The Civil Rights Cases case brief summary

The Civil Rights Cases case brief summary

109 U.S. 3 (1883)

Synopsis
This case deals with a dispute that arose regarding the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.

Case Facts
A number of cases had arisen to challenge the Civil Rights Act.  The Act required public establishments to refrain from exercising discrimination based on race. 

Legal Issue
Is the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional in that it gives Congress the power to enact affirmative legislation in order to prohibit the forms of discrimination that are prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment? 

Holding
Yes - The Civil Rights Act of 1875 is unconstitutional due to the fact that it gives Congress such powers. 

Analysis
 

Bradley, J. 
The Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress only the power to enact legislation to correct state laws and practices that might infringe upon rights that are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  However, the Act does not give Congress the right to legislate affirmatively on such issues.

Congress is not authorized to act until a state has enacted a law or other policy and that law or policy perpetuates the forms of discrimination that are prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.

As a result, The Civil Rights Act finds finds no support under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Supporters of the Act contend alternatively that it actually derives its authority from the Thirteenth Amendment. This argument also lacks merit. The Thirteenth Amendment, insofar as it grants Congress the power to make affirmative legislation, grants that power only in relation to the abolition of slavery. Supporters of the Act are essentially arguing that unequal treatment in public facilities amount to slavery. This argument is implausible. 

Harlan, J., dissenting.
The majority has eviscerated the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment using clever language. It could not possibly be that Congress intended the rights of former slaves to be subjected to the whim of states governments, which might restrict those rights as they see fit. The Thirteenth Amendment was intended to eliminate all “badges” of slavery, not just the institution itself. Racial discrimination at the hands of inns and other public facilities are such a badge. Moreover, an essential part of the privileges and immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment is freedom from discrimination. Even if one adopts the majority’s view that a state violation of such rights must occur before Congress can take action, the current situation makes it clear that such a violation has occurred.

Strauder v. West Virginia case brief summary

Strauder v. West Virginia case brief summary 

100 U.S. 303 (1880) 

Synopsis
A dispute arose as to whether a state could discriminate on the basis of race in selecting jurors.

 

Case Facts
Strauder had been convicted of murder by a West Virginia court. At the time, a West Virginia statute prohibited blacks from serving on juries. Strauder sought to remove the case to federal court and to challenge the composition of the jury, but his efforts were unsuccessful. 

Issue
Does a law prohibiting blacks from serving on juries violate the Fourteenth Amendment?

Legal Holding
Such a law violates Fourteenth Amendment.

 

Legal Analysis 

Strong, J.  

The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified specifically for the purpose of protecting the recently emancipated slaves against discrimination by the states. The West Virginia statute infringes upon Strauder’s right to a fair trial, as a jury consisting entirely of whites could not possibly be a jury of his peers. The prejudices of certain classes in society against others are well known. It could hardly be doubted that a rule prohibiting whites from serving on juries would be regarded as unfair.

Justice Field, joined by Justice Clifford, dissenting.  

Equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a black person to be entitled to a mixed jury. No one contends that women or other groups should be entitled to jurors from their respective groups. There is no reason to think that white jurors would not be equally fair to all defendants. Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees only civil rights as opposed to political rights. Jury duty is a political right and ought to be regulated as the states see fit.

Minor v. Happersett case brief summary

Minor v. Happersett case brief summary 

88 U.S. 162 (1874)

Overview
A dispute arose regarding whether a state could deny women the right to vote.

Case Facts
Virginia Minor attempted to register to vote in Missouri. After the state turned her away, she sued on the ground that it had violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

Legal Issue
Is the right to vote one of the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Holding
The right to vote is not one of those privileges and immunities.

Analysis


Waite, C.J. Historical evidence within and outside the Constitution strongly suggests that the right to vote is not coextensive with citizenship. When the Constitution was adopted, most states had limited, either expressly or implicitly, suffrage to male citizens. If the Framers had intended to change this state of affairs, they almost certainly would have done so using a clause in the Constitution. The lack of such a clause indicates that they intended to leave voting rights as they had existed. Furthermore, understanding the right to vote as a component of citizenship would lead to absurd consequences. Under this view, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV would necessarily mean that each state is bound to allow a citizen of any other state to vote. 

The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments explicitly prohibit disenfranchisement on the basis of race or previous condition of servitude, but they glaringly omit any mention of disenfranchisement based on adult relations. When the states were admitted to the Union, no objection was ever made on grounds that they denied women the right to vote; such was the case even in the readmission of the Southern states following the Civil War.

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Sessa v Macomb County case brief summary

Sessa v Macomb County case brief summary

559 N.W.2d 70 (1996)
220 Mich. App. 279

(more than revenue bond because it had to raise taxes, but not a full faith and credit bond b/c there was a cap on the faith and credit) notice of sale

1.       Issues bonds secured by revenues of lease and a limited GO pledge. County doesn’t just issue the bond b/c avoids referendum. There is a cap on amt of pledge and therefore is a limited tax obligation bond and that is not proscribed by constitution – they are only not allowed to issue bonds by an unlimited pledge of the taxing power. They create a building authority to build a court and issue bonds (why? b/c a vote probably wouldn’t work and maybe they were at their debt limit). They issue these limited tax obligation bonds. The “limited GO bond” worked like this – it was secured by rental payments on the lease and full faith and credit / tax from the general fund of the county but only up to a certain limit. The bonds would be backed by the full faith and credit of the county, with the specified limitation that the rev to pay the bondholders would come from a combination of lease payments received from the county and allocations from the county's general fund budget within its authorized 4.2-mill limitation. Notice placed in paper allowing for 45 day period for presenting a challenge to the project – no takers.

2.       Taxpayers argue that there should have been a tax limit and a vote since they are indeed secured by taxes.

3.       Ct says since it was only subject to existing taxes then no taxpayer is in jeopardy of having their taxes increased to pay for the bond. Nonetheless, we agree with ∆ that the action is barred by a related preclusive doctrine established in Bigger v Pontiac. Bigger dealt with a constitutional challenge to the issuance of public obligation bonds that had been brought before actual issuance and sale of the bonds. There, the suit was deemed untimely because it was not commenced until soon before the planned date of issuance of the bonds and thus would have prevented an orderly process of adjudication. However, the applicability of Bigger is broader than this. As interpreted by this Court and the Supreme Court, the rule is designed to deal with challenges that could prevent or frustrate public improvements in general.

4.       An equally important aspect of the Bigger rule comes into play here where suit was not begun until after the bonds had been issued and sold on the open market. The interests of third parties, the bondholders, who are bona fide purchasers for value and who, at the time of purchase, were not on notice of any such challenge, represents a vested interest that the entertaining of such litigation on its merits could defeat. In this regard, therefore, the Bigger rule is distinct from the statute of limitations and simply obligates those who would challenge such action to move promptly. Plaintiffs were obviously on notice of the need to mount their challenge promptly following publication of the May 10, 1995, notice of intent to bond in The Macomb Daily. Further, π Sessa individually, and as a member of the board of commissioners, was in possession of the requisite notice by virtue of attending the meeting on March 23, 1995, at which the board of commissioners adopted the resolution of intent to bond.

5.       However, there is simply no suggestion that Macomb County, as a "unit of local government," has levied a tax not authorized by law or charter on December 23, 1978, or that it has increased the rate of an existing tax above the rate authorized by law or charter on December 23, 1978, without approval of a majority of the qualified electors of Macomb County voting thereon. Contrary to plaintiffs' assumption that no unit of local government may issue any bond without approval of the electorate, Const 1963, art 9 merely prohibits units of local government from issuing bonds that require an increase in authorized tax rates to fund the repayment obligation. Nothing in Const 1963, art 9,prohibits Macomb County either from increasing the existing tax rate of 4.2 mills to the authorized rate of 4.7431 mills to repay these bonds or simply from repaying such bonds out of general revenues within existing tax levies.  

a.       Interesting discussion as well of the procedural issue of whether or not the plaintiff could bring the case and whether or not they had brought it on a timely basis – the bonds had already been sold and money starting to be spent. There is a provision in state law that you have to notify the public and they have to sue before the bond is issued. That is true even if you are alleging a constitutional violation – that raises some very interesting policy questions we will return to.

                                                                                                                       
              i.      The court concluded that the action was barred because the action was not begun until after the bonds had been issued and sold on the open market. The court noted that nothing in art. 9 prohibited the county either from increasing the existing tax rate or simply from repaying such bonds out of general revenues within the existing tax levies.

In re Interrogatories case brief summary

In re Interrogatories case brief summary 
193 Colo. 298

1.       Under the power of the CO Housing Finance Authority Act ,the authority issued revenue bonds to provide funds for achieving its low-income housing goals. Bill was designed to provide an appropriation for the authority so that it had a reserve fund. With the fund, its bonds were saleable in the national bond market. The senate propounded interrogatories to the ct questioning whether the bill violated sections of the state constitution. The ct. answered the interrogatories in the negative, as the authority requested. The court ruled that the authority, as a political subdivision of the state, had power to incur obligations in its own name. Its obligations thus did not constitute a constitutional debt of the state. Further, the appropriation did not constitute a debt because it was discretionary and nonobligatory. The appropriation also did not constitute a pledge of the state's credit because no debt was created and there was no lending of credit. Additionally, it did not mingle public and private funds and it furthered a valid public purpose.

2.       Housing Authority has reserve fund. If needs replenished – go to legislature who may appropriate the funds to pay and the governor may approve

3.       Legislature expressed in bill expectation and aspiration to appropriate

a.       If don’t – what to do? Cannot sue

4.       Q of the case is whether the state is on the hook for this, is this type of debt GO debt? It’s not GO debt b/c there is no legal obligation, the Gov MAY replenish the reserve. Therefore state is not required to pay you if the revenue backing is not sufficient. Not legally enforceable promise.

Flushing National Bank v Municipal Assistance Corp. case brief summary

Flushing National Bank v Municipal Assistance Corp. case brief summary

40 NY2D 731
 

                                                              i.      π, bank on behalf of noteholders, sought review of the order from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court affirming a judgment entered granting ∆ NYC summary judgment & declaring that the provision of the NY State Emergency Moratorium Act was valid and constitutional.

                                                            ii.      NYC passed the New York State Emergency Moratorium Act for the City of New York which imposed a 3-year moratorium on actions to enforce the city's outstanding short-term obligations (Deal was set up that you could exchange your city bonds (short term) for MAC long term bonds, giving the city some room to breathe, or you could keep the note and not get paid. ). The bank, on behalf of other holders of notes, filed an action alleging that the Act violated both the state and federal constitutions. The appellate court affirmed a judgment entering summary judgment in favor of the city and declaring the Act valid and constitutional. On appeal, the ct reversed, holding that N.Y. Con. art. VIII stated that a city couldn’t have contractual indebtedness unless it had pledged its faith and credit for the payment of the principal thereof and the interest thereon. The ct held that the constl. prescription of a pledge of faith and credit was designed to protect the rights vulnerable in the even of difficult economic circumstances and that it was conclusive that the constitution permitted no escape for the municipality from performing its obligations.

                                                          iii.      The court reversed the order from the appellate ct. The court held that the NY Constitution provided that ∆, NYC, could not have contractual indebtedness unless it had pledged its faith and credit for the payment of the principal thereof and the interest thereon.you can’t just not pay if they are General Obligation Noteholders.

1.       If NYC don’t pay bond indebtedness, wont be able to raise capital for a long time

2.       NYC needed to just raise taxes and pay the notes.

3.       The policy choice was for the future: If you don’t pay your bondholders you won’t be able to get money on the bond market in the future. But they temper this by saying at the end that no extraordinary remedy is available

Bradwell v. Illinois (Bradwell v. The State) case brief summary

Bradwell v. Illinois case brief summary

83 U.S. 130 (1873) 

Facts:Myra Bradwell sued the State of Illinois for refusing to grant her a license to practice law solely on account of her being female. Bradwell argued that a woman’s right to practice law was one of the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding:
The Court, however, disagreed.

Analysis:

Miller, J. The decision whether to admit an individual to a state’s bar in no way rests on the question of citizenship. Even if citizenship were allowed to be a criterion, the application of that criterion should rest with the respective states. 

Bradley J., joined by Swayne and Field JJ, concurring. Although the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees certain privileges and immunities, these privileges and immunities cannot be said to include the right of women to practice law.  History shows that men and women have always occupied separate spheres and that women have been properly allocated domestic duties. This natural balance has been reflected in the law, which prevents a married woman from making a contract without her husband’s consent. The settled order should not be upset.

The Slaughterhouse Cases case brief summary

The Slaughterhouse Cases case brief summary

83 U.S. 36 (1873)

Overview
A dispute arose as to the constitutionality of a state-controlled monopoly on slaughterhouses. 

Facts
Louisiana had passed a statute requiring all butchers within the city of New Orleans to perform their slaughtering at a designated slaughterhouse. The statute effectively established a state monopoly on the operation of slaughterhouses. The statute was challenged on the theory that it amounted to an infringement of the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 

Issue
Does the establishment of a state monopoly on slaughterhouses infringe the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment? 

Holding
The state monopoly does not so violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Reasoning
Miller, J. A state undoubtedly may exercise its police power to regulate noxious trades such as the operation of slaughterhouses. Such regulations cannot be said to conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, the Amendment draws a distinction between the privileges and immunities arising from citizenship in a particular state and those that arise from citizenship in the United States. The Amendment protects only the latter. It cannot be thought that the Amendment was intended to remove all regulation of privileges and immunities to the federal domain. Rather, the federal privileges and immunities include only the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress, to use navigable waterways, and so forth. All other rights are properly subject to regulation by the states. Any other holding would drastically alter the balance between state and federal power. 

 

Field, J., dissenting. Although Louisiana may exercise its police powers, the establishment of the monopoly goes beyond any legitimate purpose to promote public health or morals. The state was within its power to command that slaughtering should take place downstream from New Orleans and that animals should be inspected prior to slaughter. These ends, however, do not necessitate the formation of a monopoly held by a private corporation. Nothing suggests that the health regulations would be better served by a monopoly than by multiple independent actors. 

Bradley, J., dissenting. The Fourteenth Amendment, like the Magna Carta, is intended to protect certain essential rights. These rights include the right to pursue one’s calling or profession. In restricting the ability of butchers to engage in their trade outside the terms of the state-granted monopoly, Louisiana has infringed the fundamental rights of its citizens. 

Swayne, J., dissenting. Prior to the Civil War, amendments to the Constitution were intended mainly to protect rights from infringement by the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment makes it clear that such rights are to be protected from infringement by the states as well. The Court has taken an overly narrow view of the Amendment.

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Corfield v. Coryell case brief summary

Corfield v. Coryell case brief summary 
6 F. Cas. 546 (1823)

Facts: A dispute arose as to whether New Jersey could prohibit out-of-state persons from gathering clams and oysters from the state’s waters.

Holding:
The court held that this right was not protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 

Analysis:
Washington, J. The Privileges and Immunities Clause guarantees to each person only those rights that are essential to citizenship. These rights include the right to habeas corpus, the right to dispose of property, the right not to be charged higher taxes than in-state residents, and so forth. The Clause, however, cannot be supposed to grant to out-of-state persons every right incident to being the resident of a particular state.

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Prigg v. Pennsylvania case brief summary

Prigg v. Pennsylvania case brief summary 
41 U.S. 539 (1842) 

Overview
A dispute arose as to a conflict between the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and a Pennsylvania statute. 

Facts
Nathan Bemis had technically gained through inheritance the ownership of a slave, Margaret Morgan. By the time the inheritance took effect, however, Morgan had become, for all practical purposes, a free woman. Although Morgan had been a slave in Maryland, her owner had informally set her free shortly before his death. Morgan then married a free black man; the couple moved to the free state of Pennsylvania, where they started a family. Bemis, evidently intent on repossessing Morgan, engaged Prigg and several others to capture Morgan and her family in accordance with the Fugitive Slave Act. Although the initial capture was successful, there arose some question as to whether the local Pennsylvania court had jurisdiction over the question of Morgan’s status. While the is- sue was still being resolved, Morgan and her children were sold as slaves. The sale en- gendered public outrage in Pennsylvania, which demanded that Prigg be tried for violating Pennsylvania law.

Issue
May Pennsylvania impose regulations of slavery in addition to those provided by the Fugitive Slave Act?

Holding
Pennsylvania may not impose such additional regulations. 

Analysis

Story, J. The Fugitive Slave Clause expressly requires each state to deliver fugitive slaves to their owners. The Clause therefore plainly authorizes Prigg to engage in the sort of self-help currently under question. Moreover, the Clause implicitly requires states to refrain from interfering with the capture of escaped slaves, such as through the Pennsylvania law. The power to regulate the handling of fugitive slaves rests with Congress alone; the states may not enact additional legislation to supplement what Congress has decided. The history of the Constitution supports this construction since it is scarcely conceivable that the slave states would have allowed free states the power to interfere with property rights in slaves through state-level legislation. 

Taney, C.J., concurring. The states should be allowed to aid owners in recovering fugitive slaves. The Fugitive Slave Act merely prohibits states from passing any law interfering with the recapture of slaves. It says nothing about legislation to designed to actively aid slave owners. Indeed, it is the duty of the states to provide such aid. 

McLean, J., dissenting. The issue here is not whether an owner may recover his slave from another; it is whether the owner may remove the slave from that state without a judicial determination of his rights over the slave. Pennsylvania, being a free state, acts on the assumption that every person of color is free. This assumption should receive deference; a purported slave owner should not be allowed to remove a purported slave from the state until the courts have determined that it is indeed proper to do so.

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Groves v. Slaughter case brief summary

Groves v. Slaughter case brief summary

40 U.S. 449 (1841) 

Facts: 
 The Mississippi Constitution included a provision that arguably prohibited the importation of slaves from other states. Little doubt existed as to its purpose, which was to provide economic protection to local slave traders from out-of-state competition. From a constitutional standpoint, the difficult problem was distinguishing the economic protectionism of the Mississippi Constitution from other state laws that likewise prohibited the importation of slave, but on abolitionist grounds. If either was struck down as an unconstitutional state regulation of interstate commerce, then logic seemed to dictate that the same fate should befall the other. The majority opinion artfully avoided this nettlesome question. 

McLean, J., concurring. Given that slavery is local in its effects, the states should be able to regulate their respective slave trades. The states have an interest in making sure that the slave population does not become a threat to the general public.

Taney, C.J. Justice McLean correctly concludes that the power to regulate slavery should rest with the states.

Baldwin, J. A state may abolish slavery entirely, but it may not maintain slavery within its own borders and simultaneously attempt to regulate the interstate slave trade. A state may regulate slavery within its own borders to any extent it desires, but it cannot purport to extend such regulations to trade with other states. The Privileges and Immunities Clause requires that states treat each other on equal footing.

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Cooley v. Board of Wardens case brief summary

Cooley v. Board of Wardens case brief summary 
53 U.S. 299 (1852)
 
Facts
Pennsylvania had enacted a law requiring ships navigating its waterways to employ local pilots. The rationale of the law was to improve the safety of navigation. Failure to comply with the law resulted in a fine. When Cooley failed to hire a local pilot for one of ships and subsequently refused to pay the fine, the Board of Wardens sued. 


Issue
Does the Pennsylvania law amount to an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce by a state?

Holding
The law does not amount to an unconstitutional regulation of commerce. 

Reasoning

Curtis, J. Although the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate interstate com- merce, one should not blindly construe the Clause to mean that the Constitution leaves no regulatory power to the states. In some cases, it is advisable that one uniform system should be established throughout the country. In such cases, the regulatory power devolves upon Congress. In other cases, however, local regulation would be more advisable. Since Congress has taken no action to regulate the particular aspects of navigation currently in question, the regulatory power should be allocated to the state. 

McLean, J., dissenting. The Court’s decision opens the door to rampant interference with interstate commerce by the states. There is nothing to stop every state along a river from regulating its portion of the river as it sees fit.

The Passenger Cases case brief summary

The Passenger Cases case brief summary 
 48 U.S. 283 (1849) 

Facts:The Supreme Court struck down legislation in New York and Massachusetts that required the operators of ships to pay landing fees for their passengers in order to fund the support of paupers. 

Discussion:
The Court, however, did not make any substantial move toward abolishing state regulation of immigration. Even as it struck down the particular means employed by the two states, it allowed the states to continue regulation of immigration through bonds and other instruments.

Mayor of New York v. Miln case brief summary

Mayor of New York v. Miln case brief summary
36 U.S. 102 (1837) 

Overview
Miln challenged the constitutionality of a New York law regulating the entry of persons into the state. 

Facts
To combat the flood of poor immigrants arriving in New York, the New York legislature had enacted a statute imposing financial burdens and other responsibilities upon the captains of ships bringing passengers to New York. The captains of such ships were required, among other things, to post security for passengers who might become dependent on the state. Miln sued to recover a substantial fine incurred after a violation of the statute. 

Issue
Is the New York law an unconstitutional attempt to regulate interstate commerce? 

Holding
The law is not an unconstitutional attempt to regulate interstate commerce. 

Reasoning 

Barbour, J. The New York statute is plainly an exercise of police power that does not interfere with the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. The statute does not concern itself with the interstate transportation of people. To the contrary, its provisions take effect only after the passengers of a ship have debarked in the state. It was passed for the benefit of the people of New York. The statute therefore resembles inspection and quarantine laws, which the courts have consistently regarded as legitimate exercises of the police power. The facts make it plain that New York has a pressing interest in controlling the arrival of immigrants in its cities, which are already swelling with the poor. More importantly, the statute addresses a right that falls within the category of those that have not been granted to  Congress. Since the Constitution has not re- strained the states’ power to regulate the matter currently under consideration, New York should be accorded full discretion in this case. 

Thompson, J. Since Congress has not acted to restrict state legislation on the issue under consideration, there is no need to decide the extent to which Congress and the states may concomitantly exercise the power to regulate commerce. Such a decision need not be made until a con- flict arises. 

Story, J., dissenting. The effects of the statute show that it indeed amounts to a regulation of interstate commerce. New York does not merely attempt to regulate the presence of persons within its own territory; it imposes a bur- den on ships leaving from foreign ports by requiring their captains to gather and provide in- formation on the passengers. Indeed, it has already been conceded that the same statute, if enacted by Congress, would undoubtedly qualify as a regulation of interstate commerce. The argument in favor of the statute seems to be that its additional existence as an exercise of police power allows it to comport with the Constitution. If this argument were upheld, then states would be free to supplement federal regulations with their own laws. This, in turn, would bring about the unacceptable result of subjecting interstate commerce to regulation by dual sovereignties.

Chisholm v. Georgia case brief summary

Chisholm v. Georgia case brief summary
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)

Facts:Two British creditors sued the State of Georgia for debts the state had incurred.

Holding:
Although Georgia had not waived its sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court held that Georgia could nonetheless be liable.

Discussion:
The decision set off a wave of protest across the states, which eventually led to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee case brief summary

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee case brief summary
14 U.S. 304 (1816)

Facts:
A dispute arose as to the preemption of Virginia statutes by federal treaties. In the subsequent decision, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional.

Holding:
The Supreme Court reversed.

Analysis:
Justifying its authority to review the judicial opinions of states, the Court said that deference to the its decisions was a necessary check against the prejudices and biases of individual states, which might otherwise run rampant. Furthermore, the Court stressed the importance of its own function as the final arbiter in resolving differences in legal interpretation among the states.

Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co. case brief summary

Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co. case brief summary
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) 

Facts:Delaware incorporated the Black-Bird Creek Marsh Company for the purpose of damming a creek. Wilson, who operated a boat, challenged the constitutionality of the Company on the ground that Delaware, in having the creek dammed, had intruded upon the congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce. 

Holding:
The Supreme Court held that the Company did not constitute an infringement of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Given that Congress had enacted no statute designed to limit the states’ power to dam creeks, Delaware’s decisions did not amount to interference with the regulation of interstate commerce.

Gibbons v. Ogden case brief summary

Gibbons v. Ogden case brief summary

 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 

Overview
A dispute arose as to the regulation of the oper- ation of steamboats by the State of New York. 

Facts
New York had granted Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive right to operate steamboats between New York and New Jersey. Livingston and Fulton then assigned this right to Ogden. When Gibbons established competing steamboat routes, Ogden sued for enforcement of his monopoly rights. Gibbons responded by stating that a federal statute authorized him to navigate the routes in question. 

Issue
Should Gibbons be allowed to operate his steamboats notwithstanding the monopoly granted by New York?

Holding 
Gibbons should be allowed to operate his steam- boats.

Reasoning 

Marshall, C.J. In attempting to create a monopoly on interstate navigation, New York has intruded upon powers reserved to Congress under the Commerce Clause. The Clause states that Congress has the power to regulate “commerce” without qualifying the grant of power with any restrictions. Ogden therefore takes an overly narrow view of the Clause in arguing that “commerce” should be interpreted to refer only in the traffic of goods as contrasted with navigation in general. 
 

Unlike the power of taxation, the power to regulate interstate commerce in this case cannot be exercised concomitantly and harmoniously by the states and the federal government. In taxation, a state may take its share of the economic output without interfering with the federal government’s ability to take from the remainder. In the current case, New York’s attempted regulation of navigation has brought its state law into conflict with a federal statute. In such a case, the federal statute must prevail. 

Johnson, J. The nature of the power to regulate commerce is such that its grant to Congress must be plenary, leaving no residual power to the states. It is important to note, however, that identity of means does not necessarily imply identity of power. Federal statutes may act on navigation with the end of regulating commerce while state statutes may act on the same navigation with a view toward preventing the spread of disease. No conflict exists as long as the states and the federal government use regulations for sufficiently distinct ends.

McCulloch v. Maryland, Part II case brief summary

McCulloch v. Maryland, Part II case brief summary
17 U.S. 316 (1819)

Issue
May Maryland tax the second Bank of the United States? 

Holding
Maryland may not tax the Bank. 

Reasoning
The power to tax is the power to destroy.  Left unchecked, taxation of federal institutions by the states might undermine the federal government entirely. Although Maryland correctly observes that the states have broad discretion in levying taxes within their respective territories, it is equally important that the Constitution has limited the states’ power of taxation in crucial respects. The states, for instance, are forbidden from levying imposts or duties except what may be absolutely necessary. Such limitations are intended to assure the supremacy of the federal government. The federal government is supreme because it was formed by the people of the entire United States, not by the people of any single state. The decision whether to tax a federal institution such as the Bank therefore lies with the national legislature. Allowing Maryland to tax the Bank would allow the people of a single state to influence an institution that requires the consent of all. Such a state of affairs is unacceptable, as the people of any one state could not be imagined to entrust even the most minor functions of their own state government to another state. It is also no argument to say that the states can be trusted to restrict taxation to certain institutions. Those advancing this argument have stated no basis on which one might distinguish taxable institutions from non-taxable ones. Maryland has exceeded its authority in attempting to tax the operations of the Bank itself, as opposed to property held by the Bank.

NLRB Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority case brief summary

NLRB Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority case brief summary
Citation. 834 F.2d 191, 266 U.S. App. D.C. 165, 126 LRRM 3290 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

Synopsis:  The NLRB Union had challenged regulations that were issued by the Federal Labor Relations Authority on January 17th, 1980, which was nearly seven years prior to the appeal.

The FLRA claimed that judicial review was barred by a statute of limitations of sixty days.
 
Rules: 
An agency’s regulations may be attacked in two ways after the statute of limitations has passed.

One, a party that possesses standing can challenge the regulations directly on the ground that the issuing agency had acted in excess of its statutory authority in promulgating the regulations.

Two, a party can petition the agency for an amendment or a rescission of the regulations and then appeal the agency’s action.

"Final rules or regulations promulgated by the FLRA must be appealed within sixty days under 5 U.S.C. Section:7123(a)."

Case Facts:
The NLRB challenged regulations adopted by the FLRA which limited the remedies that were available to unions when agencies violated their statutory duty to bargain with the unions. The NLRB had asked the FLRA to amend the regulations because the regulations were inconsistent with the statute.  However, FLRA refused, and NLRB appealed.

Issue:
Was NLRB barred by the statute of limitations?

Holding:
No.

Analysis:
The court distinguished three types of challenges on appeal. An allegation of a procedural infirmity is not to be heard after the statute of limitations period has run. A petitioner’s claim that a regulation suffers a substantive deficiency other than lack of statutory authority can be heard on appeal after an agency denies the petition, but the review is limited to the narrow issues defined by the denial of the petition. Lastly, a petitioner’s contention that the challenged regulation should be amended or rescinded because it conflicts from the statute from which its authority derives is reviewable outside the statutory limitations period. NLRB’s challenge had fallen within the third category and warranted judicial consideration.

Hulle v. Orynge case brief summary

Hulle v. Orynge case brief summary
(The Case of Thorns)
Topic: Strict Liability
 

Case Facts—This case is basically a 1466 scrap of legal reasoning that outlines the contemporary view of tort law in England.

Issue— In what situations does the plaintiff have a just argument for seeking damages?

Holding—A man must make sure that his actions do not result in injury of damage upon others. Even when not breaking the law, damage to another’s self or property is justification for a case.

Analysis— Intent is not the issue, but facts of damage.

McGuire v Almy case brief summary

McGuire v Almy case brief summary
(Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., 1937)

Case Facts--- A nurse working with a mentally patient, was struck by the patient with the end of a leg of furniture. The patient was in the middle of a violent attack, and had destroyed furniture in the room. The defendant told the plaintiff is she were to enter the room she would kill her, despite this the nurse fearing the patient would harm herself intervened.

Issue---- Can a mentally ill person be liable for property damage

Holding----- If an insane person commits an act that does intentional damage to the person or property of another he is liable for that damage just like normal person would be liable.

Reasoning---- In order for a person to be liable he must have been capable of entertaining the same intent, as a normal person, and in fact entertained it. In this case it is apparent that the jury could find that the defendant was capable of entertaining and that she did entertain an intent to strike and to inure the plaintiff. She acted on that intent.

Judgment/Resulting Rule--- In order for a person to be liable he must have been capable of entertaining the same intent, as a normal person, and in fact entertained it.

Ranson v Kitner case brief summary

Ranson v Kitner case brief summary
Appellate Court of Illinois, 1889

Case Facts---- Ranson believing it was a wolf shot and killed Kitner’s dog.

Procedural History--- Trial court jury awarded Kitner the value of the dog= $50.

Issue--- Can a defendant be liable for a wrong done even though they were acting in good faith?

Holding---- Affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Analysis---- They failed to show that an error had been made in the trial, and no prejudice on material errors. Possibility that it could have been a dog, and has to accept that mistake.

Judgment/ Resulting Rule--- Good faith does not matter when they made the mistake that resulted in the tort

*Difference Between Mistake and Accident:

-Mistake: an error, misconception or misunderstanding

-Accident: an unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence

Garratt v. Dailey case brief summary

Garratt v. Dailey case brief summary
(Supreme Court of Washington, 1955)
 

Case Facts--- Brian Dailey, who is 5 years old, pulled a chair out from under Ruth Garratt. Ruth suffered a fracture of the hip. Brian said that he had moved the chair to sit in it himself, then tried to move it back when he realized she was going to sit, but was late. Medical damages amounted to $11,000. BATTERY

Procedural History--- The trial court dismissed the case, claiming Brian did not have “purpose, intent, or design” to injure the plaintiff.

Issue--- Should the case have been dismissed? Did Brian commit a tort? Was there damage to the plaintiff, and who is liable for such damage?

Holding--- Case remanded (sent back) to the original courts for clarification. They must decide whether Brian knew “with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down and to change the judgment if it is warranted.

Reasoning--- It is not enough that Brian may not have intended to cause a battery. The court says that if Brian knew with a substantial certainty that the plaintiff would try to sit down in the chair that he had moved he had committed a tort and would be liable. The court does not believe the lower court examined this when making their decision. He does not have to act with volition, but has to know with a substantial certainty what will result in order for negligence to occur. 

 

Judgment/ Resulting Rule ---- Affirmed. In favor of plaintiff in the amount $11,000. For a tort to occur, there does not have to be volition( the act of making a choice or determining something) or intent. But instead, there is the substantial certainty of the consequences that could occur from the action. This knowledge alone is enough to decide that a tort has been committed. Trial court must do complete analysis of the tort.

Notes

* Character of Actor’s intention: If he did intend to pull the chair away then battery occurred, trial court said this was not proven.

* Restatement of Torts: an actor who commits a direct or indirect act which is the legal cause of a harmful contact with another is liable if: 1) the act is done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to the other or a third person, and 2) the contact is not consented to by the other or the other’s consent thereto is procured by fraud or duress, and 3) the contact is not otherwise privileged.

* Intent requires that the act must be done for the purpose of causing the contact or apprehension or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact or apprehension is substantially certain to be produced.

*A battery would be established if a party acts with substantial certainty that a result will occur. The mere absence of any intent to injure, play a prank on, or embarrass the plaintiff, or to commit an assault and battery on her, would not absolve the defendant of liability if in fact he had such knowledge.