Howard v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. case brief

Howard v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp.
540 F.2d 695

Facts:
-Plaintiff farmers sought to recover for losses to their tobacco crop due to alleged rain damage. -Defendant insurer denied the claims because, prior to inspection by defendant’s adjuster, plaintiffs had either plowed or disked under the tobacco fields in question to prepare the same for sowing a cover crop of rye to preserve the soil.
-A portion of the policy specifically provided that the stalks on any acreage with respect to which a loss was claimed was not to be destroyed until defendant’s adjuster had made an inspection.

Holding:
-The trial court held that the inquiry was whether plaintiffs’ compliance with the policy provision that insured shall not destroy any stalks until an inspection was made was a condition precedent to the recovery and that the failure of the insureds to comply forfeited benefits for the alleged loss.
-The provisions of a contract were not construed as conditions precedent in the absence of language plainly requiring such construction.
-Merely plowing under the tobacco stalks did not of itself operate to forfeit coverage under the policy.

Procedural History:
-Plaintiff farmers appealed an order from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh, which entered summary judgment in favor of defendant insurer in plaintiffs’ action alleging defendant failed to pay crop insurance to plaintiffs.

Rule:
where it is doubtful whether words create a promise or an express condition, they are usually interpreted as creating a promise, thereby avoiding a forfeiture.

Analysis:
-There is a general legal policy opposed to forfeitures. Insurance policies are generally construed most strongly against the insurer.
-When it is doubtful whether words create a promise or a condition precedent, they will be construed as creating a promise.
-The provisions of a contract will not be construed as conditions precedent in the absence of language plainly requiring such construction.

Conclusion:
-Court reversed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the provisions of the policy not destroy any crops until the insurer made an inspection were not construed as conditions precedent in the absence of language plainly requiring such construction.
-The court remanded the cause for further proceedings.

Vanadium Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. case brief

Vanadium Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co
Heading: 159 F.2d 105

Facts:
-Plaintiff vendee and defendant vendor entered into a contract for the assignment of defendant’s interests in two leases. Plaintiff made an advance payment and defendant surety provided a bond securing performance of the contract by defendant.
-A condition of the contract was approval of the assignment of defendant leaseholder’s interests by the Secretary of Interior. When it became clear this approval would not be given, plaintiff brought an action to recover his advance payment.
-Under the terms of the contract, plaintiff was entitled to his payment unless his acts justified defendants’ refusal to make the refund.

Procedural History:
-Plaintiff vendee sought review of a judgment of the United States District Court (the case having been removed from the Supreme Court of the State of New York because of diverse citizenship).
-The district court entered judgment for defendants, vendor and surety, in an action by plaintiff to recover its advance payment under contract for the sale of mining leases.
-Court affirmed judgment for defendants because plaintiff had breached the condition precedent requiring him to cooperate in obtaining the Secretary’s approval.
-The court held that documents produced by the Department of the Interior, which proved plaintiff’s failure to so cooperate came within the official records exception to hearsay and concerned matters to which the officers could have testified.

Rule:
-Whenever the cooperation of one of the contracting parties is necessary for the performance of the contract, there is a condition implied that the cooperation will be given.
-You can’t work against the very people you contracted with, you have to try to fulfill the condition to the extent that it’s in your control you have to make sure they occur.

Analysis:
-In a contract, wherever the cooperation of the promisee is necessary for the performance of the promise, there is a condition implied in the fact that the cooperation will be given.

Conclusion:
-Court affirmed the judgment for defendants vendor and surety, in an action by plaintiff vendee under contract for purchase of lease interests for return of his advance payment because plaintiff failed to cooperate, which was a condition precedent for defendant’s contractual duty.

Morin Building Products Co. v. Baystone Construction, Inc. case brief

Morin Bldg. Products Co. v. Baystone Constr., Inc
717 F.2d 413

Facts:
-Motor company hired D contractor to build an addition to its plant.
-Defendant hired plaintiff subcontractor to erect the aluminum walls for the project.
-The construction contract provided that all work would be done subject to the final approval of the motor company’s authorized agent, and that his decision in matters relating to artistic effect would be final. Plaintiff put up the walls.
-Because the walls did not have a uniform finish the motor company rejected the work.
-Defendant refused to pay plaintiff for the work.
-P brought an action for breach of contract against D.

Procedural History:
-Defendant contractor sought review of a decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, which granted a judgment in favor of plaintiff subcontractor in a breach of contract action.
-The district court ordered that plaintiff should be paid for its work.
-On appeal, defendant alleged that the district court erred when it gave a jury instruction that defined the standard for acceptance of the work by defendant under the reasonable person standard. The court affirmed. The court ruled that the proper standard for approval of the work was the reasonable person standard and that the parties did not intend to subject approval of plaintiff’s work to the aesthetic whim of the motor company.

Rule:
acceptance of performance in a contract whose purpose is primarily functional will be based on an objective standard

Analysis:
-If it is practicable to determine whether a reasonable person in the position of the obligor would be satisfied, an interpretation is preferred under which the condition that the obligor be satisfied with the obligee’s performance occurs if such a reasonable person in the position of the obligor would be satisfied.
-The reasonable person standard is employed when the contract involves commercial quality, operative fitness, or mechanical utility which other knowledgeable persons can judge.
-The standard of good faith is employed when the contract involves personal aesthetics or fancy.
-This is a case of forfeiture and not of unjust enrichment.

Conclusion:
-The court affirmed the decision which granted a judgment in favor of plaintiff subcontractor in a breach of contract action because defendant contractor and plaintiff did not intend to subject approval of plaintiff’s work to the aesthetic whim of the motor company.
-The court ruled that the proper standard for approval of plaintiff’s work was the reasonable person standard.

Mattei v. Hopper case brief

Mattei v. Hopper
51 Cal. 2d 119

Facts:
-The developer planned to construct a shopping center adjacent to the landowner’s property.
-After unsuccessful negotiations, the landowner submitted an offer, which the developer accepted. -The parties’ signed a deposit receipt form, requiring purchase within 120 days subject to obtaining leases satisfactory to the developer.
-The developer paid the deposit.
-Prior to the purchase date, the developer was notified the landowner would not sell the property.

Holding:
(1) the language conditioning the developer’s performance on the obtaining of satisfactory leases was a “satisfaction” clause, (2) a valid contract arose between the parties, (3) the deposit receipt was not illusory or lacking in mutuality of obligation because it contained a “satisfaction” clause, (4) the standard for evaluating the developer’s satisfaction was that he exercise his judgment in good faith, (5) the standard of the reasonable person did not apply where the performance involved a matter dependent on judgment, and (6) any cases departing from the established rules employing the criterion of good faith in upholding “satisfaction” clauses dependent on the exercise of judgment were disapproved.

Procedural History:
-Plaintiff developer sought review of a judgment from the Superior Court of Contra Costa County (California), which concluded that an agreement between the developer and defendant landowner requiring the landowner to convey her real property to the developer was illusory and lacking in mutuality.

Analysis:
-While contracts making the duty of performance of one of the parties conditional upon his satisfaction seem to give him wide latitude in avoiding any obligation and thus present serious consideration problems, such “satisfaction” clauses are given effect. They are divided into two primary categories and are accorded different treatment on that basis.
-First, in those contracts where the condition calls for satisfaction as to commercial value or quality, operative fitness, or mechanical utility, dissatisfaction cannot be claimed arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously, and the standard of a reasonable person is used in determining whether satisfaction was received.
-An agreement in which the promise of one party is conditioned on his own or the other party’s satisfaction is generally considered as requiring a performance which shall be satisfactory to him in the exercise of an honest judgment. Such contracts are almost universally upheld.
-A promise conditional upon the promisor’s satisfaction is not illusory since it means more than that validity of the performance is to depend on the arbitrary choice of the promisor.
-His expression of dissatisfaction is not conclusive. That may show only that he has become dissatisfied with the contract; he must be dissatisfied with the performance, as a performance of the contract, and his dissatisfaction must be genuine.

Conclusion:
The court reversed the judgment.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Murphy case brief

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Murphy
206 Conn. 409
Facts:
-An action was filed against the insured to recover damages caused to a building as a result of the manner in which the insured dismantled his office after termination of a lease.
-The insured impleaded his liability insurance company and the company successfully moved for summary judgment on the grounds that insured inexcusably and unreasonably delayed in complying with the notice provisions of the insurance contract.
-Defendant sought review. The court affirmed, not because of the unreasonable delay, but because insured failed to allege that insurance company had not been materially prejudiced by the delay.

Procedural History:
-D insured sought review of the partial summary judgment entered in favor of third party defendant insurance company in an indemnification action to recover damages for breach of contract.

Rules:
-An insured who belatedly gives notice of an insurance claim may nonetheless recover on the insurance contract by rebutting the presumption that the delay prejudiced the insurer. i.e. the pl. would have to prove that the insurance company was not harmed by the delay. 
-Think about equity: Who is getting what?

Analysis:
-If the occurrence of a condition is required by the agreement of the parties, rather than as a matter of law, a rule of strict compliance traditionally applies. On the other hand, the rigor of this traditional principle of strict compliance has increasingly been tempered by the recognition that the occurrence of a condition may, in appropriate circumstances, be excused in order to avoid a disproportionate forfeiture.
-To the extent that the non-occurrence of a condition would cause disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse the non-occurrence of that condition unless its occurrence was a material part of the agreed exchange.
-In the absence of conduct that is “willful,” a contracting party may, despite his own departure from the specifications of his contract, enforce the obligations of the other party with whom he has dealt in good faith.
-In appropriate circumstances, a contracting party, despite his own default, may be entitled to relief from the rigorous enforcement of contract provisions that would otherwise amount to a forfeiture.
-A proper balance between the interests of the insurer and the insured requires a factual inquiry into whether, in the circumstances of a particular case, an insurer has been prejudiced by its insured’s delay in giving notice of an event triggering insurance coverage. If it can be shown that the insurer suffered no material prejudice from the delay, the nonoccurrence of the condition of timely notice may be excused because it is not a material part of the agreed exchange. Absent a showing of material prejudice, an insured’s failure to give timely notice does not discharge the insurer’s continuing duty to provide insurance coverage.

Conclusion:
-Trial court was correct in granting summary judgment, although not for the reason upon which it relied.

Kanavos v. Hancock Bank & Trust Co. case brief

Kanavos v. Hancock Bank & Trust Co
395 Mass. 199

Facts:
-D gave P right to acquire all the stock in an apartment complex before defendant would sell the stock to anyone else on the same terms and the option to match the price of sale of said property to extend for a 60-day period from the time an offer was received.
-Defendant entered into a purchase and sale agreement to sell the stock to a third person without giving plaintiff notice and the opportunity to purchase the stock
-The court determined that plaintiff must prove his ability to perform his concurrent obligations under the option contract and show his ability to finance the purchase of the stock.
-His ability to do so was an essential part of establishing defendant’s liability.
-The case was remanded because the question of plaintiff’s ability to purchase the stock should have been submitted to the jury

Procedural History:
-Defendant appealed from a decision of the Suffolk Superior Court (Massachusetts) imposing liability upon defendant for failing to give plaintiff proper notice of defendant’s intent to sell to a third party stock that plaintiff held an option to purchase.

Rule:
-When performance under a contact is concurrent, one party cannot put the other in default unless he is ready, willing and able to perform and has manifested this by some show of performance. (if X does not have money to pay Y, then Y would not be in default if they breach the K)


Analysis:
-The financial ability of a prospective buyer of property is a material issue in his action for damages against a repudiating defendant for breach of an agreement to sell that property for an established price.

Conclusion:
-Court remanded the case for a retrial to determine whether, if plaintiff had been given proper notice of his right to purchase the stock that he held an option to buy, he would have been ready, willing, and able to do so during the option period.

K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris case brief

K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris
223 Md. 305

Facts:
Subcontractor appellees damaged a wall in the course of their performance of a subcontract, and appellant contractor withheld partial payment as damages. The lower court awarded damages to appellees and the reviewing court reversed, holding that the failure of appellee’s performance to constitute substantial performance could justify the appellant in refusing to make a progress payment. If the refusal to pay an installment was justified on the appellant’s part, the appellee was not justified in abandoning work by reason of that refusal. His abandonment of the work would render him liable to the appellant for his increased cost since the further breach would itself be a wrongful repudiation that went to the essence, even if the defects in performance did not.

Procedural History:
Appeal from a decision of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Maryland) awarding appellee subcontractor damages after appellant subcontractor withheld an installment payment due to appellee after appellee’s failure to perform a portion of his work in a workmanlike manner.

Rule:
where there is a breach of a mutually dependent clause, the non-breaching party may suspend his performance, and the breaching party remains under a duty to continue to perform.
Promises are mutually dependent if the parties intend performance by one to be conditioned upon performance by the other, and, if they be mutually dependent, they may be (a) precedent, i.e., a promise that is to be performed before a corresponding promise on the part of the adversary party is to be performed, (b) subsequent, i.e., a corresponding promise that is not to be performed until the other party to the contract has performed a precedent covenant, or (c) concurrent, i.e., promises that are to be performed at the same time by each of the parties, who are respectively bound to perform each.

Analysis:
Promises and counter-promises made by the respective parties to a contract have are (1) independent of each other, or (2) mutually dependent, one upon the other. They are independent of each other if the parties intend that performance by each of them is in no way conditioned upon performance by the other. In other words, the parties exchange promises for promises, not the performance of promises for the performance of promises. A failure to perform an independent promise does not excuse non-performance on the part of the adversary party, but each is required to perform his promise, and, if one does not perform, he is liable to the adversary party for such non-performance.

Promises are mutually dependent if the parties intend performance by one to be conditioned upon performance by the other, and, if they be mutually dependent, they may be (a) precedent, i.e., a promise that is to be performed before a corresponding promise on the part of the adversary party is to be performed, (b) subsequent, i.e., a corresponding promise that is not to be performed until the other party to the contract has performed a precedent covenant, or (c) concurrent, i.e., promises that are to be performed at the same time by each of the parties, who are respectively bound to perform each.

There are three classes of independent promises: (1) those in which the acts to be performed by the respective parties are, by the terms of the contract, to be performed at fixed times or on the happening of certain events which do not bear any relation to one another; (2) those in which the covenant in question is independent because it does not form the entire consideration for the covenants on the part of the adversary party, and ordinarily forms but a minor part of such consideration; and (3) those in which the contract shows that the parties intended performance of their respective promises without regard to performance on the part of the adversary, thus relying upon the promises and not the performances.
While the courts assume, in deciding the relation of one or more promises in a contract to one or more counter-promises, that the promises are dependent rather than independent, the intention of the parties, as shown by the entire contract as construed in the light of the circumstances of the case, the nature of the contract, the relation of the parties thereto, and the other evidence which is admissible to assist the court in determining the intention of the parties, is the controlling factor in deciding whether the promises and counter-promises are dependent or independent

Outcome:
Judgment reversed and entered in favor of appellant because appellee’s abandonment of the work was a breach that would render him liable to appellant for damages even if the original defects in performance did not.

Walker & Co. v. Harrison case brief

Walker & Co. v. Harrison
347 Mich. 630

Facts:
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant for breach of a written contract between the parties for the lease of a sign advertising defendant’s business. Defendant stopped making payments to plaintiff after attempting to get plaintiff to maintain the sign as specified in a contract between the parties.
The court here found no valid ground for defendant’s repudiation and failure to make further payments to plaintiff. Defendant’s failure thereafter to comply with the terms of the contract was itself a material breach, entitling plaintiff to judgment. The court determined that there was no error in the judgment rendered against defendant for the cash price of the sign, for such services and maintenance as were extended and accepted, and interest upon the amount in default.

Procedural History
Defendant appealed from a judgment for plaintiff in a breach of contract action regarding the lease of an advertising sign that defendant obtained through a contract with plaintiff.

Rule:
a party attempting to repudiate a contract must convince the court that the other party has materially breached the contract.

Analysis:
In determining the materiality of a failure fully to perform a promise the following circumstances are influential: (a) The extent to which the injured party will obtain the substantial benefit which he could have reasonably anticipated; (b) The extent to which the injured party may be adequately compensated in damages for lack of complete performance; (c) The extent to which the party failing to perform has already partly performed or made preparations for performance; (d) The greater or less hardship on the party failing to perform in terminating the contract; (e) The willful, negligent or innocent behavior of the party failing to perform; (f) The greater or less uncertainty that the party failing to perform will perform the remainder of the contract.

Conclusion:
The court affirmed the judgment for plaintiff in a breach of contract action regarding the lease of an advertising sign, finding no error.

Ewing v. California case brief

Ewing v. California
538 U.S. 11, 123 S. Ct. 1179,155 L. Ed. 2d 108, 2003 U.S. 1952.

Subject: Three Strikes Laws

FACTS (A laundry list of convictions for this career criminal)
-While on parole, Defendant stole three golf clubs priced at $399.00 each.
-Prior to this incident, Defendant had committed several prior crimes.
-In 1984, D pleaded guilty to theft.
-In 1988, D was convicted of felony grand theft auto. However, the sentencing court reduced this crime to a misdemeanor after Defendant had served probation, permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea, and dismissed the case.
-In 1990, D was convicted of petty theft with a prior.
-In 1992, he was convicted of battery.
-One month later, Defendant was convicted of theft.
-In January of 1993, he was convicted of burglary.
-In February 1993, he was convicted of possessing drug paraphernalia.
-In July 1993, Defendant was convicted of appropriating lost property.
-In September 1993, he was convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm and trespassing.
-In October and November 1993, Defendant committed three burglaries and one robbery at a Long Beach, California, apartment complex over a 5-week period
-On December 9, 1993, Defendant was arrested on the premises of the apartment complex for trespassing and lying to a police officer. The knife used in the robbery and a glass cocaine pipe were later found in the back seat of the patrol car used to transport Defendant to the police station.
-After his conviction of first-degree robbery and three counts of residential burglary, D was sentenced to nine years and eight months in prison.
-While on parole for this conviction, Defendant stole the golf clubs at issue in this case.
-Defendant was convicted of one count of felony grand theft of personal property in excess of $400.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
-The trial court found, as required by the three strikes law, that D had been convicted previously of four serious or violent felonies for the three burglaries and the robbery in the Long Beach apartment complex.
-As a newly convicted felon with two or more “serious” or “violent” felony convictions in his past, Defendant was sentenced under the three strikes law of 25 years to life!

ISSUE
Does the Golden State’s three strikes law violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, which prohibits sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed?

HOLDING
-No ma'am. The judgment affirmed.
-The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is violated where the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime.
-The examination of a statute challenged on Eighth Amendment constitutional grounds must be guided by the following principles: “the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective factors–that inform the final one: The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”
-Three strikes laws have the clear purpose of isolating career criminals from the general population since traditional forms of deterrence have not been effective.
-The Constitution does not mandate the adoption of a single, specific penological scheme, but rather, the state legislatures must decide this themselves.
-Hence, California, upon determining that recidivism among criminals presents a serious public safety concern, properly enacted a statute designed to isolate the repeat offender for an extended period.
-Accordingly, Defendant’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the crime committed.

RULES
-Three strikes laws, which serve the legitimate goal of deterring and incapacitating repeat offenders, do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution’s (Constitution) prohibition on the imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.

DISSENT
Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stephens), with whom Justice David Souter (J. Souter), Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (J. Ginsburg) and Justice Stephen Breyer (J. Breyer) join, dissents. In direct disagreement with the concurrences, J. Stevens opines that the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution indeed “expresses a broad and basic proportionality principle that takes into account all of the justifications for penal sanctions.”


J. Breyer, with whom J. Souter, J. Ginsburg and J. Stevens join, dissents. J. Breyer opines that, Defendant’s recidivism notwithstanding, the sentence imposed is grossly disproportionate to the crime of stealing three golf clubs.

CONCURRENCE
Justice Antonin Scalia (J. Scalia) concurs in the judgment. J. Scalia believes that the principle of “proportionality” cannot be intelligently applied. He opines that since-as the majority acknowledges-a sentence can have a variety of justifications including incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation, it is insufficient to merely assess whether the gravity of the offense is proportionate to the harshness of the penalty. Certainly, in the present case, a sentence of 25 to life is not proportionate to the theft of three golf clubs. In short, J. Scalia advocates that instead of “read[ing] into the Eighth Amendment

Who do you agree with?  Share your thoughts in the comments section below!

Coker v. Georgia case brief

Coker v. Georgia
433 U.S. 584, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982, 1977 U.S. 146.

FACTS-The Defendant had been serving sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault when he escaped from prison.
-Defendant entered the home of Allen and Elnita Carver, threatened the couple, and tied up Mr. Carver in the bathroom.
-The Defendant obtained a knife in the kitchen and took Mr. Carver’s money and keys to the car.
-The Defendant raped Mrs. Carver and took her with him in the family car.
-Mr. Carver was able to free himself, and he called the police, who then apprehended the Defendant. Mrs. Carver was not harmed outside of the rape and kidnapping, that is, she was alive.
-The Defendant was charged with escape, armed robbery, motor vehicle theft, kidnapping and rape. -After convicted of all charges, D was sentenced to death under a Georgia statute permitting such a penalty if the jury finds certain aggravating factors.

ISSUEIs the imposition of the death penalty for rape unconstitutional?

HOLDING Yes.
-The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) forbids cruel and unusual punishment, i.e. punishments that are “excessive” in relation to the crime committed.
“A punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”
-A sentence of death for rape is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment and is therefore unconstitutional.

RULES “A punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”

ANALYSIS -Capital punishment for rape is unconstitutional.

DISSENT
-Justice Powell dissents in addition to concurring because he believes that the plurality has gone to far in holding that capital punishment is always a disproportionate penalty for rape.
-Chief Justice Burger, with whom Justice Rehnquist joins, dissents: In the Chief Justice’s view, the Eighth Amendment does not bar a state from taking into account one’s “well-demonstrated propensity for life-endangering behavior” in punishing the defendant. Further, it is not irrational nor constitutionally impermissible to penalize the defendant more severely than the criminal act it punishes in order to deter wrongdoing.

CONCURRENCE
-Justices Brennan and Marshall concur because they believe the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in all cases.
-Justice Powell concurs that the punishment of death for rape is wrong in this specific case.

United States v. Jackson case brief

United States v. Jackson
835 F.2d 1195, 1987 U.S. App. 16817.

Notes:  The professor will probably focus on policy on this case.  It is an early criminal law case in which the idea of deterrence is discussed. 

FACTS -The Defendant had been serving a sentence of imprisonment for the robbery of two banks.
-Thirty minutes after his release from prison, he committed another bank robbery.
-D was back in jail before sundown on his day of release.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
-The District Court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under a statue forbidding the possession of weapons by career criminals, and the Defendant appealed on the ground that the statute permitted a sentence of a determinate number of years but not a life sentence without the possibility of parole.

ISSUE Did the Court properly sentence the Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole?

HOLDING Yes. Affirmed.
-Specific deterrence had failed for this Defendant.
-The Court was therefore permitted to consider general deterrence and incapacitation.
-The statute under which the D was sentenced did not have a stated maximum sentence. However, life imprisonment without parole and a long term of imprisonment serve the same purpose since the Defendant was 35 years of age at the time of the crime.
-To read the statute as authorizing a long term of imprisonment measured in a number of years but not a life sentence is absurd.
-The Defendant’s sentence was not inappropriate.

RULES -The imposition of life imprisonment for a career criminal is permissible.

ANALYSIS-The principles of deterrence and incapacitation permit imprisoning a repeat offender for life.

CONCURRENCE
-The Defendant should not be imprisoned for life.
-A 20-year prison sentence will adequately serve the aim of deterrence, because a 55-year-old man is unlikely to commit robbery.

People v. Superior Court (DU) case brief

People v. Superior Court (DU)5 Cal. App. 4th 822, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 1992 Cal. App. 525, 92 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3464.

Author's Note:  This case contains graphic content that may not be suitable for children.  Parental discretion is advised.

FACTS -March 16, 1991: the D was working at the Empire Liquor Market, one of two convenience stores owned and operated by the D.
-On that day, the D was working at Empire so that her son could work at the other store owned by the family because her son had recently been threatened by local gang members.
-Defendant was waiting on two customers when Harlins entered the store.
-Harlins proceeded to the section of the store where juice was kept and she selected a bottle of orange juice, put it in her backpack and proceeded to the checkout.
-Although the orange juice was in Harlins’ backpack, it was partially visible.
-As Harlins approached the counter with two or three dollars in her hand, the Defendant called her a “b--ch” and asked Harlins to pay for the juice.
-When Harlins responded “what juice?” the Defendant concluded that Harlins was attempting to shoplift.
-The Defendant began pulling on Harlan’s sweater in an attempt to retrieve the bottle of juice. As a
result, the two women struggled and, eventually, Harlins ended up striking the Defendant twice in the eye with her fist.
-The Defendant fell to the ground and testified later that Harlins told her that she would be killed.
-the Defendant subsequently picked up a stool from behind the counter and threw it in the direction or Harlins, narrowly missing.
-The D then grabbed a .38 caliber revolver.
-Harlins put the juice back on the counter and proceeded to exit the store.
-As Harlins tried to exit the store, the D shot her in the back of the head, killing her instantly.

ISSUE-Should the D be convicted on the charge of voluntary manslaughter despite her allegation that she acted in self-defense?
-If convicted, should the Defendant be given probation or sentenced to state prison?

HOLDING-The jury found the Defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter and rejected the Defendant’s defenses that the killing was unintentional and that the Defendant killed in self-defense.
-After the Defendant’s conviction, the case was referred to a Los Angeles County Probation Officer, who prepared a pre-sentence probation report.
-The probation officer’s final conclusion and recommendation was that probation be denied and the Defendant be sentenced to state prison.

RULES -Any self-defense claim will be heavily scrutinized and only applied in limited situations.

ANALYSIS-Much of this decision focuses on the probation report compiled by the Los Angeles Probation Officer.
-In the probation officer's report, the officer detailed the fact that the Defendant and her family had moved from Korea and, eventually, purchased the Empire store despite being told that it was in a “bad area.”
-Furthermore, the report stated that the Defendant’s family often had problems with harassment from gang members, including an incident in 1990 when gang members robbed their son at the store. -Alternatively, the probation report revealed that Harlins had experienced an unusually hard life, including the violent death of her mother.
-The probation report concluded that, although the Defendant would most likely not repeat this crime in the future, she expressed very little remorse for the victim and her family.
-The recommendation that the Defendant be sentenced to prison rather than probation seemingly revolved around her lack of sympathy for the victim.

State v. Ragland case brief

State v. Ragland105 N.J. 189, 519 A.2d 1361, 1986 N.J. 1259

TOPICS
Jury Nullification, Judge using the word "must", Criminal Law.

FACTS-Defendant was charged with various offenses, including armed robbery and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon.
-At trial's conclusion, the judge instructed the jury that it “must” convict of the possession charge if it found that the Defendant possessed a weapon during the commission of the robbery.
-The jury convicted the Defendant of, among other things, armed robbery and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, and this appeal ensued on the issue of whether the judge’s use of the word “must” deprived the Defendant of the jury’s nullification power, an essential attribute of his constitutional right to a jury trial.

ISSUE-Did the trial court improperly instruct the jury that it must convict of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon if it finds that the defendant possessed a weapon during the robbery?

HOLDINGNo, but the conviction for possession was reversed and a new trial was ordered on other grounds not recounted in the opinion.

RULESThe jury’s right to acquit, despite overwhelming evidence of guilt, is not a right of the accused but rather a power of the jury.
-A jury may acquit a defendant despite overwhelming proof of guilt. This practice, commonly referred to as jury nullification, is certainly a power the jury has.
-Jury nullification is not desirable.
-The legislature has defined criminal conduct, and while twelve people picked as jurors may see a law as unjust or a particular application of a law as unfair, they are not in the best position to revise the law.  The legislature is elected to perform such a duty.
-The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that jury nullification is not, as the defendant argues, a constitutionally protected attribute of the right to trial by jury. A jury simply has the power to nullify the law by acquitting a person believed to be guilty.
-It was not error for the judge to instruct the jury as he did.

ANALYSIS-The chance that the jury will nullify the law by acquitting a defendant the jury believes to be guilty is one benefit for the defendant of trial by jury.
-However, the jury has no more than the power to nullify.
-The Defendant does not have a right to have the judge “advertise” the jury's power to nullify.

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan case brief

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 (1935)

FACTS -Section:9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 authorized the President of the United States,

“to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced to withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any state law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation of an order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by a fine, not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment not to exceed six months, or both.”

-The President issued the foregoing prohibition by Executive Order, and then authorized the Secretary of Interior to exercise all of the powers vested in the President under Section:9(c).
-The Secretary of Interior then issued regulations to carry out the President’s orders, which required all petroleum producers to file monthly statements, under oath, with the Division of Investigations of the Department of the Interior.
-The President also approved a “Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry,” and designated the Secretary of Interior with all of the powers vested in him under the Act and the Code. -Section:9(c) was challenged on the ground that it was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by Congress.

ISSUE Was the delegation of power to the President under Section:9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power?

HOLDING -Yes.
-The attempted delegation was plainly void because the power sought to be delegated was legislative power. 
-Congress did not declare or indicate anywhere in the statute any policy or standard to guide or limit the President when acting under the delegation.

RULES -There are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend. Although the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, Congress is forbidden to delegate the essential legislative functions which it is vested by Article I, Section:1 and Article I, Section:8 of the United States Constitution.
ANALYSIS-The Executive Orders and regulations issued by the Secretary of Interior were void because the delegation of power to the President under Section:9(c) was without constitutional authority.

DISSENT
Cardozo: The “declaration of policy” in Section:1 of the Act, stating that there was a national emergency, was a sufficient definition of a standard to make the statute valid.

Franklin v. Anna National Bank of Anna case brief

Franklin v. Anna National Bank of Anna
140 Ill. App. 3d 533, 94 Ill. Dec. 870, 488 N.E.2d 1117 (App. Ct. 1986)

FACTS -Whitehead and Goddard went the bank on April 17, 1978 where Goddard signed a signature card for a savings account.
-Goddard stated that the two went to the bank to have Whitehead’s money put in both their names so she could get money when they needed it.
-Whitehead claimed that Goddard wanted her to have the money if she outlived him.
-The signatures of Whitehead and Goddard appeared on both sides of the card.
-The name of Whitehead’s late wife was “whited out” on the card and Goddard’s signature was added.
-The back of the card stated that all funds deposited were owned by signatories as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.
-The plaintiff began to care for Whitehead later in 1978.
-January of 1979: Nine months after adding Goddard’s name to the savings account, Whitehead attempted to remove Goddard’s name and substitute Franklin’s name.
-In a letter dated January 13, 1979, Whitehead wrote, “I Frank Whitehead want Enola Stevens and me only go in my lock box. Account type Saving and Checking. In case I can’t see she is to take care of my bill or sick.”
-Goddard testified that she did not make any deposits or withdrawals.

ISSUE -Is there clear and convincing evidence that a gift was not intended when a joint tenancy account is created?

HOLDING -Yes.
-Decedent did not intend to make a gift through the joint account.
-There must be clear and convincing evidence that a gift was intended based upon the events relating back to the time of the creation of the joint tenancy and events occurring after the creation of the joint tenancy.
-The deceased intended to keep the account as his own because he made repeated attempts to change the name on the account and put Goddard’s name and later Franklin’s name on the account in the event that he could not get his money.
-The deceased was afraid of losing his eyesight.
-Furthermore, Goddard never exercised any control over the account after it was established.

RULES -A joint tenancy account presumptively creates a gift unless the party claiming otherwise proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that a gift was not intended.

ANALYSIS
-In this case there was evidence in the form of written letters that the decedent believed he may go blind soon and consequently appointed others to help him with his financial affairs.
-The decedent was not making a gift but was rather in such a condition that it behooved him to put another person’s name on his account to carry out his affairs.

Gruen v. Gruen case brief

Gruen v. Gruen 68 N.Y.2d 48, 505 N.Y.S.2d 849, 496 N.E.2d 869 (1986)

FACTS -Plaintiff’s father wrote a letter to the Plaintiff on his birthday in which he stated that he was giving his son a Klimit painting but that he wished to retain possession of the painting for his lifetime. -Plaintiff was later instructed to destroy this letter in two subsequent letters sent by his father.
-One of the subsequent letters provided that Plaintiff was to be given the painting and made no mention of his father’s retention of a life estate.
-Plaintiff never took possession of the painting during his father’s lifetime.
-Following his father’s death Plaintiff requested the Klimit painting from his step mother, Defendant, and she refused. Plaintiff then brought this case.

ISSUE -Can a valid inter vivos gift of chattel, where the donor has reserved a life estate in the chattel and the donee never had physical possession of it before the donor’s death, be made?

HOLDING Yes. Affirmed.
-A valid inter vivos gift of chattel may be made even if the donor reserves a life estate in the chattel for himself.
-The elements of a valid inter vivos gift are present in this case and therefore Plaintiff is the rightful owner of the painting.

RULES -Intent + Delivery + Acceptance = valid inter-vivos gift.
-In order to have a valid inter vivos gift one must show an intent of the part of the donor to make a present transfer, delivery of the gift, and acceptance by the donee.
-A present transfer may include the creation of a remainder in chattel.

ANALYSIS -In order to have a valid inter vivos gift there must be clear and convincing evidence of: (a) an intent on the part of the donor to make the present transfer; (b) delivery of the gift- actual or constructive; and (c) acceptance by the donee.
-If the intention is to make a testamentary disposition effective only after death the gift is invalid unless made in a will.
-However, if the maker intended the gift to transfer some present interest then it will not fail for lack of intent.
-In the present case the P’s father transferred a present interest, the remainder after his life estate, when he wrote the letters to his son.
-Delivery may be either by a physical delivery of the subject of the gift or some constructive or symbolic delivery that divests the donor of dominion or control.
-The circumstances of each case must be observed to see what is sufficient to constitute delivery.
-In this case, physical delivery was not required as it would have been impractical.
-When a gift is of value to the donee the law will presume an acceptance.

Barcelo v. Elliot case brief

Barcelo v. Elliot
923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996)

FACTS
-Frances Barcelo retained David Elliot (D) to assist her with estate planning.
-Defendant drafted a will and inter vivos trust agreement for Frances Barcelo.
-Barcelo signed the will and trust agreement in September 1990 and passed away in January 1991. -Two of Barcelo’s children contested the validity of the trust and it was declared invalid and unenforceable.
-Barcelo’s grandchildren (Ps), who were the intended remainder beneficiaries under the trust, settled for an amount substantially smaller than they would have received under the trust.
-Plaintiffs subsequently filed a malpractice action against the Defendant alleging his negligence caused the trust to be invalid.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
-The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs now appeal.

ISSUE
-Does an attorney who negligently drafts a will or trust agreement owe a duty of care to the person intended to benefit under the will or trust, even though the attorney never represented the intended beneficiaries?

HOLDING
No. Judgement Affirmed.
-An attorney retained by a testator or settlor to draft a will or trust owes no professional duty of care to persons named as beneficiaries under the will or trust.

RULES
-Intended beneficiaries of a will or trust will be denied a cause of action for legal malpractice against the attorney retained by the testator as there is no professional duty of care owed to such persons.

ANALYSIS
-At common law an attorney owes a duty of care only to his or her client and not to third parties.
-This “privity barrier” helps protect the attorney-client relationship.
-While many courts have relaxed the barrier in the estate planning context, the Court in this case was unwilling to do so.
-The Court believes that the greater good is served by preserving a bright line “privity barrier” in order to ensure that attorneys can represent their clients without threat of suit from third parties.

DISSENTS
-Spector: It is sound public policy to recognize a limited cause of action for intended beneficiaries of wills or trusts. Such a cause of action would require attorneys to exercise due care in implementing estate plans, otherwise they will be accountable to no one.


-Cornyn: Intended beneficiaries of a will or trust may bring a cause of action against an attorney that caused them to lose a legacy in whole or in part. Intended beneficiaries are foreseeable plaintiffs. In addition, lawyers wishing to protect themselves for what might be the testator’s wishes rather than a lawyer’s mistake can do so by documenting the testator’s intentions.

Hotz v. Minyard case brief

Hotz v. Minyard304 S.C. 225, 403 S.E.2d 634 (1991)

FACTS
-October 24, 1984, Dobson, Respondent, a South Carolina Lawyer, drafted decedent’s will.
-Decedent had a daughter, Judy, and a son, Tommy.
-Decedent owned two automobile dealerships, the Greenville Dealership and the Anderson Dealership.
-In decedent’s first will, he left the Greenville Dealership to his son, gave other family members bequests totaling $250,000, and divided the remainder of his estate equally between his son and a trust for his daughter, Appellant.
-The afternoon that decedent executed his first will, he returned to respondent’s office and signed a second will containing the same provisions as the first will except that it gave real estate upon which the Greenville Dealership was located to Tommy outright.
-Decedent instructed respondent not to disclose the existence of the second will and specifically directed that Appellant not be told about it.
-January 1985: appellant called respondent requesting a copy of the will her father had signed the morning of October 24, 1984 and with decedent’s permission, respondent discussed the first will with appellant in detail.
-Respondent explained decedent’s intent to provide for appellant as he had for his son when and if she became capable of handling a dealership and respondent made notations to this effect on the copy of the will he discussed with appellant.
-Appellant claims respondent told her that the will she was shown was in actuality decedents last will and testament and appellant believed the handwritten notes were part of the will.
-Respondent denies making that express statement but admits that he never told her the will he discussed with appellant had been revoked.
-January 1986: decedent was admitted to the hospital for various health problems and while decedent was ill, appellant and her brother decided appellant would care for decedent while he temporarily ran the Anderson Dealership.
-Appellant questioned her brother’s financial dealing while he was running the Anderson Dealership and consulted an Anderson law firm regarding her concerns.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
-Respondent was granted summary judgment on the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Appellant appeals.

ISSUE
-Did the decedent’s attorney breach his fiduciary duty to Appellant by following decedent’s wishes and not disclosing the existence of a second will to the Appellant?

HOLDING
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
-Summary judgment was improperly granted because there was a factual issue presented as to whether the attorney breached his fiduciary duty to Appellant.
-Although the attorney represented the decedent and not the appellant, he did have an on-going attorney/client relationship with Appellant and there’s evidence that Appellant had a special confidence in him.
-While the attorney owed no duty to disclose the existence of decedent’s second will, the attorney did owe the Appellant the duty to deal with her in good faith and not actively misrepresent the first will.
-The grant of summary judgment was reversed on the cause of action for vicarious liability against Law Firm because there is no evidence that he was acting in his capacity as an accountant on the occasion in question since he was giving legal advice and no rendering accounting services.

RULES
A fiduciary relationship exists when one has a special confidence in another so that the latter, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good faith.

ANALYSIS
An attorney/client relationship is, by nature, a fiduciary relationship.

Ford v. Ford case brief

Ford v. Ford
307 Md. 105, 512 A.2d 389 (1986)

FACTS
-Respondent (D) murdered her mother by stabbing her 40 times.
-Under the criminal law D was found guilt of murder in the first degree, however D was also found not criminally responsible by reason of insanity.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
-The trial court in which the will was admitted to probate ruled that Petitioner be declared the heir of the estate.
-Appeal: the Circuit Court reversed and decided that Respondent was entitled to the property. Petitioner now appeals.

ISSUE
Can an individual who kills another share in the distribution of the decedent’s estate when the individual was insane at the time of the killing?

HOLDING
Yes. Affirmed.
-The slayer’s rule does not apply in the context of a killing committed by an insane individual because for a homicide to be felonious in the context of the rule it must be one for which the killer is criminally responsible under Maryland’s criminal insanity test.
-Even though a killing may be intentional if it is not felonious the slayer's rule does not apply and the individual may share in the distribution of the estate.

RULES
The Slayer's Rule, which prevents an individual who commits a felonious and intentional homicide from sharing in the distribution of the decedent’s estate, is not applicable when the killer was not criminally responsible for their conduct at the time they committed the homicide.

ANALYSIS
-The slayer’s rule provides that a person who kills another may not share in the distribution of the decedent’s estate when the homicide is felonious and intentional.
-The individual may share in the distribution when the homicide is unintentional even thought it may be the result of gross negligence.
-This rule is a reflection of the common-law principle of equity that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, to take advantage of his own wrong, to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.
-Slayer's Rule is found inapplicable when a person is criminally insane and allowing the individual to inherit is consistent with principles of equity.

DISSENT
-Respondent (D) should be disqualified as devisee under her mother’s will because an actor’s conduct remains wrongful notwithstanding a finding of insanity.
-An insane killer can commit a felonious act since the finding of insanity is not tantamount to an absence of mens rea or lack of intent to commit a crime. Therefore the slayer’s rule, which bars an individual from profiting from his own wrongs, is still applicable.

Shapira v. Union National Bank case brief

Shapira v. Union National Bank
39 Ohio Misc. 28, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Com. Pl. 1974)

FACTSDavid Shapira, M.D., the testator, conditioned his son, Daniel Jacob Shapira, (P), inheritance under his will upon Plaintiff being married to, or marrying within seven years of testator’s death, a Jewish girl with two Jewish parents.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the condition was unconstitutional, based upon the premise that the right to marry is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

ISSUE-Is a condition upon inheritance, based on marriage, unconstitutional, contrary to public policy, and unenforceable because of its unreasonableness?

HOLDING -No.
-Upholding and enforcing the provisions of the decedent’s will conditioning the bequests to his sons upon their marrying Jewish girls does not offend the Constitution of Ohio or the United States.
-The conditions contained in decedent’s will are reasonable restrictions. His unmistakable testamentary plan was for his possessions to be used to encourage the preservation of the Jewish faith.
-The condition did not pressure plaintiff into marriage by the reward of money because the seven year time limit is a reasonable grace period, which would give plaintiff ample time for reflection and fulfillment of the condition without constraint or oppression.

RULES-A gift conditioned upon the beneficiary marrying within a particular religious class or faith is reasonable.

ANALYSIS
-It is a fundamental rule of law in Ohio that a testator may legally disinherit his children. This demonstrates that, from a constitutional standpoint, a testator may restrict a child’s inheritance.

Yesler Terrace Community v. Cisneros case brief

Yesler Terrace Community v. Cisnerosa
37 F.3d 442 (9th Cir. 1994)

FACTS
-HUD determined that Washington’s state court eviction procedures satisfied the elements of due process, allowing the public housing authorities to evict tenants accused of criminal activity without first affording them an informal grievance hearing.
-March, 1992: the Seattle Housing Authority served Davidson with an eviction notice stating that she would not be afforded a grievance hearing because her eviction was due to alleged criminal activity.
-Davidson and Yesler (P) brought suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming HUD’s determination was invalid because it was made without giving public housing tenants notice and an opportunity to comment.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
-The district court granted summary judgment for HUD.

ISSUE(S)
-Did P have standing to bring this action?
-Pursuant to Section:10.1, was HUD required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures in making the determination that Washington state court eviction procedures met HUD’s due process standards?

HOLDING
-Yes, case reversed and remanded.
-Plaintiffs had an injury-in-fact, the injury was traceable to HUD’s action, and Plaintiffs’ interests in the terms and conditions of their tenancies fell within the zone of interests protected by the statutes they alleged HUD violated. Therefore, Plaintiffs had standing.
-Yes. When HUD decided that Washington’s state eviction procedures satisfy the basic due process elements, it promulgated a substantive rule. Since it did so without providing notice and an opportunity to comment as required by its own Section:10.1 regulation, the rule thus promulgated was invalid.

RULES/ANALYSIS
-Adjudications resolve disputes among specific individuals; rulemaking affects the rights of broad classes of unspecified individuals.
-HUD’s own requirements under Section:10.1 mandate that HUD proceed by notice and comment rule making whenever it promulgates a substantive rule.
-In this case, HUD’s determination had no immediate, concrete effect on anyone, but affected the rights of a broad category of individuals that were not yet identified. Therefore, HUD’s determination was a rule, subject to the notice and comment requirement.

DISSENT
-Plaintiffs had no standing to challenge HUD’s action because none of them were actually threatened with an eviction stemming from drug-related or other criminal activities, and therefore suffered no injury-in-fact.

Londoner v. Denver case brief

Londoner v. Denver
210 U.S. 373, 28 S. Ct. 708, 52 L. Ed. 1103 (1908)

FACTS
-Denver's charter empowered the city to make local improvements and assess the cost upon the properties specially benefited.
-The plaintiffs owned corner lots and were assessed a tax for paving done to the street which their land abutted.
-Under the charter, the city clerk was to notify the owners of real estate to be assessed by publication for ten days in a general circulation newspaper.
-In this case, notice did not fix the time for a hearing, but stated that written complaints filed within thirty days would be heard before the city council before the passage of any ordinance assessing the cost.
-Plaintiffs filed a timely paper with objections, but instead of affording them an opportunity to be heard upon their allegations, the city council's board met and adopted a resolution to assess the tax. -Plaintiffs sought relief from the tax in the State Court of Colorado, claiming the process of assessing the tax denied them due process of law.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The trial court granted relief to the plaintiffs, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax assessed was in conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the State.

ISSUE
Was there a denial of due process of law, guaranteed by the Constitution, and was the assessment valid?

HOLDING
-The assessment was void, as plaintiffs were not allowed an opportunity to be heard and therefore denied due process of law.
-The hearing requirement was not met by plaintiffs’ submission of their brief.  Due process requires that Plaintiffs have the opportunity to support their allegations by argument and, if necessary, by proof.
-A hearing was denied to plaintiffs in error.

RULES/ANALYSIS
-Few constitutional restrictions exist on states’ power to assess, apportion and collect taxes.
-However, where the legislature authorizes a subordinate body to make a determination of the tax, due process of law that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the taxpayer be afforded a hearing, of which he must have notice.
-The hearing requirement is not satisfied by the mere right to file objections.

People v. Hall case brief

People v. Hall
999 P.2d 207 (2000)
 

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Facts	Hall (D) was skiing and ran into Cobb. Cobb died from the collision. It was said that Hall was probably skiing to fast and not looking where he was going. Hall was arrested and charged with felony reckless manslaughter (involuntary manslaughter).
Procedural History	At a preliminary hearing, the Trial Judge dismissed the charges. Prosecutor appealed. Trial Judge found Hall's conduct did not rise to the level of dangerousness required under Colorado law. Appeal: Trial Court affirmed the dismissal. The prosecutor appealed. The Trial Court found that Hall may have been negligent, but that wasn't enough to make him criminally culpable. For that, his conduct would need to rise to the level of recklessness. The difference, under Colorado law, was that Hall's conduct would have needed to be "at least more likely than not" to cause a death. Skiing too fast generally does not result in someone dying. "For his conduct to be reckless, the actor must have consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death could result from his actions." The Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a trial. The Colorado Supreme Court found that "substantial" did not mean "more likely than not" and so the Trial Judge was in error. The Court found that a reasonable person could have concluded that Hall's skiing could have a substantial risk of causing death. The Court concluded that, because Hall had no good reason for skiing like a maniac, a reasonable person could have concluded that the risk was unjustifiable. The Court found that a reasonable person could conclude that Hall's conduct was a "gross deviation from the standard of care" that a reasonable skier would take. The Court found that a reasonable person could conclude that Hall consciously disregarded the risk. On remand, the Trial Court found Hall innocent of reckless manslaughter, but convicted him of the lesser charge of negligent homicide.
Issue	Was D guilty of reckless manslaughter?
Holding	No, here the D was charged with negligent homicide.
Rules	Basically, this case said that there are four elements to showing the minimum culpability for involuntary manslaughter: The activity has a substantial risk of causing death. The activity has a risk that is not justifiable. The risk must be a gross deviation from the standard of care. The actor must consciously disregard the risk.
Analysis	The D’s conduct created a risk that was substantial (did not need to be 50%) and unjustifiable (merely for own enjoyment). A reasonable person would have known that the speed and lack of ability to stop created a risk. Given his training and experience, it is also reasonable to infer that the D was aware of the risk that his skiing created and he disregarded that risk intentionally (rises to the level of recklessness rather than criminal negligence).
Notes	People v. Hall (full case)

People v. Goetz case brief

People v. Goetz
68 N.Y.2d 96, 497 N.E.2d 41 (1986)

Facts	Goetz (D) was worried about getting mugged and so he carried a gun with him on the subway. Four youths approached him and one said, "Give me five dollars." Goetz responded by shooting and wounding all four of the youths. Goetz surveyed the scene, and realizing that one of the youths wasn't wounded, went back and shot him again. Goetz claimed he was being robbed, and then fled the scene, although he later turned himself in. Goetz argued that he was shooting in self-defense.
Procedural History	The prosecutor told the Grand Jury that in order to be self-defense under New York law (Penal Law §35.15), a person must reasonably believe that the victim was about to use deadly force, or is committing a kidnapping, forcible rape, or robbery. The prosecutor clarified that the jury should read the term reasonably believe as "whether the defendant's conduct was that of a reasonable man in the defendant's situation." (the objective standard) The Grand Jury charged Goetz with attempted murder, assault and weapons possession. The Trial Court dismissed all the charged. The prosecutor appealed. The Trial Court found that the prosecutor had instructed the jury incorrectly. Under §35.15, the proper question was whether the defendant's reactions were reasonable to him, not reasonable to a reasonable person. (the subjective standard). A subjective standard would allow the jury to consider factors specific to Goetz, like the fact he had been mugged before and was extra scared. The Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal. The prosecutor appealed. The New York Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the charges.
Issue	Whether the defendant's reactions were reasonable to him, not reasonable to a reasonable person. (the subjective standard)
Holding	Jurors are now told to consider a defendant's background and to consider whether a reasonable person would feel imperiled if that reasonable person was the defendant.
Rules	The New York Supreme Court noted that under Model Penal Code §3.04(2)(b) a defendant charged with murder (or attempted murder) need only show that he believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to protect himself to prevail on a self-defense claim (subjective standard) However, if the defendant's belief was reckless or negligent, he could still be charge with a lesser offense, like manslaughter. See also Model Penal Code §3.09.
Analysis	The Court held that to use an entirely subjective test to determine whether a defendant appropriately used deadly physical force would be very dangerous, in that it would permit a jury to acquit every defendant who believed that his actions were reasonable, regardless of how bizarre the rationale. The Court explained that the justification statute requires an objective element, in that deadly physical force is only permissible if a reasonable person would believe that he is in imminent fear of serious physical injury or death. This would prevent the slippery slope of a different reasonable test necessary for every single defendant claiming justification. With respect to the lower court's alternate theory for dismissal, the perjury issue, the Court held that there was no basis for the lower court to suspect perjury, and that there was no basis in statute or case law permitting a dismissal merely because new information comes to light which may lead a defendant's acquittal. Therefore, the Court reversed the lower court on both grounds, and reinstated all counts of the indictment.
Notes	The Trial Court convicted Goetz of carrying an unlicensed concealed weapon, but acquitted him of all other counts. However, the youths sued Goetz and won $43M.

Transcript of Court's Decision

Case Briefs for Criminal Law

Criminal Law Case Briefs

B. (A Minor) v. Director of Public Prosecutions case brief - 1 All E.R. 833 (2000)
Boro v. Superior Court case brief - 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1985)
Cheek v. United States case brief - 498 U.S. 192 (1991)
Clark v. Arizona case brief - 548 U.S. 735 (2006)
Commonwealth v. Atencio case brief - 345 Mass. 627, 189 N.E.2d 323 (1963)Commonwealth v. Carroll case brief - 412 Pa. 525, 194 A.2d 911 (1963)
Commonwealth v. Fischer case brief - 721 A.2d 1111 (1998)
Commonwealth v. Malone case brief - 354 Pa. 180, 47 A.2d 445 (1946)
Commonwealth v. Root case brief - 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961)
Commonwealth v. Sherry case brief - 386 Mass. 682, 437 N.E.2d 224 (1982)
Commonwealth v. Welansky case brief - 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944)
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health case brief - 497 U.S. 261 (1989)
Girouard v. State case brief - 321 Md. 532, 583 A.2d 718 (1991)
Hicks v. United States case brief - 150 U.S. 442 (1893)
Hines v. State case brief - 267 Ga. 491, 578 S.E.2d 868 (2003)
Jones v. United States case brief - 308 F.2d 307 (1962)
Lambert v. California case brief - 355 U.S. 225 (1957)
M'Naghten's Case brief - 10 CL & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843)
Maher v. People case brief - 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dec. 781 (1862)
Martin v. State case brief - 31 Ala. App. 334, 12 So.2d 427 (1944)
 McCleskey v. Kemp case brief - 481 U.S. 279, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 95 L. Ed.2d 262 (1987)
Morissette v. United States case brief - 342 U.S. 246 (1952)
People v. Acosta case brief - 284 Cal.Rptr. 117 (1991)
People v. Arzon case brief - 92 Misc.2d 739, 401 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1978)
People v. Burton case brief - 6 Cal.3d 375, 491 P.2d 793 (1971) 
People v. Campbell case brief - 124 Mich.App. 333, 335 N.W.2d 27 (1983)
People v. Casassa case brief - 49 N.Y.2d 668, 404 N.E.2d 1310 (1980)
People v. Dlugash case brief - 41 N.Y.2d 725, 363 N.E.2d 1155 (1977)
People v. Evans case brief  - 85 Misc. 2d 1088, 379 N.Y.S. 2d 912 (1975)

Free Tort Law Outlines

Free Torts Outlines

Tort outlines generally cover the same information.  However, you should pay close attention to what your professor teaches, as that material is what will be on the exam.  Some professors pay closer attention to some topics than other professors, and some skip certain information.  However, it is a good idea to compare the information on your outline to others to make sure you got the law correct.  These tort law outlines should be able to help you with that.  That being said, I do not claim that they all have valid law, that is why it is important to compare multiple sources.  Good luck!

1.  Barnett - Fall 1998 - Tort Law Outline
2.  Barnett - Fall 1999 - Tort Law Outline
3.  Barnett - Fall 1999 - Tort Law Outline
4.  Barnett - Fall 1999 - Tort Law Outline
5.  Barnett - Fall 2000 - Tort Law Outline
6.  Barnett - Spring 2002 - Tort Law Outline
7.  Barnett - Spring 2003 - Tort Law Outline
8.  Diamond - 2000-2002 - Tort Law Outline
9.  Gordley - Spring 1998 - Tort Law Outline
10.  McGovern - Spring 2003 - Tort Law Outline
11.  McGovern - Spring 2003(2) - Tort Law Outline
12.  Moran - Fall 1998 - Tort Law Outline
13.  Moran - Fall 1999 -  Tort Law Outline
14.  Sugarman - Fall 2002 - Tort Law Outline
15.  Tort Law Outline
16.  Popper - WCL_American - Tort Law Outline
17.  Sharkey - NYU - Tort Law Outline
18.  Bell - Rutgers Newark - Tort Law Outline
19.  Scordado - Fall 2005 - Tort Law Outline
20.  University of Michigan - Tort Law Outline

A.F.A. Tours, Inc. v. Whitchurch case brief

A.F.A. Tours, Inc. v. Whitchurch
937 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1991).

Facts	-A.F.A. Tours, Inc. (P) sued its former employee Whitchurch (D). -Plaintiff alleged that Defendant stole confidential information such as customer lists from Plaintiff after Defendant ceased employment with Plaintiff. -Plaintiff further alleged that Defendant used or intended to use such information in order to compete with Plaintiff. -Plaintiff requested compensatory damages in excess of $50,000 and punitive damages of $250,000. -New York law allowed punitive damages if there was willful and wanton misappropriation. -Defendant argued that the plaintiff did not satisfy the jurisdictional amount because he only acquired two customers signatures on tours and that the information that he used was not confidential.
Procedural History	-Whitchurch (D) moved for summary judgment. -The district court granted the motion on the grounds that there was no possible way that any fact finder would award damages to T.F.A. Tours and no possible basis for reaching the fifty thousand dollar amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. -A.F.A. Tours appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. It contended that the dismissal was improper because the trial court failed to provide an opportunity to show that it satisfied the jurisdictional amount, and failed to apply the proper standard to A.F.A. Tours’ requests for damages and injunctive relief.
Issue	What is required for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity?
Holding	The Supreme Court of the United States established this test in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co. Federal district courts have jurisdiction over diversity actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs. The court can impose costs on the claimant if the claim is later found to be less than $50,000. In this case A.F.A. Tours was not afforded ample opportunity to prove that its claim could have exceeded $50,000.
Rules	Unless provided otherwise by law, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. In order to justify dismissal, it must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount.
Analysis	-The judgment is vacated and remanded for further proceedings. In order to justify dismissal, a district court must show to a legal certainty that a plaintiff cannot recover the jurisdictional amount. -A plaintiff must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to show that it has a good faith belief that it is reasonably possible for the plaintiff to recover in excess of the jurisdictional amount. -In this situation, Plaintiff showed that if Defendant were eventually successful in acquiring 2% of Plaintiff’s entire clientele, the Plaintiff’s damages could be $51,000. In addition, the record could support a finding of punitive damages, which would meet the jurisdictional amount as well.