City of Richmond v. J.R. Croson case brief

City of Richmond v. J.R. Croson (1989)

Strict Scrutiny should be applied in evaluating state and local affirmative action programs

Facts: Richmond adopted the Minority Business Utilization Plan in 1983, which required non-minority prime contractors receiving city construction contracts to subcontract at lease 30% of the $ amount to one or more MBEs, which were at least 51% controlled by minorities. Plan said it was remedial and was enacted to promote wider participation of minorities in aiding in the construction of public projects. Richmond’s population was 50% black, but only .67% of prime construction contracts had been awarded to MBEs b/w 1978 and 1983. Croson was a non-minority contractor. Richmond thought that they were doing the right thing because this was exactly was what the court upheld in Fullilove.

Holding: (O’Connor) Court said this program clearly not narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of private discrimination. This case holds that all state and local racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny (after Croson, answered question as to whether there’s a separate standard for Congress).

1. No consideration of any race-neutral means to increase minority business participation.
2. Quota can’t be said to be narrowly tailored to any goal except outright racial balancing.

However, O’Connor said that affirmative action classifications are not per se unconstitutional. The Croson plan was problematic because it only gave broad nationwide statistical information as justification. The majority distinguishes Fullilove by saying that Congress did that under §5 of the 14^th Amendment.

Notes: SC approved of the same kind of minority business enterprise set asides in Fullilove. Richmond patterned their plan on Fullilove’s. Richmond included Blacks, Spanish, Asians, Aleuts. The majority thought that these categorizations were random. The issue in Richmond was really about Blacks. This category was the federal definition of MBE’s at the time.

• Importance of state action evident here. Courts seem to view as private discrimination, use lesser standard. If ordinance focused on discrimination in contractors, court looks at it as attenuated.
• Washington v. Davis + state action = serious limitations on Congress to enact legislation.
• §5 of 14^th A: Extent to which Congress can reach out and address remedially facially neutral discriminationrequires finding of state action, judicially cognizable constitutional violation. Does not mean the court has to have declared Richmond as being in violation.