Torres v. Mukasey case brief

Torres v. Mukasey case brief summary
551 F.3d 616 (2008)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Petitioner alien sought review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which denied the alien's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

CASE FACTS
The alien, a native and citizen of Honduras, claimed that he was persecuted while a soldier in the Honduran army because of his membership in a social group--namely, his family, which included four older brothers, three of whom were military deserters. The alien asserted that he was tortured and abused as punishment for his brothers' actions and sought asylum and other relief. An Immigration Judge (IJ) rejected all of the alien's claims solely because the IJ found that the alien's evidence lacked credibility.

DISCUSSION
On review, the court found that the IJ's credibility determination was tainted, which was a finding sufficient to remand the case. According to the court, the IJ played an overactive role during the hearings, demonstrated impatience with the alien, conducted improper lines of questioning, and relied on personal knowledge beyond facts in the record. Thus, the IJ's credibility determination was not based on specific, cogent reasons that bore a legitimate nexus to the finding, and was therefore in error. That meant that the decision to deny the alien relief was not supported by substantial evidence.

OUTCOME

The court vacated the decisions of the BIA and IJ and remanded for further proceedings.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. v. United States Department of Justice case brief

The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. v. United States Department of Justice case brief summary
742 F.2d 1484 (1984)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Appellants, organizations which sought disclosure of government documents, and appellant United States government, both sought review of separate decisions from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which granted the government's motion for summary judgment and dismissed a complaint seeking to compel disclosure of certain government materials in one case and which ordered release of documents in the other case.

CASE FACTS
In these cases the court was asked to decide a novel question concerning the scope of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): whether appointment calendars, phone logs, and daily agendas of government officials were agency records subject to disclosure under FOIA.

DISCUSSION
The court concluded that appointment materials that were created solely for an individual's convenience, that contained a mix of personal and business entries, and that could be disposed of at the individual's discretion were not agency records under FOIA. The court also held that non-binding budgetary recommendations submitted by a federal agency to the Office of Management and Budget were protected from disclosure under Exemption 5 of FOIA. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's order in the first case and reversed the district court's order in the second case.

OUTCOME

The court affirmed in part the order that granted the government's motion to compel and reversed the district court's order as to daily agendas. The court held that appointment materials were not agency records under FOIA and that non-binding budgetary recommendations were protected from disclosure under FOIA.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz case brief

Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz case brief summary
435 U.S. 78 (1978)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Petitioner school board sought a writ of certiorari from a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit which reversed the trial court's dismissal of respondent medical student's complaint that she was not afforded procedural due process prior to her dismissal for failure to meet academic standards.

CASE FACTS
The medical student was dismissed by officials of the school during her final year of study for failure to meet academic standards. The medical student filed suit against the school board under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, alleging that she was not afforded procedural due process prior to her dismissal. The school board contended that the procedures that it employed when dismissing the medical student were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.

DISCUSSION

• The court reversed the appellate court's decision. 
• Assuming the existence of a liberty or property interest, the medical student was awarded at least as much due process as U.S. Constitution amendment XIV required. 
• The determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons required an expert evaluation of cumulative information and was not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking. 
• Under those circumstances, the court declined to formalize the academic dismissal process by requiring a hearing.

OUTCOME

The appellate court's decision was reversed in favor of petitioner school board.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

Bi-Metallic Investment Company v. State Board of Equalization case brief

Bi-Metallic Investment Company v. State Board of Equalization case brief summary
239 U.S. 441 (1915)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Plaintiff property owner brought an action against defendants, the state board of equalization and the state tax commission, to enjoin them from putting in force an order increasing the valuation of all taxable property in Denver 40 percent. The Supreme Court of Colorado sustained the order and dismissed the action. The property owner appealed.

CASE FACTS
The tax commission and the board of equalization reassessed all the property in the city. The property owner alleged that the reassessment or raise in valuation could only be made upon notice and hearing or opportunity to be heard. The property owner contended that the reassessment deprived it of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because there was no hearing and no notice.

DISCUSSION

• The United States Supreme Court held that the reassessment order was valid because notice and hearing were not required. 
• The Court reasoned that general statutes within the state power were constitutional without providing individuals a chance to be heard.

OUTCOME

The Court affirmed the state supreme court's decision upholding the order of the state tax commission and the state board of equalization reassessing all property within the city.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation case brief

Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation case brief summary
277 F.3d 1128 (2002)

CASE SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff disabled coach sued defendants athletic associations alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and state law claims. The parties entered into a settlement agreement and the coach moved for attorneys fees and costs as the prevailing party. The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied motion. The coach appealed.

CASE FACTS
The coach, who was a paraplegic, was the assistance baseball coach for a high school baseball team. He had coached high school baseball from an athletic wheelchair for four consecutive seasons in the athletic association's league. In 1999, the coach was prevented from coaching in the field by the athletic association. Despite numerous attempts to settle the matter and despite numerous assurances that the coach would be permitted on the field, the coach was consistently excluded from on-filed coaching. The coach filed a complaint and the parties eventually entered into a settlement agreement.

DISCUSSION

• The court of appeals held that the coach was a prevailing party because he could enforce the terms of the settlement agreement against the athletic association. 
• The district court's finding that the relief the coach sought for himself already had been granted prior to the filing of his complaint was clearly erroneous because on at least two separate occasions prior to the initiation of the litigation, the athletic association had assured the coach that a variance either was being sought or had been granted, but nonetheless, the coach was prohibited from coaching his team.

OUTCOME

The judgment, which denied an award of attorney fees, was reversed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission case brief

Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission case brief summary
725 F.2d 716 (1984)

CASE SYNOPSIS

The court considered the request by petitioner utility companies to review respondent Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) decision not to institute rulemaking and to review a policy statement made by the ICC. The utility companies argued that specific rules were required in order for them to comply with the Long-Cannon Amendment to the Staggers Rail Act (Amendment), 49 U.S.C.S. § 10707a(e)(2)(B), (C).

CASE FACTS
The utility companies filed a petition with the ICC to institute a rulemaking proceeding under § 10707a(e)(2)(B), (C). The utility companies requested carrier-specific data that they claimed was necessary to comply with the policy of the Amendment. The ICC issued a decision refusing to institute a rulemaking proceeding and announcing that the factors in § 10707a(e)(2)(B), (C) would be considered on a case by case basis. The utility companies appealed the decision and requested a review of the policy statement.

DISCUSSION

• The court affirmed the ICC's refusal to institute a rulemaking proceeding, and the court declined to comment on the policy statement. 
• The court held that there was no basis in the record to compel rulemaking. 
• The ICC's decision to avoid the compilation of unnecessary data was sound, and it had the discretion to make the decision under the Amendment. 
• The policy statement was not ripe for judicial review because it was a non-binding statement of future intent, and it did not pose any hardship on the utility companies. 
• Review by the court was only appropriate after the policy was applied to a concrete fact situation.

OUTCOME

The court affirmed the decision of the ICC not to institute the rulemaking proceeding requested by the utility companies, and the court declined to review the ICC's policy statement.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

Appeal of Eno (New Hampshire Department of Employment Security) case brief

Appeal of Eno (New Hampshire Department of Employment Security) case brief summary
495 A.2d 1277 (1985)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Plaintiff employee appealed from an order of the appeal tribunal of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, which sustained the department's denial of unemployment benefits on the ground that the employee had failed to expose herself to the labor market to the extent commensurate with the economic conditions and the efforts of a reasonably prudent person seeking work.

CASE FACTS
The employee was a student in college, but her schedule was otherwise flexible such that she was able to work as a clerical employee for the telephone company. She was laid off from the company and applied for unemployment compensation benefits under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 282-A. The employee received a pamphlet from the department in which it stated that she had to seek work as a condition of eligibility for benefits. A certifying officer determined that the employee was ineligible for benefits because she was a student in college, so she was not available for work on all shifts and hours for which there was a market for her services.

DISCUSSION

• The tribunal affirmed the disqualification because she did not actively seek employment. 
• The court determined that the department led the employee to believe that she did not have to do more than she had done to establish her eligibility. 
• The court explained that the employee acted accordingly by answering want ads by telephone calls and by sending out her resume. 
• The court concluded that the tribunal's denial of benefits for failing to do more was fundamentally unfair and amounted to a denial of due process.

OUTCOME

The court reversed and remanded the order of the tribunal, which sustained the department's denial of unemployment benefits on the ground that the employee had failed to expose herself to the labor market to the extent commensurate with the economic conditions and the efforts of a reasonably prudent person seeking work.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

In re Trinity Industries, Inc. case brief

In re Trinity Industries, Inc. case brief summary
876 F.2d 1485 (1989)

CASE SYNOPSIS

In these consolidated appeals, appellant companies challenged the orders from the United States District Courts for the Northern District of Alabama and the Middle District of Florida, which found appellants in contempt of court for failure to honor Occupational Safety and Health Administration inspection warrants.

CASE FACTS
Appellants, an Alabama company and a Florida company, were held in contempt of court for failure to honor Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspection warrants.

DISCUSSION

• On appeal, the court found that the warrant applications provided sufficient information to enable the magistrate to conclude that appellants were selected by specific, neutral criteria, and thus met the test under Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. for probable cause. 
• With respect to sanctions imposed against Florida appellant, Florida appellant's actions made obvious the need for the lower court to resort to coercive tactics to secure compliance with its contempt orders. 
• With respect to attorney fees, the lower court properly limited appellee's recovery to amounts expended in the post-Alabama litigation phase, since appellee's efforts during that phase were those which directly led to the ultimate finding of contempt. 
• However, the court remanded the issue of attorney fees with regard to Alabama appellant, because there was no explanation of the basis of the denial of appellee's request for the fees.

OUTCOME

The orders holding appellant companies in contempt of court were affirmed in part, because there was no abuse of discretion in issuing the warrants, imposing sanctions on Florida appellant, or awarding appellee Secretary of Labor attorney fees from Florida appellant; however, the award of attorney fees as to the Alabama appellant was reversed, because there was no explanation of the basis for denying appellee's request for said fees.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

INS v. Lopez-Mendoza case brief

INS v. Lopez-Mendoza case brief summary
468 U.S. 1032 (1984)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Petitioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), challenged the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that the exclusionary rule of the 4th Amendment applied to the INS deportation hearings.

CASE FACTS
-Respondent illegal aliens were arrested by petitioner INS.
-At their deportation hearings, respondents attempted to suppress evidence of their status, arguing that under the exclusionary rule of the 4th Amendment, petitioner's illegal arrest of respondents had to be suppressed.
-Petitioner opposed respondents' motion, claiming that the criminal exclusionary rule did not apply to civil proceedings such as a deportation hearing.
-The court of appeals reversed one deportation order and remanded the other.

DISCUSSION

• On appeal, the Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply to civil proceedings such as petitioner's deportation hearing, since the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct, and that did not exist in this situation. 
• Application of the exclusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings could be justified only if the rule was likely to add significant protection to U.S. Constitution 4th Amendment  rights. 
• The Court concluded by stating that excluding respondents' illegal status would have allowed them to continue breaking the law, something that the exclusionary rule was never designed to do.

OUTCOME

The Court reversed the decision of the lower court and held that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule did not apply to the INS' deportation hearings, and thus, respondents were properly determined to be aliens subject to deportation.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

International Union, United Automobile Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW v. Occupational Safety & Health Administration case brief

International Union, United Automobile Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW v. Occupational Safety & Health Administration case brief summary
938 F.2d 1310

CASE SYNOPSIS

Petitioner unions sought review of an order of respondent Occupational Safety & Health Administration, ruling that the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 655(b)(5), did not provide the statutory criteria for the lockout rule of the Control of Hazardous Energy Sources, 54 Fed. Reg. 36,644, regulation.

CASE FACTS
Petitioner unions challenged a regulation promulgated by respondent Occupational Safety and Health Administration which was designed to reduce injuries caused by ordinary industrial equipment that might suddenly move and injure a worker. The Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout) regulation contained two procedures designed to reduce such injuries. Petitioners contended that the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act), provided the statutory criteria for the lockout rule. Petitioners claimed that the hazard involved was a harmful physical agent as that term was used in the Act.

DISCUSSION
The court upheld respondent's conclusion that § 655(b)(5) did not govern occupational safety standards that regulated hazards causing immediately noticeable physical harm.

OUTCOME

The court upheld respondent Occupational Safety & Health Administration's ruling that the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act) did not provide the statutory criteria for the lockout rule of the Control of Hazardous Energy Sources regulation. The Act did not govern occupational safety standards that regulated hazards causing immediately noticeable physical harm.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

Jackson v. Veterans Administration case brief summary

Jackson v. Veterans Administration case brief summary
768 F.2d 1325 (1985)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Petitioner employee sought review of the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board to remove him from his position as a supervisor with respondent Veterans Administration on the basis that he sexually harassed a female subordinate.

CASE FACTS
The Veterans Administration (VA) removed the employee for sexually harassing a female subordinate. The employee appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board), and a hearing was held before a hearing officer. The hearing officer determined that none of the five alleged incidents of misconduct were established by a preponderance of the evidence. The VA requested that the Board review that decision, and the Board reversed the presiding official, concluding that two of the alleged incidents were supported by the evidence and that the penalty of removal was not unreasonable given the employee's past disciplinary record. The employee appealed, and the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a determination of a lesser penalty.

DISCUSSION

• The court found that one of the two incidents the Board had cited was based upon substantial evidence, while the other was not. 
• However, the employee's past disciplinary record did not include sexual misconduct, and thus removal was not warranted.

OUTCOME

The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a determination of a lesser penalty, holding that the Merit Systems Protection Board's decision was partly supported by substantial evidence, but that the incident supported by the evidence did not warrant the employee's termination.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

JEM Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission case brief

JEM Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission case brief summary
22 F.3d 320 (1994)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Pursuant to its "hard look" processing rules, respondent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) dismissed petitioner broadcasting company's license application without affording the broadcasting company an opportunity to correct the error in its license application. The broadcasting company sought review of the FCC's summary dismissal of its application.

CASE FACTS
The broadcasting company challenged the summary dismissal by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of its license application for a new FM station. The corporation claimed that the FCC's "hard look" rules were promulgated without notice and comment in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.S. § 553, that it was entitled to a hearing on its application under the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.S. §§ 309(d)-(e), and that the FCC's summary dismissal deprived it of due process under U.S. Const. amend. V.

DISCUSSION

• The court rejected the broadcasting company's claims. 
• According to the court, the broadcasting company's challenge to the "hard look" rules was untimely under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 2344, and, in any event, the "hard look" rules were procedural in nature and were exempt from the general notice and comment requirements of § 533 of the APA. 
• Also, the FCC was not required to hold a hearing before dismissing the broadcasting company's application, which failed to comply with the FCC's rules.
• The court found that the broadcasting company had clear and explicit notice of the consequences of failing to include the specified data in its application.

OUTCOME
The court denied the broadcasting company's petition for review of the order of the Federal Communications Commission.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

John D. Copanos and Sons, Inc. v. Food and Drug Administration case brief

John D. Copanos and Sons, Inc. v. Food and Drug Administration case brief summary
854 F.2d 510 (1988)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Petitioner human and veterinary drug company, which both manufactured and distributed the drugs, sought review of an order of respondent United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which denied the drug company a hearing and summarily withdrew its approval of the drug company's applications for sterile injectable products.

CASE FACTS
The FDA withdrew the drug company's New Drug Applications and New Animal Drug Applications on the grounds that the methods, facilities, and controls used to produce the sterile injectable products were inadequate to assure their identity, strength, quality, and purity. The drug company sought a petition for review, claiming that it was denied an opportunity for hearing and due notice because the FDA failed to give it notice of the type of information that was required to have been submitted to justify a hearing.

DISCUSSION

• On appeal, the court denied the petition for review. 
• The court held that it was rejecting the drug company's claim that it had a right to any more specific notice than it received because the drug company had failed to identify any evidence, or type of evidence, that it might have presented but for lack of notice as to its relevance. 
• The court further held that the FDA was entitled to withdraw the drug company's applications without holding a hearing because the record demonstrated that in several respects the methods, facilities, and controls were inadequate and were not made adequate within a reasonable time after receipt of written notice.

OUTCOME

The court denied the drug company's petition for review of the FDA's summary withdrawal of its approval of the drug company's applications for sterile injectable products.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

Martinez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services case brief

Martinez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services case brief summary
815 F.2d 1318 (1987)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Appellant prisoner sought review of an order from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, which denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 2241 that sought release from custody and appointment of advisory counsel for his pending appeal from his conviction for unarmed bank robbery.

CASE FACTS
Appellant prisoner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 2241, seeking release from custody and appointment of advisory counsel for his pending appeal from his conviction for unarmed bank robbery. The district court denied the petition on the merits, and appellant sought review.

DISCUSSION

• The court vacated the order that denied appellant's petition on the merits and remanded the cause to the district court with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
• The court determined that the district court had no authority to review the petition while appellant's petition for certiorari was pending before the supreme court. 
• The court concluded that the district court should not have reviewed appellant's petition because the court had previously decided the issues raised in motions submitted by appellant.

OUTCOME

The court vacated the order that denied, on the merits, the petition for habeas corpus relief filed by appellant prisoner and remanded the cause to the district court with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the district court had no authority to entertain the petition while appellant's petition for certiorari was still pending before the supreme court.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency case brief

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency case brief summary
549 U.S. 497 (2007)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Petitioners, environmental organizations and state and local governments, brought an action challenging the determination of respondent Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) not to regulate motor vehicle emissions which allegedly contributed to global warming. Upon the grant of a writ of certiorari, petitioners appealed the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which upheld EPA's determination.

CASE FACTS
The EPA argued that the Clean Air Act (CAA) did not authorize the EPA to address global climate change and that, in any event, executive policy specifically addressing global warming warranted the EPA's refusal to regulate in such area.

DISCUSSION

• The U.S. Supreme Court first held that petitioners had standing to challenge EPA's denial of their rulemaking petition since at least one petitioner state properly asserted a concrete injury from the potential further loss of its coastal land, much of which was owned by the state, from rising sea levels caused by climate change. 
• Further, because greenhouse gases were clearly within the CAA's broad definition of an air pollutant, the EPA had the statutory authority to regulate the emission of such gases from new motor vehicles, and there was no showing of any congressional intent to bar the EPA from addressing global warming. 
• Also, it was undisputed that global warming threatened serious harms, and policy considerations were irrelevant to the EPA's statutory mandate to determine whether the greenhouse gases contributed to global warming and whether motor vehicle emissions of such gases actually or potentially endangered public health or welfare.

OUTCOME

The judgment upholding EPA's determination to decline rulemaking was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

Mathews v. Eldridge case brief

Mathews v. Eldridge case brief summary
424 U.S. 319 (1976)

CASE SYNOPSIS

In an action where respondent had sought an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of petitioner's Social Security disability benefit payments, certiorari was granted to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

CASE FACTS

• Mr. Eldridge (plaintiff) began receiving Social Security benefits in June 1968. 
• In March of 1972, the state agency in charge of monitoring Eldridge’s medical condition sent him a questionnaire. 
• Based on Eldridge’s answers to the questions and reports from Eldridge’s doctor and a psychiatric consultant, the state agency informed Eldridge that he was no longer eligible for Social Security benefits. 
• Eldridge disputed this decision in writing, but the state agency terminated his benefits. 
• The Social Security Administration (SSA) accepted this determination and advised Eldridge that his benefits would terminate after that month. 
• The notification informed Eldridge that he had the right to seek reconsideration by the state agency within six months. 
• Eldridge did not request reconsideration, but filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the administrative procedures used to determine whether a Social Security recipient has a continuing disability. 
• The district court and court of appeals held that Eldridge had to be afforded an evidentiary hearing under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Mathews, the Secretary of HEW, appealed.

DISCUSSION

• The United States Supreme Court found that respondent had not been denied procedural due process when he was not granted an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of his Social Security disability benefit payments. 
• The district court had jurisdiction over the suit, because respondent had presented his claims for review to both the district social security office and the regional office for reconsideration, and petitioner Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare had accepted the termination through the Social Security Administration. 
• Procedural due process had been satisfied because respondent was not in as dire a position as that of a typical welfare recipient, and because of the myriad procedural safeguards of the process, including an evidentiary hearing before the denial of the claim became final. 
• The public interest in limiting the procedures available was significant, given the cost of additional procedures.

OUTCOME

The court reversed the lower court, because procedures in place were sufficient to satisfy due process, and the state of persons receiving disability benefits was typically not as serious as that of welfare recipients.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

Metropolitan School District v. Davila case brief

Metropolitan School District v. Davila case brief summary
969 F.2d 485 (1992)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Defendant United States Department of Education appealed a summary judgment from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana entered in plaintiff school district's suit to void defendant's ruling regarding the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (Act), 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 1411-20. Defendant contended that its rule was interpretative, and not subject to the notice and comment under the Administrative Procedure Act.

CASE FACTS
In response to a query from a state school district, defendant United States Department of Education issued a letter stating that under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA-B), 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 1411-20, school districts were required to provide educational services for eligible students who had been removed from the classroom for discipline reasons. Plaintiff school district challenged the rule on the ground that defendant had not followed the formal rulemaking dictates of the Administrative Procedure Act.

DISCUSSION

• In reversing the judgment for plaintiff and entering judgment for defendant, the court held that defendant's rule was paradigmatically interpretive, not legislative, and thus was exempt from the formal notice and comment process under the statute. 
• The court stated that defendant's characterization of the rule was entitled to some deference, and noted that defendant had acted as though it was interpreting the IDEA-B, not legislating. 
• The court explained that neither the fact that the rule imposed substantive burdens on plaintiff nor that defendant's announcement was entirely novel necessarily qualified it as legislative.

OUTCOME

The court reversed the judgment for plaintiff school district and ordered judgment entered for defendant United States Department of Education. The court held that defendant's letter ruling that plaintiff had a duty to provide educational services to disabled students it expelled from the classroom for disciplinary reasons was interpretive and not subject to notice and comment.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

MetWest, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor case brief

MetWest, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor case brief summary
560 F.3d 506 (2009)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Petitioner, a laboratory company, sought review of a final order of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Review Commission, upholding a citation against the company for allowing its employees to remove needles from reusable blood tube holders, in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(d)(2)(vii)(A).

CASE FACTS
In 1991, OSHA promulgated  a statute which prohibited employers from removing needles from blood-drawing equipment unless there was no feasible alternative or such was required due to the nature of a medical procedure. The rule was not enforced until OSHA issued a 2003 guidance document stating that reusable blood tube holders, which required removal of the needle, likely violated § 1910.1030(d)(2)(vii)(A). In 2004, the company was cited for using reusable holders. The company argued that OSHA effectively amended the rule without employing the procedures required under 5 U.S.C.S. § 553.

DISCUSSION

• The court disagreed. 
• First, OSHA never interpreted the rule to allow the use of reusable holders in all situations. 
• Second, the guidance documents OSHA issued over the years were consistent with each other and with the rule. 
• Third, the change in enforcement policy was expected, as the availability of disposable holders had become widespread. 
• Finally, the Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act did not vest the company with discretion to determine the safest medical device for each of its facilities without regard to the regulations.

OUTCOME

The court denied the company's petition for review.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

Morrison v. Olson case brief

Morrison v. Olson case brief summary
487 U.S. 654 (1988)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Appellant independent counsel challenged a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that reversed the trial court's decision and held that the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 591 et seq, were invalid.

CASE FACTS
The Special Division appointed appellant as independent counsel to investigate appellees for violations of federal criminal laws pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C.S § 591 et seq. Appellant caused a grand jury to issue and serve subpoenas on appellees. All three appellees moved to quash the subpoenas, claiming that the independent counsel provisions of the Act were unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed appellees' motions, but the appellate court reversed the decision when it found that the Act was invalid.

DISCUSSION

• The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision when the Court found that: 
• (1) the Act did not violate the Appointments Clause for Congress to vest the appointment of independent counsel in the Special Division; 
• (2) the powers exercised by the Division under the Act did not violate U.S. Constitution article III; and 
• (3) the Act did not violate the separation-of-powers principle.  Awesome, huh?

OUTCOME

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and concluded that it did not violate the Appointments Clause for Congress to vest the appointment of independent counsel in the Special Division.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. case brief

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. case brief summary
463 U.S. 29 (1983)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Certiorari was granted to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a review filed by respondent automobile insurance companies contesting the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) rescission of a passive restraint safety standard for all new automobiles as arbitrary and capricious under the informal rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 553.

CASE FACTS
Under authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act), 15 U.S.C.S. § 1381 et seq., the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) promulgated Standard 208 to require installation of seatbelts in all automobiles. Subsequently, the NHTSA promulgated rules to require passive restraint systems in new vehicles, but then rescinded the requirement on the basis that it was no longer able to find that the requirement would produce significant safety benefits. Respondent automobile insurers filed petitions for review of the NHTSA's rescission. The district court held that the NHTSA's rescission was arbitrary and capricious. Petitioners sought a writ of certiorari, which was granted.

DISCUSSION

• The court held that the NHTSA failed to present an adequate basis and explanation for rescinding the passive restraint requirement and required the NHTSA to either reconsider the restraint issue further, or amend Standard 208 to comply with the supporting analysis. 
• The court held that under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of judicial review, the NHTSA failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for its action to abandon the passive restraint system.

OUTCOME

The court vacated the judgment of the lower court and remanded the cases to the lower court with directions to remand the matter to the NHTSA for further consideration consistent with the court's opinion that the NHTSA failed to present an adequate basis and explanation for rescission, as required under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

National Credit Union Admin. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. case brief

National Credit Union Admin. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. case brief summary
522 U.S. 479 (1998)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Petitioners, the National Credit Union Association and a federal credit union, appealed an order of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which reversed two district court decisions and held that respondents, five banks and a bankers' association, had standing under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 702, to challenge agency interpretation of the Federal Credit Union Act § 109, 12 U.S.C.S. § 1759.

CASE FACTS
The Federal Credit Union Act § 109 (Act), 12 U.S.C.S. § 1759, limited membership in federal credit unions to groups having a common bond of occupation or association. Petitioner, the National Credit Union Association, interpreted § 109 to permit credit unions to admit unrelated employer groups. Respondents, five banks and a banking association, filed an action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 702, to challenge petitioner's interpretation of the Act as applied to petitioner credit union. The district court dismissed the action twice, and twice the appellate court reversed. On appeal, the court affirmed.

DISCUSSION:

• The court held that respondents had standing and that petitioner agency's construction of the statute was erroneous. 
• Under its prudential standing cases, the court held that respondents were the competitors of petitioner credit union and could challenge petitioner agency's action that relaxed statutory restrictions on their competitor's business. 
• On the merits, the court applied the Chevron rule and noted that Congress had expressly limited membership in credit unions to members of definable groups.
• Petitioner agency's expansive reading of § 109 was impermissible.

OUTCOME

The court affirmed the circuit court's decision. Under its prudential standing cases, the court held that respondent, five banks and a banking association, were competitors of petitioner credit union and had standing to challenge petitioner agency's action that relaxed restrictions on the competitor's activities. Because Congress had expressly limited membership in federal credit unions, petitioner agency's interpretation was impermissible.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Aerospace Company Division of Textron Inc. case brief

National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Aerospace Company Division of Textron Inc. case brief summary
416 U.S. 267 (1974)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Petitioner sought review of the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denying petitioner's cross-petition for enforcement of petitioner's order in petitioner's action against respondent for unfair labor practice in violation of §§ 8 (a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 158 (a)(5) and (1).

CASE FACTS
A union representing respondent's workers requested of petitioner a representation election to determine whether the union could be certified as the bargaining representative of the buyers at respondent's plant. Respondent opposed the petition asserting the buyers, as managerial employees, were not covered under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 151 et seq. (the Act). Petitioner held the buyers were covered by the Act and ordered respondent to bargain with the union. The appellate court denied enforcement of the order and remanded the case to petitioner so petitioner could conduct a rulemaking proceeding in conformity with § 156. Petitioner sought Supreme Court review.

DISCUSSION

• The Court held that managerial employees were not covered under the Act but expressed no opinion as to whether the buyers fell into the category of managerial employees. 
• Further, petitioner was not limited to rulemaking procedures under §156 if petitioner should so determine that the buyers were not managerial employees on remand, but instead had discretion to decide that the adjudicative procedures could also produce the relevant information necessary to a mature and fair consideration of the issues.

OUTCOME

The judgment in favor of respondent was affirmed as to the determination that managerial employees were not covered under the statute, but reversed as to the determination that petitioner was limited to rulemaking procedures when determining whether the employees at issue were managerial employees within the meaning of the statute.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst case brief

National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst case brief summary
322 U.S. 111 (1944)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Petitioner National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) sought review of a decision of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which denied enforcement of the NLRB's orders that found respondent publishers had violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 158(1) and (5). The publishers were ordered to cease and desist from such violations and to bargain collectively with the union upon request.

CASE FACTS

• Four petitions were filed with the NLRB for investigation and certification by a local union. 
• The NLRB made findings of fact that the regular, full-time newsboys selling each paper were employees within the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 152, and that questions affecting commerce concerning the effective representation of employees had arisen. 
• The NLRB had designated appropriate units and ordered elections and, after the union was selected, the publishers refused to bargain with it. 
• After finding the publishers to have violated 29 U.S.C.S. § 158(1) and (5), the NLRB ordered them to cease and desist from such violations and to collectively bargain with the union upon request. 

DISCUSSION
The appellate court refused to enforce the NLRB's orders when it decided that the newsboys were not employees within the meaning of the Act. Certiorari was granted, and the United States Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that the NLRB's findings were not erroneous. The Court found that the newsboys were the publishers' employees within the meaning of the Act, and the publishers were required to collectively bargain with them.

OUTCOME

The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision refusing to enforce the NLRB's orders that the publishers cease and desist from engaging in unfair labor practices.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

National Labor Relations Board v. Local Union No. 25 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers case brief

National Labor Relations Board v. Local Union No. 25 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers case brief summary
586 F.2d 959 (1978)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Pursuant to § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 151 et seq., § 160(e), petitioner National Labor Relations Board sought enforcement of its supplemental order issued against respondents, union, association and corporation, that invalidated part of respondent union's collective bargaining agreement.

CASE FACTS
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that respondent union had engaged in unfair labor practices. The ALJ also found that Article XI of respondent union's collective bargaining agreement was illegal even though the issue had not been raised by petitioner National Labor Relations Board's complaint, in the briefs, or in oral argument, and no evidence was presented concerning the issue. Petitioner sought enforcement of its supplemental order that embodied the findings and conclusions of the ALJ.

DISCUSSION

• The court declined to order enforcement of the supplemental order to the extent it dealt with Article XI because respondents, union, association and corporation, did not receive the notice required by § 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 554. 
• The court ruled that the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 151 et seq., § 160(e), did not prevent the court from considering the objection based on the failure to comply with the provisions of § 554. 
• The court did grant enforcement to the portion of the supplemental order that required respondent union to keep permanent hiring records but modified the period of time to two years.

OUTCOME

The court declined to order enforcement of so much of petitioner National Labor Relations Board's supplementary order as dealt with Article XI of the collective bargaining agreement. The court granted enforcement of the supplementary order that respondent union maintain permanent hiring records but only as modified to require that records be kept for two years.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)

National Parks and Conservation Association v. Morton case brief

National Parks and Conservation Association v. Morton case brief summary
498 F.2d 765 (1974)

CASE SYNOPSIS

Appellant, a national park association, brought an action under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552, seeking to enjoin appellees, officials of the Department of the Interior, from refusing to permit inspection and copying of records concerning concessions operated in the national parks. The association sought review of an order from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granting summary judgment to appellees.

CASE FACTS
The park association sued under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.S. § 552, to enjoin appellees from refusing to permit inspection and copying of agency records concerning concessions operated in the national parks. The district court granted summary judgment for appellees on the ground that the information was exempt from disclosure under Exemption 4 of FOIA, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(4).

DISCUSSION

• The issue was whether the information was confidential. 
• The court held that appellees had no apparent interest in preventing disclosure of the matter. 
• Disclosure of the material to the park association was a mandatory condition of appellees' right to operate in national parks. 
• The record did not support application of the financial information exemption. 
• The case was remanded to determine whether public disclosure of the information posed the likelihood of substantial harm to the competitive positions of the parties from whom the information had been obtained.

OUTCOME

The court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the action for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.

Recommended Supplements for Administrative Law Examples & Explanations: Administrative Law, Fourth Edition
Administrative Law and Process: In a Nutshell (Nutshell Series)