511 U.S. 1 (1994)
The state trial courts gave state-approved jury instructions on the definition of "reasonable doubt" in the defendants' murder prosecutions; both defendants argued that those instructions, which included references to "moral certainty," "substantial" and "grave" doubts, and "strong probabilities" of the case, overstated the degree of doubt necessary for acquittal and therefore unconstitutionally lowered the prosecutions' burden of proof. After the respective state supreme courts affirmed their convictions, the defendants filed petitions for writs of certiorari and their cases were consolidated.
- On appeal, the Court affirmed.
- It noted that jury instructions had to be taken as a whole and that the Constitution neither prohibited nor required trial courts to define "reasonable doubt."
- While noting that the challenged words, by themselves, might be problematic, it did not find that the instructions, when taken as a whole, would have caused a reasonable juror to misinterpret the prosecution's burden of proof or allow them to believe they could convict the defendants on a finding of guilty based upon a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause.
The Court found that the jury instructions on "reasonable doubt" did not violate the Due Process Clause and affirmed the defendants' murder convictions.
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