Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States)
Procedural History:
Proceeding in the International Court of Justice.
Overview:
Nicaragua (P) filed suit in !984 against the Uuited States (D) claiming it was responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. The United States (D) challenged the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to hear the case, as well as the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application to the I.C.J. Nicaragua (P) filed suit in 1984 against the United States (D), claiming it was responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (P). The United States (D) challenged the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to hear the case. Though the United States (D) deposited a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in 1946, it attempted to qualify that declaration in a 1984 notification referring to the declaration of 1946 and stating in part that the declaration “shall not apply to disputes with any Central American State …. “The United States (D) also argued that Nicaragua (P) had failed to deposit a similar declaration to the l.C.J., and that the I.C.J. lacked jurisdiction on that ground as well. Nicaragua (P) argued that it could rely on the 1946 declaration made by the United States (D) because it was a “state accepting the same obligation” as the United States (D) when it filed charges in the l.C.J. against the United States(D). Nicaragua (P) also pointed to its intent to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. through a valid declaration it made in 1929 with I.C.).’s predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, even though Nicaragua (D) failed to formally deposit it with that court. Finally, the United States (D) also challenged the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application to the I.C.).
Issue:
(I) Does the International Court of Justice have jurisdiction to hear a dispute between two states if each accepted the Court’s jurisdiction? (2) Is the application by a state to the International Court of Justice admissible where no grounds exist to exclude it?
Rule:
(1) the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear a dispute between two states if each accepted court’s jurisdiction; (2)the application by a state to the ICJ is admissible where no grounds exist to exclude it
Analysis:
The questions of jurisdiction and admissibility are very complicated, but are based primarily on the principle that the I.C.J. has ono/ as much power as that agreed to by the parties. A primary focus of the case was on the declarations-the 1946 declaration of the United States, and the 1929 declaration of Nicaragua-and what each declaration indicated about the respective parties’ intent as it relates to the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction .
Outcome:
(I) Yes. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear a dispute between two states if each accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. Nicaragua’s (P) declaration of 1929 is valid even though it was not deposited with the Permanent Court, because it had potential effect that would last for many years. Because it was made unconditionally and was valid for an unlimited period, it retained its potential effect when Nicaragua (P) became a party to the Statute of the I. C.). The drafters of the current Statute wanted to maintain the greatest possible continuity between it and the Permanent Court. Nicaragua (P) may be deemed to have given its consent to the transfer of its declaration to the l.C.]. when it accepted the Statute. In addition, the conduct of Nicaragua (P) and the United States (D) suggest that both intended to be bound by the compulsory jurisdiction of the I. C.)., and the conduct ofthe United States (D) constitutes recognition of the validity of the declaration of Nicaragua (P) of 1929. Because the Nicaraguan declaration of 1929 is valid, Nicaragua (P) was a “state accepting the same obligation” as the United States (D) at the date of filing of the charges with the I.C.J., and therefore could rely on the United States’ (D) declaration of 1946. The 1984 notification by the Untied States (D) does not prohibit jurisdiction in this case, because the United States (D) appended by its own choice a six months’ notice clause to its declaration, and it was not free to disregard it with respect to Nicaragua (P). The obligation of the United States (D) to submit to the jurisdiction of the I. C.J. in this case cannot be overridden by the I 984 notification. The “multilateral treaty reservation” that was appended to the United States’ (D) declaration of 1946, which limited the I.C.J.’s compulsory jurisdiction, also does not prohibit jurisdiction in this case. Through the declaration, the United States (D) accepted jurisdiction except with respect to “disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (I) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction.” Nicaragua’s (P) application in this case relies on four multilateral treaties, and the United States (D) argued that the I.C.J. could exercise jurisdiction only if all treaty parties affected by a decision were also parties to the case. But the effect on other states is not a jurisdictional problem, and the United States’ (D) objection to jurisdiction on the basis of the multilateral treaty reservation is unfounded. (2) Yes. The application by a state to the International Court of Justice is admissible where no grounds exist to exclude it. The United States (D) challenged the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application on five separate grounds. The first-that Nicaragua (P) failed to bring forth necessary parties-fails because there is no “indispensable parties” rule. The second and thirdthat Nicaragua (P) is asking the Court to consider the existence of a threat to peace, which is the eXclusive province of the Security Council-fails because the l.C.J. can exercise jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Security Council. Both proceedings can be pursued pari passu. The fourth-that the I.C.J. is unable to deal with situations involving ongoing armed conflict-is not a show-stopper because any judgment on the merits is limited to the evidence submitted and proven by the litigants. The fifth-that the case is incompatible with the Contadora process, to which Nicaragua (P) is a party-fails because there is nothing compelling the I.C.J. to decline to consider one aspect of a dispute just because the dispute has other aspects. The fact that negotiations are being conducted subject to the Contadora process does not pose any legal obstacle to the exercise by the Court of its judicial function.
Procedural History:
Proceeding in the International Court of Justice.
Overview:
Nicaragua (P) filed suit in !984 against the Uuited States (D) claiming it was responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. The United States (D) challenged the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to hear the case, as well as the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application to the I.C.J. Nicaragua (P) filed suit in 1984 against the United States (D), claiming it was responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (P). The United States (D) challenged the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to hear the case. Though the United States (D) deposited a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in 1946, it attempted to qualify that declaration in a 1984 notification referring to the declaration of 1946 and stating in part that the declaration “shall not apply to disputes with any Central American State …. “The United States (D) also argued that Nicaragua (P) had failed to deposit a similar declaration to the l.C.J., and that the I.C.J. lacked jurisdiction on that ground as well. Nicaragua (P) argued that it could rely on the 1946 declaration made by the United States (D) because it was a “state accepting the same obligation” as the United States (D) when it filed charges in the l.C.J. against the United States(D). Nicaragua (P) also pointed to its intent to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. through a valid declaration it made in 1929 with I.C.).’s predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, even though Nicaragua (D) failed to formally deposit it with that court. Finally, the United States (D) also challenged the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application to the I.C.).
Issue:
(I) Does the International Court of Justice have jurisdiction to hear a dispute between two states if each accepted the Court’s jurisdiction? (2) Is the application by a state to the International Court of Justice admissible where no grounds exist to exclude it?
Rule:
(1) the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear a dispute between two states if each accepted court’s jurisdiction; (2)the application by a state to the ICJ is admissible where no grounds exist to exclude it
Analysis:
The questions of jurisdiction and admissibility are very complicated, but are based primarily on the principle that the I.C.J. has ono/ as much power as that agreed to by the parties. A primary focus of the case was on the declarations-the 1946 declaration of the United States, and the 1929 declaration of Nicaragua-and what each declaration indicated about the respective parties’ intent as it relates to the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction .
Outcome:
(I) Yes. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear a dispute between two states if each accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. Nicaragua’s (P) declaration of 1929 is valid even though it was not deposited with the Permanent Court, because it had potential effect that would last for many years. Because it was made unconditionally and was valid for an unlimited period, it retained its potential effect when Nicaragua (P) became a party to the Statute of the I. C.). The drafters of the current Statute wanted to maintain the greatest possible continuity between it and the Permanent Court. Nicaragua (P) may be deemed to have given its consent to the transfer of its declaration to the l.C.]. when it accepted the Statute. In addition, the conduct of Nicaragua (P) and the United States (D) suggest that both intended to be bound by the compulsory jurisdiction of the I. C.)., and the conduct ofthe United States (D) constitutes recognition of the validity of the declaration of Nicaragua (P) of 1929. Because the Nicaraguan declaration of 1929 is valid, Nicaragua (P) was a “state accepting the same obligation” as the United States (D) at the date of filing of the charges with the I.C.J., and therefore could rely on the United States’ (D) declaration of 1946. The 1984 notification by the Untied States (D) does not prohibit jurisdiction in this case, because the United States (D) appended by its own choice a six months’ notice clause to its declaration, and it was not free to disregard it with respect to Nicaragua (P). The obligation of the United States (D) to submit to the jurisdiction of the I. C.J. in this case cannot be overridden by the I 984 notification. The “multilateral treaty reservation” that was appended to the United States’ (D) declaration of 1946, which limited the I.C.J.’s compulsory jurisdiction, also does not prohibit jurisdiction in this case. Through the declaration, the United States (D) accepted jurisdiction except with respect to “disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (I) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction.” Nicaragua’s (P) application in this case relies on four multilateral treaties, and the United States (D) argued that the I.C.J. could exercise jurisdiction only if all treaty parties affected by a decision were also parties to the case. But the effect on other states is not a jurisdictional problem, and the United States’ (D) objection to jurisdiction on the basis of the multilateral treaty reservation is unfounded. (2) Yes. The application by a state to the International Court of Justice is admissible where no grounds exist to exclude it. The United States (D) challenged the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application on five separate grounds. The first-that Nicaragua (P) failed to bring forth necessary parties-fails because there is no “indispensable parties” rule. The second and thirdthat Nicaragua (P) is asking the Court to consider the existence of a threat to peace, which is the eXclusive province of the Security Council-fails because the l.C.J. can exercise jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Security Council. Both proceedings can be pursued pari passu. The fourth-that the I.C.J. is unable to deal with situations involving ongoing armed conflict-is not a show-stopper because any judgment on the merits is limited to the evidence submitted and proven by the litigants. The fifth-that the case is incompatible with the Contadora process, to which Nicaragua (P) is a party-fails because there is nothing compelling the I.C.J. to decline to consider one aspect of a dispute just because the dispute has other aspects. The fact that negotiations are being conducted subject to the Contadora process does not pose any legal obstacle to the exercise by the Court of its judicial function.
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