172 N.W.2d 647 (1969)
Plaintiffs brought suit against defendant, alleging nuisance to plaintiffs' crops as a result of sulphur emitted through defendant's power production.
Defendant argued that failure of plaintiffs' counsel to rely on a theory of nuisance rather than negligence until almost the close of plaintiffs' case warranted reversal.
- The court rejected this argument, because the operative facts of the case constituted the cause of action, and plaintiffs' case clearly relied on facts demonstrating nuisance.
- Plaintiffs' "substantial injury" entitled them to compensation.
- Defendant's degree of care could not defeat plaintiffs' claim of nuisance, because nuisance rested on the degree of danger existing, irrespective of care.
- The court refused to weigh the social utility afforded by defendant's actions, because the doctrine of comparative injury was not used in Wisconsin in nuisance cases.
- The existence of a continuing nuisance, as found by the jury, warranted a finding that all plaintiffs had their land value diminished.
Judgment finding that defendant's power production constituted a nuisance was affirmed, because social utility provided by defendant's power production was irrelevant in Wisconsin, where the doctrine of comparative injury was not applicable in nuisance cases.
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