Roy
v. United States: D was convicted
as an accomplice to armed robbery. The jury instruction was that it
was sufficient to find D liable if the robbery was the natural and
probable consequence of the illegal attempt to sell a handgun, even
if he did not intend Ross to rob Miller (Luparello
reasoning!) On one hand you do not want
to hold people liable for things they did not do. On the other, if
you put criminal conduct in motion or you intentionally assist in the
commission of a crime, then you are held responsible for the natural
and probable consequences of that crime, even if they go beyond what
you put in motion. A handgun sale is
qualitatively different from robbery.
Judgment reversed for D.
- The degree of radicalness is different than Luparello. This one is more restrictive. This one has to be in the Range of Recklessness.
- The phrase “criminal act in which the ordinary course of things was the natural and probable consequence of a crime,” as used in an accessory liability context, means a consequence WITHIN a reasonably predictable range; it refers to a consequence reasonably likely to ensue from the planned events without the interference of any intervening factors.
- Lup. Jurisdiction: If you have some purpose to aid in the commission of a crime, and instead of that crime, another one results you are still on the hook for accomplice liability.
- In a non-lup jurisdiction: your Purpose DOES NOT extend to aid, it also has to do with what crime you are trying to aid. You have to ask? Did you have a purpose both to aid and both to commit the particular crime?
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