Hughes v. State case brief summary

Hughes v. State case notes (2006)
1994 OK CR 3
868 P.2d 730
Case Number: F-92-1083
 

o   2 pilots in the Grove drank all night til 5 am

o   1^st issue = concept of preemption (Express, Field, Conflict)

§  Express (statutory) – congress will say something like “no state shall regulate the rates, routes, or services of airlines”

§  Field –

§  Implied -

o   Presumption against preemption in areas traditionally state regulated

o   Federal Aviation Act (FAA) does NOT provide for criminal penalties for crew members operating an aircraft under the influence

o   Defense argued federal law preempts the state law and should look to see what federal law says you can do against these pilots (and there was nothing so they should be not guilty)

o   COURT REJECTED D’S argument

§  HOLDING: NO PREEMPTION HERE

o   Constitutional challenges made by D

§  Vague? “under the influence” and “operate” undefined

§  Section 860.13 – know this statute à Incorporation Challenge

·         This is the FL statute where the appeal sort of came from

·         In any prosecution charging careless or reckless operation of aircraft in violation of this section…have to consider as prescribed….what?

§  14 CFR §1.1 (1997)

·         Operate: with respect to aircracft, means use cause to use or authorize to use aircraft, for the purpose…of air navigation including the piloting of aircraft, etc…

§  14 CFR §91.17(a)

·         Prohibition: “eight hours from bottle to throttle

·         Prohibition against acting as crewmember with blood alcohol level of 0.04% or higher did NOT exist in 1983, the year the FLa. Statute §860.13(2) was (re)enacted. 

o   Captain Chronic – preflight work is operation, etc…

o   Court here said they could be tried under the FL statute…

·         Facts

o   TSA smells alcohol on breath of pilots as they walk through screening

o   TSA notifies MDPD

o   MDPD goes to plane after it had left terminal and check pilots, who then find out that both pilots are above Florida’s legal limit (.08).

·         Issue

o   Defendant challenged a judgment of the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County (Florida) finding him guilty with a codefendant of operating an aircraft while intoxicated or in a careless or reckless manner, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 860.13 (2002).

·         Decision

o   The appeals court found that as applied to defendant, who attempted to pilot a commercial aircraft with an estimated blood alcohol level of between .113 and .145 at the time defendant was performing preflight checks on board the aircraft, Fla. Stat. § 860.13 was not unconstitutionally vague, and defendant lacked standing to facially attack the statute on vagueness grounds.

o   Defendant's conduct was clearly prohibited by the statute and he could not seriously contend that he was not on notice that his conduct was illegal based on the statute's failure to define "under the influence."

o   Since (1) the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did operate the aircraft (an essential element of the crime charged); (2) the State's case was premised on whether defendant violated the statute by taking control of the aircraft and performing the preflight functions while under the influence of alcohol; and (3) there was no evidence of any mechanical or other problem which rendered the aircraft incapable of being operated without substantial mechanical repairs, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to instruct on inoperability.

·         Notes

o   Preemption

§  Express

·         Statutory

§  Field

·         Federal and state’s coexist (speed limit on I-95->US1)

§  Conflict

·         Federal and state law cant meet

o   Pilots claiming state cant sue them under state law, must be federal bc of FAA

§  However, FAA does not provide or criminal penalties for crew members operating an aircraft under the influence

§  No preemption!!

Kent v. Dulles case brief summary

Kent v. Dulles, 358 U.S. 116, (1958)
 

o   McCarthyism was going on and the Communist scare  so these cases arise contextually

o   Facts: Kent wanted to fly to Helsinki (guess hes a communist) for some type of rally, his passport application was denied by the Secretary of State. 

o   What are Kent’s rights after he gets the denial letter—what does he do?

§  He had a right to a hearing, but he challenged the fact that he couldn’t leave

o   …

o   Dr. Walter Briehl, a psychiatrist, also applied for a passport, but was refused for communist party membership

§  Dr. Briehl objected that “affiliations” were irrelevant to right to a passport and “every American citizen has the right to travel regardless of politics.” 

o   Court: “the issuance of passport is a discretionary act on the part of the secretary of state…but a passport is not to be refused to an American citizen even if his character is doubtful.  Unless there is reason to believe that he will put the passport to an improper lawful use.”

§  Supreme court said: So standing alone, a communist affiliation was not enough to deny a passport

§  “the right to travel is a part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law under the fifth amendment.”

o   The Dissent: secretary not authorized to deny a passport to a communist whose travel abroad would be inimical to our national security—dissent said that was wrong

***

Search Terms:  passport, American citizen, communist party, passport denial, right to travel

"Does an American citizen have a right to travel?"

"Are political affiliations enough to deny a United States citizen a passport?"

Mustafa v. City of Chicago case brief summary

Mustafa v. City of Chicago

442 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2006)

Use of the word "Bomb" by the passenger.  Granted SJ in favor of defendants because it found there was PC to arrest Mustafa and regardless within the scope of their immunity.

No duty to actually look for the bomb, once PC existed via accusation of a credible witness, they could seize her.

Qualified Immunity - protects LEO performing discretionary functions from civil liability so long as their conduct does nto violate long standing statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would know about.

the bomb threat statute does not only apply to credible or convicining bomb threats. THerefore polce qualified immunity protects them.

Appeal not frivolous, while wrong, it does not warrant grant of attorney fees to defendants.

Is profiling really bad? Voir Dire is perfectly fine yet its the same thing.

Facts:

·         Mustafa, a 56-year-old American citizen of Palestinian descent and Muslim faith, just three months after the attacks of September 11 arrived at the Swissair ticket counter at O'Hare, intending to fly to Tel Aviv by way of Zurich, Switzerland to attend her father's funeral with nineteen members of her immediate family.  Mustafa ordered a “Muslim” meal for the flight.

·         Moments later, the Swissair clerk took Mustafa to a bomb-detection machine to have her two pieces of luggage inspected for weapons. 

·         Mustafa suspected that this was an instance of discriminatory religious or ethnic profiling.  She started to freak out and yell.

·         Mustafa tried to point out that her purse had not been inspected, saying, “You already checked my luggage. Maybe I have a bomb in my purse. Nobody has checked that.”

·         After she said the word “bomb”, police were called to the scene.  Another shouting match ensued between Mustafa, her family, and cops; eventually, she was placed under arrest and spent two days jail (charged with disorderly conduct).  After being acquitted of that charge, she filed the instant suit (a §1983 suit) against the City of Chicago and four police officers, which originally contained seven counts.

Issue 1: Was there probable cause to arrest Mustafa (as PC is an absolute defense to any 1983 claim for false arrest)?

Holding 1: Yes. Here, there were at least two separate facts that could have led a reasonable person to believe that a crime had been committed.

First, the earliest arriving officer, Officer Schober, observed “commotion” and “agitation” in progress, with Mustafa at its center, at a crowded ticket counter at an international airport.

Second, Qadeer, the Swissair manager, told the officers that the plaintiff had said, “Maybe I have a bomb.” Once a reasonably credible witness informs an officer that a suspect has committed a crime, the police have probable cause to arrest the suspect.

-The truth of the matter asserted is irrelevant for purposes of showing probable cause.  Once officers have PC they have no duty to investigate extenuating circumstances or search for exculpatory evidence (if the claim comes from credible evidence, here the manager). 

Issue 2: Were the Police protected by Qualified Immunity?

Holding 2: Defendants had qualified immunity.  Qualified immunity protects officers performing discretionary functions from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would know about  (Saucier Test). 

-To defeat a qualified immunity defense the P must show that their rights were violated, and that the law concerning those rights was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Third, the court has to determine if a competent official would have known that his conduct was “unlawful” in the situation he confronted. 

-The Illinois statute at issue applies to implausible and unconvincing bomb threats.  The argument that one can only be arrested for “credible or convincing bomb threats are open to interpretation (not settled), so, the officers here have qualified immunity. 

-Further, even if they thought her threat of a bomb was not real, Officers may arrest individuals suspected of any crime (that other crime being a crime of disorderly conduct (conduct which alarms or disturbs another or provokes a breach of the peace); the fact that Mustafa was prosecuted under only the bomb threat section of the disorderly conduct statute does not mean that she could only properly be arrested under that section. Thus, the officers are protected by qualified immunity.

(Note: the court didn’t grant the officer’s fees, as it didn’t think that her claim was overly vexatious).

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U.S. v. $124,570 U.S. Currency case brief summary

U.S. v. $124,570 U.S. Currency

873 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1989)

Generalized Search of all Passengers unconstitutional.

(Mission Creep)

Facts:

Forfeiture Action (how the suit is against money)

·         Passenger's money was detected by X-Ray Scan by Airport Security.

·         Security officer then informed US Customs in return for a $250 reward.

·         Customs then seized the passenger's money as it contained trace elements of drugs. 

·         Motion to suppress upheld because search is only constitutional if it was to only target risks of security not evidence of general crime.

Broad Issue: To what extent may law enforcement authorities use airport security inspections to promote objectives unrelated to air safety?

Broad Holding: While narrowly defined searches for guns and explosives are constitutional and justified by the need for air traffic safety, a generalized search of all passengers as a condition for boarding a commercial aircraft would plainly be unconstitutional.

The search here does not:

1. Serve a narrow but compelling administrative objective, (there is a working relationship between security and customs including a monetary reward)

2. Was a limited intrusion.

 
***

U.S. v. $124,570 U.S. Currency (C.A. 9,1989)

Facts

·         Appellant airline passenger went through the security checkpoint at an airport. While the search for weapons was being conducted, the security officer found a large quantity of currency. The officer then notified the United States Customs Service and received a cash reward for her tip.

·         Federal law enforcement had the currency checked with a drug-sniffing dog that indicated that the money had been in contact with some form of illegal drug.

·         Appellee United States then filed a forfeiture motion to obtain the currency. Appellant answered and moved the district court to suppress the evidence due to the unlawful search by the airport security. The district court denied appellant's motion and ordered that the currency be forfeited.

·         Appellant challenged this decision and prevailed on appeal. The court found that the search conducted by airport security was unlawful. Though administrative searches were found to be necessary for weapons in airports, the agent went beyond the scope of her legitimate interest.

·         Further, because she received a reward for the tip, her actions were undistinguishable from law enforcement.

Decision

·         The court vacated the district court's order of forfeiture and found that the suppression was proper. The court held that, because the airport security agents were working closely with law enforcement and would receive cash rewards for tips, the agents were abusing the scope of the search which was designed to discover weapons.

Notes

·         Policy at airport is to make sure planes take off and land safely

·         Security should make sure of safety, not objectives unrelated to airport safety

ABC Charters Inc. v. Bronson case brief summary

ABC Charters Inc. v. Bronson

2009 WL 1010435 (S.D. Fla. 2009)

The federal government can limit the right to travel to certain destinations (Cuba).

State law which attempts to establish its own foreign policy is violative of the interstate commerce clause and is preempted by existing Federal Law (Direct Conflict).

(Preemption of State Law)

 

Facts:

·         The FL Sellers of Travel Act hampered federally licensed travel to Cuba.

 

Issue:

Whether the Florida Sellers of Travel Act unconstitutional and therefore subject to a permanent injunction against it's enforcement?

 

Holding:

No, it violated the supremacy clause because a comprehensive scheme of federal law and regulation preempts the FL law's passage. Def enjoined from enforcing.

 

Rationale:

The FL law burdens the ability of the nation as a whole to choose a foreign policy with Cuba, furthermore the law conflicts with and is preempted by federal laws/regs already existing and it affects the flow of foreign commerce, violative of the interstate commerce clause. FL is conducting its own foreign policy. US Const vests exclusive authority of foreign relations to the national govt.

 

This case is indicative of the voice of a Local Community and the difficulty to enact national laws in their interest. 

Ex: Tampa lightning storm, potential enactment of law that allows compensation to those by who have to wait before taking off on a flight.

United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty case brief summary

United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty
 

·         FACTS: class action was filed for parole release guidelines are inconsistent with constitution but after case was denied to be certified as class action, and before brief of appeal, Geraghty was released on parole so court dismissed as moot

·         LEGAL ANALYSIS: Mootness has two aspects
1) when issue is presented no longer live
2) parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.

There is a personal stake requirement -> limits cases to cases of capable of judicial resolution. That goes to the first aspect, relates to case or controversy. Mootness can happen before or after a case is certified but you can always replace the representative. 

·         CONCLUSION/HOLDING: in a class, not moot if one person’s claim is moot. Do not have to dismiss.  If however during appeal something should occur that could prevent recover to any member of the class then the case must be dismissed as moot.

Clusiau v. Clusiau Enterprises case brief summary

Clusiau v. Clusiau Enterprises
AZ (2010) (35)

Issue- Should the ‘SUPERIOR COURT’ Allow The RE-LITIGATION  of an ISSUE Already Previously Decided in ‘SMALL CLAIMS COURT.’

Rule- “COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL” PREVENTS “RELITIGATION” of an Issue That Was “Actually Litigated in a PREVIOUS PROCEEDING,” IF

1.  The Parties had “A Full and Fair Opportunity and Motive to Litigate the Issue,”

2.  A Valid and Final Decision On The Merits Was Entered

3.  Resolution of the Issue was Essential to the Decision

4.  AND The Proceedings Share a Common Identity of the Parties.

Holding- Under the Circumstances Presented (Narrow Holding), the Judgment Rendered in a “SMALL CLAIMS” Case is NOT ENTITLED to Collateral Estoppel Effect in a SUBSEQUENT ACTION in Superior Court. Issue CAN Be RE-LITIGATED In The SUPERIOR COURT.

Reasoning- Pre-Trial Procedures Available to Parties in SMALL CLAIMS COURT Are SCANT, Not Provided with a Full Opportunity.

Rule- Where a COUNTERCLAIM EXCEEDING the “JURISDICTIONAL LIMIT” of the SMALL CLAIMS COURT is Filed, the Matter is “AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFERRED” to the Justice Court or Superior Court.

Not Moving The Case Out of Small Claims Initially for Full Procedures- Does Not Constitute WAIVER of Possible Jurisdictional REMOVAL or Possible RE-LITIGATION.

Exception!- Clusiau Relitigation Applies When Judgment is Entered AGAINST a “DEFENDANT” in Small Claims Court.  Thus, The Clusiau Option to RE-LITIGATE an ISSUE in the JUSTICE COURT or SUPERIOR COURT May NOT Apply when the Small Claims Judgment is ADVERSE to the PLAINTIFF in the Case.   PLAINTIFF May NOT Be Able to RE-LITIGATE Issue.

Lear v. Fields case brief summary

Lear v. Fields
AZ 2011

Facts- Arizona Legislature Enacts a “STATUTE” essentially mandating that Arizona Courts Apply the Daubert Test To Expert Testimony As Opposed to the Frye Test. 

Holding- Statute Infringes on the Arizona Supreme Court’s Rulemaking Power and thus, Unconstitutional.

Reasoning- Statute is PROCEDURAL in Nature.  Statute Implicates a GENERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE, that, By its own terms, Applied to the Admission of Expert Testimony in “ANY” CIVIL OR CRIMINAL ACTION, AND, it Did NOT ALTER “SUBSTANTIVE” Law.

Seisenger v. Siebel case brief summary

Seisenger v. Siebel
Az. Sup. Ct. 2009 

Facts: An “ARIZONA STATUTE” Passed by the “ARIZONA LEGISLATURE” Seeks to Raise the “BURDEN OF PROOF” set by the Arizona “RULES OF EVIDENCE” for Admitting EXPERT TESTIMONY.

RULE:  The Legislature and Supreme Court BOTH have Rulemaking Power, BUT, in the event of “IRRECONCILIABLE CONFLICT” Between a “PROCEDURAL STATUTE” and a “COURT OR EVIDENTIARY RULE,” the “COURT RULE PREVAILS.”

TEST: 

1.  It is the “ARIZONA COURT’S” DUTY to “SAVE” the STATUTE, By “HARMONIZING” it With the COURT RULE, if possible, By CONSTRUING it so that it does Not Violate the Constitution.

-Reading the Statute as “SUPPLEMETING” the Arizona Court Rule, Rather Than “ABROGATING” the Rule.

2.  If Harmony CANNOT be Effected, and there is a Conflict, we must determine whether the ARIZONA STATUTE is SUBSTANTIVE or PROCEDURAL.

-SUBSTANTIVE Statute- A statute that “creates, defines, regulates RIGHTS.”

-PROCEDURAL Statute- A statute that “prescribes METHOD of enforcing the right or obtaining redress.

Holdings: ARIZONA STATUTE requiring an Expert Witness in “A MALPRACTICE TORT ACTION” to Meet Certain Criteria, Even If ‘Otherwise Qualified’  under ARIZONA EVIDENCE RULE Governing Expert Witnesses, was in “DIRECT CONFLICT” with a COURT PROCEDURAL RULE, BUT, Since the STATUTE was “ALSO SUBSTANTIVE” in nature, it did not offend the Separation of Powers Doctrine.

TORT Elements- The “COMMON LAW” “ELEMENTS” of a “TORT” Medical Malpractice Action are Plainly “SUBSTANTIVE.”

Statutes Are NOT Retroactive- Unless Explicitly Declared Therein.  Thus, it won’t apply to these parties, but it will apply to future parties.

Matter of Friedman case brief summary

Matter of Friedman

1.      Arnold Friedman was an unsuccessful, impressionist artist

2.      Wife inherits all of Friedman’s artwork after death and transfers all artwork to Egan, the dealer

a.       She transfers title and doesn’t get payment

b.      She would get 50% of any sale

3.      Wife dies and daughter wants the artwork back

a.       Title has been transferred, but daughter sues Egan claiming that the contract was unfair

4.      Egan’s attorney Duker represents both sides of the transaction because wife couldn’t afford an attorney

5.      Court looks at terms and decides that there was not a sale

a.       There was a consignment agreement

b.      The elements of the agreement are of a consignment agreement

6.      As a consignment agreement, the court finds that the agreement is unconscionable

a.       Court orders Egan to return the pictures to the wife’s estate

7.      Lesson is that not every agreement is a good agreement and not every agreement will be enforced by the court

O’Keeffe v. Bry case brief summary

O’Keeffe v. Bry

1.      Bry was acting as the sales agent of O’Keeffe

a.       They had a falling out, and O’Keeffe requested all of her art back

2.      Key question

a.       Without a written agreement, when an artist transfers work to an agent, does he transfer title or just a right of consent to sale the artwork?

3.      Quantum meruit

a.       Latin phrase meaning “as much as its worth”

b.      You can only have quantum meruit if there is no contract

c.       Party argues that a person has to pay

4.      Federal court sitting in diversity normally applies law of the forum state

a.       Bry wants New Mexico law

b.      Judge says that New York law will apply because it is more involved in the dispute than is New Mexico

5.      New York Statute of Frauds mentioned in the case requires a written agreement for something that can’t be fully performed before the conclusion of one of the party’s life

a.       Bry tries to show that documents show an agency relationship

6.      Bry wants to be O’Keeffe’s agent for life and to represent the estate of O’Keeffe after her death

a.       She predicates this on what she says O’Keeffe represented to her but has no written document to prove this relationship

7.      You’re an artist starting out, and you need a contract

State v. Ronald P. White case brief discussion

State v. Ronald P. White

1.      Criminal case where White has a loss of liberty

a.       Fundamental values are colliding

                                                  i.      White is going to be put in jail for doing what he says is permitted and protected by the First Amendment

2.      Court looks to see if tattooing sufficiently communicates a message

a.       Is this conduct that is meant to convey an idea that the audience will be able to understand?

b.      Burning a draft card is not protected conduct

c.       Burning a flag is protected conduct

3.      So, does the act of tattooing fall closer to draft card burning or flag burning?

4.      Does a tattoo artist communicate?

5.      Dissent argued that tattooing is protected free speech

a.       Then, the analysis can shift to whether the state statute is appropriate under strict scrutiny

                                                  i.      The statute basically silences the tattoo artist

6.      Distinction between tattooing and painting is the medium

a.       In one case, the medium is inanimate – the canvas

b.      In the other case, the medium is animate – the body

7.      Does the difference in medium make a legal difference?

8.      Two tattoo artists

a.       A requires the client to give him complete artistic freedom to create

b.      B will only work off of a blueprint or sketch and will not add anything to the design

c.       Everyone believed that both artists have equal First Amendment rights

                                                  i.      They’ve decided to be artists and get to decide how to use their talent