision does not have precedential value. Law is still unclear.

U.S. v. Chestman (2^nd Cir. 1991) (p.508)

• Addressed the issue of whether a spouse who does not normally participate in confidential business discussions and who has not promised to keep a secret is liable for using insider information
• Court ruled that the spouse was not liable.
• Note that this decision has been overturned by SEC Rule 10b5-2, which prevents spouses from using inside information.

SEC v. Adler (11^th Cir. 1998) (p.509)

• Ruled that the insider trade must be made on the basis of the nonpublic information. If the insider could prove that she would have traded anyway, there would be no liability.
• Note that this decision was overturned by SEC Rule 10b-1, which defines “on the basis of” as “awareness of” with only a few narrow exceptions.

SEC Regulations

• Rule 10b-5. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices. This covers general deceptive practices.
  • Rule 10b5-1. Covers insider trading.
  • Rule 10b5-2. Misappropriate rule. Duty of trust when one gives word to, has habit of being in confidence of, or is a relative or spouse of insider.
• Rule 14e-3a. Makes it unlawful for someone to use non-public information to purchase stock in the case of a tender offer. No fiduciary relationship to shareholders is necessary.

4. Short Swing Profits

General Observations

• This is regulated by a bright-line rule in SEA §16. Objective of §16 was to eliminate one source of market fraud by adopting an absolute prohibition on short-term trading by officers and major shareholders.
• Under SEA §16(a), the SEC collects information on stock trades by insiders. This is useful info on a company and provides documentary evidence of possible 10-b(5) violations.
• There is strict liability for any profit made on trades under §16(b). There is a private right of action for corporations or for shareholders derivative action.
• Note that derivative action doesn’t have to follow requirements such as security bond – it’s a federal action and goes directly to federal court.
• §16(b) matches any sale with any purchase within the time frame.
• §16(c) explicitly deals with “short” sales. They are absolutely prohibited.
• Bottom of §16(b) gives exemption to a beneficial owners who was not a beneficial owner at the time of either the sale or the purchase. On the other hand, officers and directors are liable if they were officers or directors at either sale or purchase.
• Deputization: If a firm’s employee serves as a director of another firm, §16(b) may apply to the first firm’s trades in the stock of the second.

Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co. (U.S.1972) (p.512)

• Court rules that there is no liability because the beneficial owner was not a beneficial owner at the time of the second sale.
• Thus, §16(b) has relatively little power over beneficial owners, though it still affects officers and directors.

Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Company (U.S.1967) (p.515)

• Question is whether ‘at the time of the purchase’ means it was a preexisting condition or that the purchase created the condition.
• Court rules for ‘preexisting condition.’ Remember that this is not true for directors or officers.

Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. (U.S. 1973) (p.517)

• Question is whether a stock swap qualifies as a §16(b) violation.
• In borderline cases (but not straightforward cases) Court looks at whether the transaction serves as a vehicle for the kind of evil that Congress intended to prevent.
• In this case, the defendant would not have had access to insider information, which was the kind of evil Congress intended to prevent.
• Thus, while there may be cases where a stock swap will result in §16(b) liability, but this is not one of them.

SEA

• §16. Rule regarding short-swing transactions.
  • §16(a). Requires disclosures by directors, officers, and beneficial owners.
  • §16(b). Profits from purchase and sale, or sale and purchase within 6 months must inure to issuer (corporation). Exception for beneficial owners who are not beneficial owners at time of both purchase and sale.

5. Control in Publicly-Held Corporations

General Observations

• Shareholder election of boards really only fits cases where there are a hundred or so shareholders. Too few and elections are usually redundant; too many and collective action problems emerge.
• State law provides mechanism for electing board of directors. Must give notice of an annual or special meeting, hold meeting, and vote.
• Voting for board of directors of publicly held corporations is usually straight voting, where each shareholder votes up or down for each candidate. In straight voting, a majority can elect all of the board positions.
• At annual or special meetings, votes include:
  • Electing Board (essentially universal that elections are unopposed)
  • Major corporate changes (amendment of articles/bylaws, merger, dissolution)
  • Ratify certain transactions (e.g., interested directors’ transactions, stock option plans)
  • Ratify selection of auditors
  • Proposals put forward by corporation or shareholders.
• Shareholders cannot vote by mail, so they must designate someone to be a proxy. Proxy can’t vote against your wishes, so proxy voting essentially the same as voting by mail. Proxy remains important, though, because representatives of a majority of shares must be present for quorum at meeting.
• Under federal law, people who want to wage a proxy battle alert the corporation, which has the choice of giving them shareholder list or paying their expenses.
• SEC requires 3 sets of documents from corporation concerning proxies:
  • Form of proxy – actual right to vote
  • Proxy statement – description of issues to be covered at meeting
  • Annual report – overall description of company’s business

Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. (SDNY 1967) (p.541)

• Public relations firms may be employed as part of the process of soliciting proxy votes.
• Within very broad boundaries, management can use the corporation’s money to defend the actions of the current board.
• Rule is generally that if contest is over policy and not just ‘personality’ then the corporation can pay.

Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.

• New Board got shareholder approval to reimburse their own expenses and then made a unilateral decision to reimburse the old board.
• Directors must be able to make expenditures for soliciting proxies or the ability of the corporation to achieve quorum and thus be managed effectively would be impaired.
• Test is whether or not directors act in good faith in a contest over policy and whether expenses are reasonable.
• Demonstrates that both outsiders and insiders are under powerful incentive to spend as much money as quickly as possible. The votes are ‘all-or-nothing’ for each side.
• Dissent says that ultra vires, i.e., unreasonable, expenditures must be ratified by unanimous vote of shareholders.
• Dissent also notes impracticality of policy versus personality test.

J.I. Case Co. v. Borak (U.S. 1964) (p.550)

• Creates an implied cause of action under §14(a) to cover corporate misstatements in proxy materials.
• Shareholders may file derivative suits since the damage to come out of uninformed votes is to the corporation directly.

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. (U.S. 1970) (p.553)

• Has to do with material false statement in proxy materials concerning a merger.
• Liability under §14(a) cannot be foreclosed by a finding that the transaction (e.g., merger or interested director transaction) was fair. This would bypass the voter as shareholder. However, relief can be predicated on fairness of merger.
• Court says that proving ‘causality’ (i.e., that a misstatement affected a vote) is not necessary if one has proved materiality, because materiality implies causality.
• Thus, there is an ‘objective’ test rather than a psychological test (which would be extremely difficult to apply)
• A misstatement is not said to affect the vote of an interested party.
• Possible forms of relief include setting aside merger or other equitable relief, but does not require court to “unscramble a corporate transaction merely because a violation occurred.”

Seinfeld v. Bartz (N.D. Cal. 2002) (p.561)

• Question is whether corporation should do Black-Shoals calculations for shareholders in order to indicate the value of options given to executives.
• Court bases conclusion (Black-Shoals is not material as a matter of law) on state court precedents in New York and Delaware.

Shareholder Proposals

• When can a company exclude a proposal? Number of reasons, including:
  • Personal grievance or special interest that does not pertain to shareholders at large.
  • Company does not have power to implement the proposal
  • Proposal addresses “ordinary management operations”
• When a company wants to exclude a proposal, it asks the SEC for a “no action” letter. Shareholder must then bring an appeal of an administrative finding under the APA.
• Siegel says that corporate opposition to shareholder petitions is sociological – the in-group thinks that dissent will make their whole structure fall down.

Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd. (D.D.C.1985)

• Case concerning pate de foie gras and animal cruelty.
• Rule 14a-8(i)(5) ferrets out proposals related to under 5% of revenue or not otherwise significantly related to business.
• Court rules that economic interests are not the only considerations to be judged under 14a-8(i)(5). If the proposal raises policy question important enough to have a significant relationship to the issuer’s business, it may not have to reach the economic thresholds.

NYC Employee’s Retirement System v. Dole Food Company, Inc. (SDNY 1992) (p.570)

• NYCERS wanted Dole to weigh in on the national debate over health insurance by researching the impact of different health insurance plans on its business.
• Dole tried to rely on “ordinary business” prohibition. However, SEC had said that the purpose of the prohibition was to weed out proposals that did not contain a substantial policy or other decision.
• Lesson is that company-wide strategy is exempt from ordinary business prohibition.

Austin v. ConEd of New York (SDNY 1992) (p.575)

• Shareholders attached to local union wanted to include a non-binding resolution endorsing the idea that employees should be able to retire after 30 years of service, regardless of age.
• Fact that SEC has long record of issuing “no action” letters in similar cases is relevant.
• Deals with specific pension plan and thus falls under ordinary business prohibition. Too specific.

Shareholder Inspection Rights

• State law generally requires corporation to hand over list of shareholders and other corporate information if this information is to be used for a “proper purpose.”
• Federal component under 14a-7 is that corporation must either mail materials on proxy campaign at cost or give the shareholder list.

Crane Co. v. Anaconda Co. (N.Y.1976) (p.579)

• Crane was attempting tender offer to buy Anaconda, which was vigorously opposed by Anaconda’s management. Crane, already a shareholder, demanded Anaconda’s shareholder list under NYBCL §1315.
• Mainline law that using a list for tender offer or proxy campaign is a proper purpose

State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc. (Minn.1971) (p.582)

• Shareholder bought shares to protest company’s role in manufacturing weapons. Wanted shareholders’ ledger and corporate records dealing with weapons and munitions manufacturing.
• Buying stock only for the sake of instituting proceedings or investigating a corporation is an improper reason to have right to inspect.
• Court cites efficiency reason for not allowing all shareholders to inspect records at will.
• Shareholder’s attempt to get hold of substantive records of business will not succeed. Inspection rights limited mainly to shareholder’s list and financial statements.

Sadler v. NCR Corporation (2^nd Cir. 1991) (p.585)

• Case is again a construal of NYBCL §1315.
• Shareholders in this case had a relationship with AT&T, which wanted to make a tender offer for NCR but did not itself qualify because it hadn’t owned stock for long enough.
• Question is whether corporation has to turn over a NOBO list, which it doesn’t have but can compile. Court says yes.
• Note that this is a case where a foreign corporation is tried under New York corporate law. Court addresses Constitutional issue and says that it is proper state power.

Stroh v. Blackhawk Holding Corp. (Ill. 1971) (p.592)

• Corporation creates a class of stock that has voting rights but no rights to profits or capital.
• Illinois constitution of 1870 guaranteed shareholders the right to vote based on number of shares owned.
• Court says that parties may divide of rights to voting, interest, and assets by defining shares however they want within the confines of the 1870 voting requirement.

Wisconsin Investment Board v. Peerless Systems Corp. (Del.Ch.2000) (p.597)

• Board maneuvers to prevent a vote averse to its interests from passing.
• Shareholder does not have to attend shareholders’ meeting to record an objection.
• Court uses Blasius test:
  • Plaintiff must prove primary purpose of board was to thwart shareholder vote.
  • If plaintiff succeeds, defendant board must demonstrate a compelling justification for its actions.

SEA

• §14. Grants the SEC authority to regulate proxy statements.

SEC Regulations

• Rules 14a-(2-5,11). Regulates proxy solicitations.
  • 14a-2. Shareholder who does not solicit proxies does not have to register with the SEC.
  • 14a-(3-6). People who solicit proxies must furnish each shareholder with a “proxy statement.” Must file copies of statement with SEC.
• Rule 14a-7. Gives management the choice of supplying shareholder list or sending out materials at cost in proxy fights.
• Rule 14a-8. Gives shareholders the right to create resolutions or proxy statements.
  • 14a8-i. Lists reasons that company may exclude proposal:
    • (1-2) Improper under state law or violation of law.
    • (4) Personal grievance or special interest.
    • (5) Relevance. Proposal relates to operations accounting for less than 5% of company’s total assets or net earnings and gross sales, or otherwise not significantly related to company’s business.
    • (6) Company lacks power or authority to implement proposal.
• Rule 14a-9. Makes it unlawful to send false or misleading proxy statements. Implied private right of action comes specifically from this.

6. Control in Closely-Held Corporations

General Observations

• Until 1960s, closed corporations had to go through with shareholder voting, annual meetings, election of board, etc. Today, many states have optional closed corporation rules. Even if a close corporation does not choose to opt in, it might still benefit from the legal standards applied to closed corporations.
• In corporations, it is generally assumed that each share of common stock represents the same interests in control, profits, and capital.
• All stock within a given class must have identical interests, but different classes can distribute interests differently. You can have contingent voting preferred stock or stock that only can vote in certain matters. It’s also possible to have classification of board by shares, e.g., class A elections board member A, class B elects member B.
• Problem for lawyers is how to privately order the management of a closed corporation. It may be that shareholders intend that the division of control is different from the division of ownership interests. There are numerous devices for doing this:
  • Voting agreements
  • Voting trusts. Old mechanism that separates ownership interest from control. Term is statutorily limited, but a voting trust has the advantage of being essentially self-enforcing.
  • Non-voting stock
  • Cumulative voting structure
• Most voting in closed corporations is done by cumulative voting, where shareholders can allocate their votes to director candidates however they want.
• Number of votes need to guarantee election of one director:

Votes > (shares X positions)/(positions + 1)

• This formula will only fail if:
  • There is a deadlock (tie among all candidates). In this case, old board will carry over and there is a basis for dissolution on grounds of an irretrievable deadlock.
  • Not voting enough share to guarantee election to board. This might happen if you think that you can get an extra seat by spreading your votes thinner, or if your coalition falls apart.

Ringling Bros. v. Ringling (Del.Ch.1947) (p.606)

• Two shareholders had a voting agreement which dictated that they must agree on how to distribute their cumulative vote. If they couldn’t agree, the agreement would go to binding arbitration.
• One of the shareholders refused to agree and refused to abide by the arbitration decision.
• Court says that it is okay to have a voting agreement as long as there is no monetary consideration.
• Court decides to throw out the offending votes altogether rather than simply switch them and enforce the agreement.

McQuade v. Stoneham (N.Y.1934) (p.613)

• Action brought to compel specific performance of a voting agreement.
• Part of the agreement was that as directors, parties would vote for each other as officers and agree to a set salary.
• Court ruled that the power to unite is limited to the election of directors and is not extended to contracts whereby limitations are placed on the power of directors to manage the business of the corporation by the selection of agents at defined salaries.
• Note that this is expressly overturned by NYBCL §620(b).

Clark v. Dodge (N.Y. 1936) (p.618)

• Shareholder agreement provided that plaintiff would be elected director, made general manager as long as he was “faithful, efficient, and competent,” paid 1/4^th of the net income of the corporation, and that no other officer would be paid an unreasonable salary.
• Logical test for whether agreement is valid has to do with whether it is unfair to minority shareholders.
• Confines McQuade opinion to the facts of the case.

Galler v. Galler (Ill. 1964) (p.624)

• Test for whether a shareholder agreement is valid:
  • No complaining minority shareholders
  • No apparent injury to public or creditors
  • No language clearly prohibited by statute

Ramos v. Estrada (Cal.App.4^th 1992) (p.632)

• Question here is the distinction between a shareholders’ agreement and a proxy (which can expire, must be changed according to the will of the shareholder, and is otherwise subject to more rules).
• Under California law, corporation does not have to be legally a “closed corporation” for any number of shareholders to enter into voting agreement.

Del.

• §141. Generally establishes the powers and procedures of Board of Directors.
  • §141(c). Allows delegation of power to committees.
  • §141(d). Allows corporations to create classes of directors to stagger the expiration of their terms of office. Allows different directors to have different powers.
  • §141(e). Allows directors to rely on employees or experts.
  • §141(h). Gives power authority to fix compensation of directors.

NY

• §620. Agreements as to voting.
  • §620(a). Permits shareholders to enter into voting agreements.
  • §620(b). Permits a shareholder to take over powers normally allowed to board under certain conditions.
  • §620(h). In case of (b), transfers liability from the board to the shareholder.

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